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Chapter 1
Introduction
Investment is one of the key figures in determining the business cycle as well
as in facilitating long-term economic growth. Despite the relative importance
of the topic and the amount of research conducted, economists’ knowledge
and understanding of micro-level and aggregate investment decisions are far
from being conclusive. The neo-classical approach, that assumes the exis-
tence of a representative firm which trades oﬀ gains in firm value against the
(continuous and convex) costs associated with changes in its stock of capital,
has proved not very successful empirically. Two major theoretical reasons
why the workhorse of the neo-classical investment theory, the quadratic-
adjustment cost, q-theoretic model, performs so relatively poorly have been
established in the literature.
The first reason put forth, relies on the hypothesis that capital markets
are imperfect. This forces firms in their investment activities to consider
the investment-funds available to them; and hence, investment decisions not
only depend on the fundamental profitability of investment projects. In fa-
vor of this view, a number of papers has found empirical evidence for high
cash-flows being a driving force in investment decisions. Moreover, this force
seems stronger for firms with low investment-funds. However, recent works
have questioned these results.1 The main point of criticism focuses on errors
1See Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Cummins et al. (1999), Erickson and Whited (2000)
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in measuring fundamental investment incentives, which may mislead econo-
metric findings. Yet, these arguments still typically do not rehabilitate the
neo-classical model.
Therefore another reason, why the neo-classical model might fail, has
seemed a more promising explanation: If investment is connected to some
fixed costs of adjusting the capital stock, then investment activity of firms
concentrates at a few points in time. Moreover, firm-expected investment is
no longer a linear or concave function in productivity of capital, but is convex.
Thus, higher order moments of the marginal productivity distribution (over
the firm population of an economy) play an important role in determining
aggregate investment.
However, as Gomes (2001) pointed out, without allowing for both finan-
cial frictions and non-convex investment-technologies, empirical evidence can
hardly discriminate between both theories: Fixed cost of capital adjustment
and fixed costs of financial transactions yield similar investment patterns.
Moreover, Holt (2003) has argued that financial frictions and fixed costs of
adjusting the stock of capital reinforce each other’s importance. Hence, in the
thesis at hand we merge both the financial frictions and the fixed adjustment
costs approach.
Only by allowing for both elements, we are able to diﬀerentiate between
the financial transaction cost and the fixed adjustment cost model. Moreover,
by incorporating both eﬀects we can directly address the seemingly contradic-
tory observation that finance has a quite low influence on the stock of capital
whereas it has a strong influence on investment decisions.2 Additionally, since
we employ nonparametric estimation techniques, the empirical results pre-
sented in this thesis are free of bias from functional mis-specification. And,
as will be shown, this bias can be substantial and may lead to false conclu-
sions if in fact both financial frictions and fixed capital adjustment costs are
of importance.
or Gomes (2001).
2E.g. Guariglia (1999) finds that liquidity proxies and firm size are not correlated,
whereas investment and liquidity are.
3However, the relevance of non-convex investment technologies on the
macro-level has been taken into question recently by Thomas (2002). She
argues that under perfect competition, general equilibrium eﬀects force aggre-
gate investment to behave as if adjustment costs were concave, even though
there are fixed costs of adjusting the stock of capital.3 Yet, the assump-
tion of perfect competition is quite unrealistic for a number of industries.
We show in contrast that imperfect competition even amplifies the eﬀects
of financial frictions and non-convexities: In duopoly the strategic situation
brings up investment behavior that is qualitatively diﬀerent from both the
monopolistic setting with frictions and the duopolistic setting with concave
adjustment costs. If e.g. firms are homogeneous enough with respect to their
debt-burden or ”leverage”, a shrinking market may trigger a predatory race
for market shares.
One should however mention that most said so far and the major concern
of this thesis relates to investment in structures and equipment. Investment is
but a much broader phenomenon: A firm invests whenever it trains workers,
when it hoards labor during recessions, when it restructures, or when it
undertakes R&D. So do workers invest, when they search for a job, train
themselves, or spent time and eﬀort in building (social) networks. Needless
to say, we can expect investment technologies to diﬀer substantially across
these diﬀerent types of investment. Hence, it is sensible to concentrate on
one of these types, and–as stated above–we do so by concentrating on
investment in equipment and structures, where fixed costs of investment are
a long documented phenomenon.4
The following chapter, Chapter 2, extends this introduction by reviewing
the investment literature. However, we do not try to give an extensive sur-
vey of the literature as there already exists a number of excellent surveys.5
3Similar results can also be found in Khan and Thomas (2003) and Veracierto (2002).
4See e.g. Rothschild (1972).
5See e.g. Chrinko (1993), or Hassett and Hubbard (1996) for general surveys, Caballero
(1997) for a survey concentrating on fixed adjustment cost works and Hubbard (1998) for
a survey of the financial-frictions-in-investment literature.
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We rather review the literature to the extent that it builds a foundation for
the subsequent analysis. Having introduced to and reviewed models with ei-
ther non-convex capital-adjustment technologies or financial frictions in the
previous chapter, Chapter 3 now provides a first, stylized model of both
frictions interacting. Chapter 4 joins the preceding chapters and presents
empirical evidence for our hypothesis that the interaction of financial fric-
tions and non-convex technologies plays an important role in determining
investment. Chapter 5 now puts this evidence into a strategic perspective,
and analyzes the interaction of financial frictions and non-convex technolo-
gies in a duopolistic setting. In a sense this chapter changes the focus from
a macroscopic to a more microeconomic point of view. To allow Chapter 5
to be read independently, it is organized mostly self-contained. So someone
who is only interested in a theory of predatory behavior based upon financial
frictions and capital irreversibility may concentrate on this chapter. Chapter
6 gives some concluding remarks. Three appendices follow and present the
technical proofs, which were omitted in the preceding chapters.
Chapter 2
Reviewing the literature:
Financial frictions or
non-convex adjustment cost
2.1 Tobin’s-q approach and before
One of the earliest contributions to the (empirical) investment literature is
the accelerator model of Clark (1917). Or, to account for the serial correlation
of investment, the flexible accelerator model (Clark 1944, Koyck 1954):
It = α
nX
τ=0
βτ∆Yt−τ (2.1)
This model was motivated by the assumption that the long-run optimal stock
of capital K∗ was a fraction α of the output Y produced. So investment I
was assumed to be a distributed lag process of changes in optimal capital.
Although the approach was empirically rather successful, the absence of
prices was a major criticism. Hence, starting from the optimization problem
of a perfectly competitive firm that faces no adjustment costs and produces
with a constant returns to scale technology, Jorgenson (1963) proposed the
neoclassical theory of investment. Again, there also was a (ad hoc) flexible
5
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version (Hall and Jorgenson, 1967). In these models, K∗ is replaced by the
first-order condition
K∗ = α
Y
Pk
(2.2)
where Pk is the price—respectively user-cost—of capital so that
It = α
nX
τ=0
βτ∆
µ
Yt−τ
Pk,t−τ
¶
. (2.3)
However, modifying this model to
It = α
nX
τ=0
¡
β1τ∆Yt−τP−1k,t−τ + β2τYt−τ∆P−1k,t−τ
¢
(2.4)
Eisner (1969) showed that the cost of capital coeﬃcient, β2τ , was quite low
and statistically insignificant once it was not imposed to equal the one of
production, β1τ . Additionally, the flexible neo-classical model suﬀered from
the same ad-hockery as the flexible accelerator model, since there was no clear
theoretical underpinning for the distributed lags.1 Moreover, one should note
that production is not determined on the firm level in such a setting with
perfect competition.2 Consequently, the seminal contribution of Tobin (1969)
and Brainard and Tobin (1968) was the first one that constituted a full model
of investment. The basic idea was that in a general equilibrium the ratio of
firm value over the replacement costs of the firm’s assets should be equal to
1 in the absence of adjustment costs. This ratio then became well known
as ”average-q” or ”Tobin’s q”. In its ad-hoc flexible version the now widely
used investment equation was
It =
nX
τ=0
βτqt−τ . (2.5)
Later, the theoretical contributions of Abel (1979) and Hayashi (1982) showed
1Hall and Jorgenson (1967) propose delivery lags to be the driving force behind the
dynamics, but their explicit model is a static one.
2See Hayashi (1982, p. 213)
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that the neoclassical investment model with convex adjustment cost could
be represented by a q-model in which Tobin’s q had to be replaced by the
fraction of the marginal internal value of new capital over its replacement
costs. Additionally, Hayashi showed that, when firms are price-takers and
the technology is linear homogeneous, Tobin’s-q remains a suﬃcient statistic
for investment. As marginal-q is–unlike Tobin’s-q–unobservable, this is an
important result for empirical work.
Hayashi’s model–here presented in discrete time as in Barnett and Sakel-
laris (1999)–reads as follows: Let F (Kt, µt) denote a production function
that is linear homogeneous in capital, K, and depends on a stochastic pro-
ductivity parameter µ.Moreover, let A (It,Kt, ut) ·Pk,t be an adjustment cost
function which also is homogeneous of degree one in capital and investment
and also depends on a stochastic term u. Consequently, the optimization
problem of the firm–assuming no depreciation for simplicity–can be repre-
sented by the following Bellman equation:
V (Kt, µt, ut, Pk,t) = max
It
(
F (Kt, µt)− A (It, Kt, ut) · Pk,t
+βEt
£
V
¡
Kt + It, µt+1, ut+1, Pk,t+1
¢¤ ) . (2.6)
Et denotes the expectations operator conditional on information available at
time t. β is the discount-factor.
Define it := ItKt and denote items relative to capital by small letters. Due
to our homogeneity assumptions, V is linear in capital Kt. A division of (2.6)
by Kt now yields:
v (µt, ut, Pk,t) = max
it
(
f (µt)− a (it, ut) · Pk,t
+βEt
£
(1+ it) v
¡
µt+1, ut+1, Pk,t+1
¢¤ ) . (2.7)
The first order condition for optimal investment then is
∂a (it, ut)
∂it
· Pk,t = βEt
£
v
¡
µt+1, ut+1, Pk,t+1
¢¤
. (2.8)
If individual shocks to productivity, µt, and to adjustment costs, ut, are
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uncorrelated with shocks to the price of capital, we obtain by dividing by
Pk,t :
∂a (it, ut)
∂it
= βEt
"
v
¡
µt+1, ut+1, Pk,t+1
¢
Pk,t+1
#
Et
·
1
1+ P˙t+1
¸
, (2.9)
where P˙t denotes the inflation rate,
Pk,t+1
Pk,t
− 1. Let a be quadratic, i.e.
a (it, ut) =
1
2α1
(α0 + α1it + ut)
2 and define average q as qt+1 :=
v(µt+1,ut+1,Pk,t+1)
Pk,t+1
.
Then we can rewrite (2.9) as
α0 + α1it + ut = βEt
·
qt+1
1+ P˙t+1
¸
=: βqˆt+1. (2.10)
Therefore, investment is theoretically directly related to q. However, it is
related to the expected value of future q for which two proxies are at hand
as Barnett and Sakellaris (1999) argue: qt and qt+1. As the original model
of Hayashi (1982) was presented in continuous time, most authors have used
qt in empirical applications. However, the correlation between qt and qˆt+1
is not clear-cut. For that reason Barnett and Sakellaris propose to use qt+1
instead, which is an unbiased estimator, as
qt+1 = qˆt+1 + ξt+1; Et
¡
ξt+1
¢
= Et
¡
ξt+1qˆt+1
¢
= 0. (2.11)
The structural parameters α0,1 can then be estimated by regressing qt+1 on
it. Previous studies typically solved (2.10) for it and replaced qˆt+1 by qt. So
the estimated equation was:
ijt = γ0 + γ1qjt + νjt. (2.12)
However, such an estimation has modest success: The estimated parameters
yield implausible high adjustment costs, and changes in q explain only about
5% of the variation in investment rates in firm-panels.3 Moreover, additional
scale variables such as cash-flow or sales have a significant influence on in-
3See for example Blundell et al. (1992).
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vestment, though there is no additional role for them in the above model.4
Indeed, Barnett and Sakellaris (1999) show that the estimated parameters
become much more plausible, once (2.10) is directly estimated replacing qˆt+1
by its realization. Nevertheless, marginal R2 remains as low as 3% in their
regressions. Respectively R2 raises to 8% when lagged cash-flow enters the
regression, which is still considerably small. Of course, when explaining
such relatively large fraction of variation, the cash-flow parameter is highly
significant.
2.2 Incorporating financial frictions
The lack of empirical success of q-theoretic models and the superiority of
accelerationists’ models let researchers look for a theoretical reasoning to
include cash-flow or other sales based variables besides q in the empirical
models. Already in the 1950s Meyer and Kuh (1957) had argued that fi-
nancial considerations of firms could result in an accelerationist model. Yet,
after the famous contribution of Modigliani and Miller (1958) most econo-
mists believed in the dichotomy of financial and real decisions of firms. The
progress in capital-market theory, achieved during the late 1970s and 1980s,5
gave a renewed theoretical ground for the inclusion of financial variables in
investment regressions.
The seminal contribution of Fazzari et al. (1988) triggered a new research
4See Summers (1981), who argues, why these variables should not be included in a
structural estimation. Similar Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) argue that under a
perfect capital market assumption, no other scale variables should appear significant in
the regression.
5Since the famous ”lemon market” paper of Akerlof (1970) it has been well noticed
that because of informational asymmetries external finance can be more expensive than
internal one. Jaﬀee and Russell (1976) provide a model of asymmetric information that
leads to credit rationing. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) argue, that due to moral hazard and
adverse selection credit rationing may occur. Gale and Hellwig (1985) relate capital market
imperfections to costly-state-verification in case of bankruptcy.
The Myers and Majluf (1984) model, directly based on the ”lemons” consideration,
shows that new shares can only be issued at a discount so that external equity finance is
more expensive just as external debt financing had been shown to be.
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agenda which was joined in by others in a number of subsequent papers.6
Denoting cash-flow by CF, the canonical estimating equation became:
ijt = γ0 + γ1qjt + γ2
CFjt
Kjt
+ νjt. (2.13)
Fazzari et al. now split their sample on apriori grounds in three subgroups.
These subgroups had the purpose to reflect the likelihood of a firm being
financially constrained in its investment decisions. For each subgroup (2.13)
is then estimated independently and the estimated parameters are compared
across the groups. If considered as a formal test, the neoclassical model is
rejected if γ2 6= 0. Yet, a rejection of the neo-classical model does not nec-
essarily imply the existence of financial frictions. Other deviations from the
neo-classical model are e.g. adjustment costs other than to capital, market
power, or fixed costs of adjustment. However, Fazzari et al. argue that, if
the rejection is due to financial frictions, γ2 can be expected to be larger
for a financially constrained sample of firms than for an unconstrained one.
Hence, a test for financial frictions uses the diﬀerences between firm groups.
Following this procedure a number of studies emerged. These studies
each used diﬀerent econometric procedures or diﬀerent groupings: Fazzari et
al. (1988) grouped firms by their dividend payout behavior. They showed
that those firms which payed least dividends reacted strongest to changes
in cash flow. Gilchrist (1991) has confirmed Fazzari et al.’s results using
similar sample splittings. Calmoris and Hubbard (1995) use a tax-reform as
a natural experiment to identify the shadow value of internal funds. They
group the firms by this estimated shadow price and find a significantly higher
cash-flow estimate for the firms that valued internal funds higher. Hoshi et al.
(1991) obtain similar results analyzing a sample of Japanese firms, splitting
the sample on the basis of membership in a ”keiretsu”, a large industrial
group. The procedure of Lammont (1997) is quite analogous. He uses a
drop in oil-prices to estimate the diﬀerent response of investment of non-
6See Hubbard (1998) for an extensive survey.
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oil branches in oil and non-oil companies. He found a significant decrease
in investment of the non-oil-branches of oil companies which is not present
for the non-oil companies. Moreover, controlling for other factors, liquidity
constraints can be identified as the driving force behind this phenomenon.
In the same spirit, Ber et al. (2002) uses the diﬀerential impact of monetary
policy on exporting and non-exporting firms to identify liquidity constraints.
As exporting firms have better access to international capital markets, they
can be expected to be much less influenced by monetary policy through the
credit channel than other firms. Indeed, this is what Ber et al. find.7
Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995) proceed similar to Fazzari et al. (1988),
but split their sample of manufacturing firms on the basis of a multitude of
indicators, e.g. if the firm has a bond rating or a commercial paper program
or on firm size. Moreover, they explicitly take the dynamic and interdepen-
dent structure of the data into account.
In all these papers, typically for the unconstrained group γ2 is indeed
smaller than for the constrained group, and sometimes even γ2 = 0 cannot
be rejected for firms considered as unconstrained. Hence, this evidence sup-
ports the view that capital market imperfections are an important factor in
determining investment.
However, there is a number of reasons why q might measure fundamental
investment incentives with error and if this measurement-error diﬀers be-
tween ”constrained” and ”unconstrained” firms, the obtained evidence may
be flawed.
In the denominator the value of the stock of capital reported may not
equal the replacement costs.One reason for this could e.g. be a diﬀerence
between economic and reported depreciation. In the nominator of q there
is e.g. an error when the market value of a firm may be subject to stock
7Note, however, that Ber et al.’s paper is not based as straightforward on a q-theoretic
model as the other papers mentioned. The estimation equation they used is augmented by
a number of other regressors than Tobin’s q. Their main point of focus is the interaction
term of the short-term (aggregate) interest-rate and the amount of export-orientation of
a firm.
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market bubbles or stem from other capitalized quasi-rents besides the one
from capital.8 Additionally, average q and marginal q diﬀer, when firms have
market power. Hence Whited (1992), Bond and Meghir (1994) and Hubbard
et al. (1995), test the neoclassical model on the basis of the first-order-
condition Euler-equations. They also can confirm the results of Fazzari et
al. (1988). The basic idea of these Euler equation approaches is as follows:
If the Lagrange multiplier for the liquidity variable appears significant in the
estimated first-order condition, the neoclassical model can be rejected. Yet,
the Euler-equation approach has been criticized for the lack of statistical
power.9
On the other hand, the original approach by Fazzari et al. (1988) has
been criticized for only testing the neoclassical model as a whole. Kaplan
and Zingales (1997) argue that the sensitivity of investment to liquidity does
not necessarily increase with net-worth when capital markets are imperfect.
Moreover, they argue that typically the empirical studies carried out mostly
rejected the neoclassical model not only for the constrained firms but for the
whole sample. Kaplan and Zingales use the as-constrained-classified subsam-
ple of Fazzari et al. and split it up into in 5 groups based on the firms’ finan-
cial reports. Although for all groups the neoclassical model is rejected, there
is no clear-cut structure in the sensitivity. Rather, the firms which appear to
be least likely constrained exhibit the largest investment-sensitivity to cash
flow. However, Fazzari et al. (2000) note that Kaplan and Zingales’ sample
is rather small so that splitting the sample in five subgroups may result in a
substantial small sample bias. Moreover, Kaplan and Zingales’ sorting itself
is rather subjective and firms identified as financially constrained are likely
to be in financial distress. This also might bias their results.
Nevertheless, Kaplan and Zingales’ paper was very influential in the sense
that it emphasized the problem of how to interpret positive cash-flow coef-
ficients. One possible alternative interpretation–which still is somewhat
8See e.g. Merz and Yashiv (2002) for a discussion of this topic, when labor markets are
incomplete.
9See e.g. Oliner et al. (1995).
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related to Fazzari et al.’s (1988) one–are non-value-maximizing managers
(Jensen, 1986). Blanchard et al. (1994) use cash-windfalls as a natural ex-
periment to test the asymmetric information model against the agency model
of Jensen and find better support for the agency model. Typically, even if av-
erage q is low managers keep cash-windfalls within the firm and invest them
in fixed assets rather than use them to reduce debt or repurchase shares. So
this interpretation still links the estimates to some informational imperfec-
tions, but here within the firm. More recently, product market imperfections,
respectively decreasing returns-to-scale in production, have been put forward
as a potential cause of the positive empirical cash-flow influence.
Recall that only under a constant returns-to-scale production technology
and perfect competition marginal-q can be replaced by average q. Hence
γ2 = 0 tests these assumptions jointly with the assumption of a perfect
capital market.
Cooper and Ejarque (2001) provide numerical examples by generating
artificial data for firms with a decreasing returns-to-scale technology. When
they estimate (2.13) from their generated data cash-flow appears as a signif-
icant regressor although the capital market has been assumed to be perfect.
A very similar analysis has been carried out by Alti (2003). He shows that
even the diﬀerences between the sample-splittings can be reproduced by the
decreasing-returns assumption. He does so by splitting his artificially gen-
erated data by a similar rule as Fazzari et al. (1988) apply to their data.
Abel and Eberly (2002) provide a fairly general theoretical underpinning for
these results: They show analytically that investment of a monopolist with
perfect access to finance reacts positively to average q even in the absence
of adjustment costs. Furthermore, the monopolist’s investment also reacts
positively to cash-flow. Moreover, Abel and Eberly show that in this setting
cash-flow sensitivity of fast-growing firms are larger. Empirically, these firms
are the no-dividend paying small firms and are the ones typically considered
as financially constrained in the previous literature.
Closely related to the results concerning market power are the findings of
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Gomes (2001) who simulates a general equilibrium model of investment and
financing decisions. In summary, he finds positive estimates for cash flow to
be neither suﬃcient nor necessary for capital market imperfections. Notewor-
thy, in one alternative specification Gomes (2001, pp. 1278) also picks up the
idea of fixed financial transaction costs and concludes that empirically the re-
sulting investment behavior can hardly be distinguished from the behavior of
a firm facing fixed capital adjustment costs. This is unusual insofar as most
theoretical models which employ the imperfect capital market framework at
the aggregate level emphasize net-worth eﬀects on the marginal cost of capi-
tal and hence rely on the above mentioned (more sophisticated) asymmetric
information microeconomic models of capital market imperfections.10
What drives Gomes main results? On the one hand, a positive cash-
flow eﬀect (in the absence of financial frictions) is obtained since average-q
measures marginal-q imperfectly. Therefore, cash-flow provides additional
information (on this measurement error). On the other hand firm value and
hence q not only captures the fundamental profitability of incremental invest-
ment, but also the value liquidity has when capital markets are imperfect.
Therefore, a high q can simply reflect the financial flexibility a firm has, so
that additional liquidity variables have a lesser informational content.11
This problem has been observed before by Gilchrist and Himmelberg
(1998), who construct a structural VAR-model, that controls for the dy-
namics and interdependency of fundamental and financial variables that de-
termine investment. Gilchrist and Himmelberg disentangle the eﬀect of both
factors on firm-value and find a significant fraction of cash-flow influence
in investment-decisions simply reflects fundamental productivity. Neverthe-
10See e.g. Bernanke et al. (1996).
11Note that the assumptions of Gomes’ (2001) model are somewhat problematic. His
basic idea is that a firm which cannot finance its investment from current cash flow has
to rely on external finance and pay a premium for these funds. However, in such setting,
firms would have an incentive to precautionarily save. Hence and as Blinder (1988) argues,
liquidity is rather to be measured as a stock which–for example–proxies the line of credit.
This view of ”liquidity” also is more suitable to capture the ideas of the capital markets
literature that highlights the role of net-value, e.g. Bernanke et al. (1998).
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less, they also find an independent influence of the financial factor in the
investment decisions. Insofar, they still are able to reject a broad class of
neo-classical models. Moreover, the influence of the financial factor is found
to be stronger for the group of firms apriori considered as financially con-
strained.
In summary, evidence of financial frictions still is mixed, but one has
to be careful in selecting measures of liquidity and fundamental investment
incentives.
2.3 Measurement errors or financial frictions?
The argument put forth in the last section, based on economic theory and
highlighting the imperfectness of average-q as a proxy for marginal-q, is just
one possible reason for a classical measurement error that might actually
drive the results of the empirical financial constraints literature. Other pos-
sible reasons that have been discussed in the literature are stock market
bubbles or misreported respectively falsely calculated replacement costs of
capital.12
As a remedy for measurement errors induced by stock-market bubbles
Cummins et al. (1999) suggest to construct a measure of fundamental firm
value based on analysts’ net-income forecasts ECFit for each firm.
As this highlights the problems involved in dealing with the measurement
error problem in q-theoretic models, we will discuss their procedure in more
detail: Cummins et al. define a variable ”real Q”, bQit, which is computed on
the basis of analysts’ expectations [ECF it of firm net-income and its expected
net-income growth-rates. These items are available through I/B/E/S. Scaling
12See for example Erickson and Whited (2000, 2001 and 2002) and Cummins et al.
(1999) for a discussion.
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all items by the replacement value of capital, they compute bQit as:
bQit = nX
j=1
αj [ECF it+j−1. (2.14)
This formula is of course motivated by the idea that fundamental firm value is
the sum of discounted net-income. ”Real Q” is then used in (2.13) instead of
Tobin’s q. Using GMM-techniques they obtain more reasonable estimates for
the parameter of ”real Q”, when this parameter is interpreted in terms of a
quadratic adjustment cost function. Moreover, they find no significant influ-
ence of cash-flow. These results have been replicated by Bond and Cummins
(2001), who also provide a more detailed theoretical underpinning. Further-
more, Bond and Cummins find that lagged sales and Tobin’s q also appear
as insignificant additional regressors in this setting. So, they conclude, the
neo-classical model captures investment behavior quite well, once rational
bubbles are controlled for. However, in a sense their empirical model just
replicates the findings of Jorgenson (1963), so that Eisner’s (1969) criticism
might well apply:
First of all, bQjt and cash-flows are notably correlated,13 so that one might
also specify bQjt = β CFjtKjt−1 + ujt. As a result the estimation equation becomes
ijt = γ0 + γ1
µ
β
CFjt
Kjt−1
+ ujt
¶
+ γ2
CFjt
Kjt−1
+ νjt. (2.15)
If the variance of u is small, there is a strong collinearity problem. Indeed
the very large confidence bounds reported may indicate such a situation.
Moreover, using instruments as a cure for the potential measurement error
problem makes the potential collinearity problem even worse, if the instru-
ments are not correlated with ujt. And even if one imposes γ2 = 0, as Bond
and Cummins (2001) do in one of their regressions, the interpretation of their
results is not clear-cut. If ujt and user-cost of capital are highly correlated,
13See figure 1 in Cummins et al. (1999).
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we obtain Jorgenson’s neoclassical model; if they are not, we are back to the
accelerationist-model.14
Moreover, more important and besides the issues raised by Gomes (2001),
the structural interpretation of Cummins et al. (1999) is correct if and only
if β is chosen correctly, i.e. there is no systematic correlation between cash-
flow and the diﬀerence of marginal-q and bQjt. If there is such a diﬀerence, γ2
will be estimated incorrectly, perhaps as insignificant although it might be
significant in the ”true” marginal-q model.
A suﬃcient condition for this to happen would be systematic errors in the
constructed analysts’ forecasts of bQjt which are correlated with current cash
flow. To be more precise, suppose bQjt is formed (by the analysts) as a linear
function of marginal q, a purely random measurement error, and maybe an
additional eﬀect of cash-flow:
bQjt = θ1 CFjt
Kjt−1
+ θ2qjt + ujt . (2.16)
Using this equation in (2.13) now yields:
Ijt = γ0i +
γ1
θ2
bQjt +µγ2 − θ1θ2β1
¶
CFjt
Kjt−1
+
µ
νjt −
γ1
θ2
ujt
¶
(2.17)
Obviously, the structural parameters are not identified unless one is willing
to assume fixed values for θ1,2, e.g. θ1 = 0 and θ2 = 1, which means there
is no systematic error in forming a measure of marginal-q from the analyst’s
cash-flow forecast.
Yet, there are a number of reasons why θ1 > 0: If, for example, a firm
also has other (quasi-)rents but the one from capital to exploit, cash-flow will
be serially correlated to a greater extent than marginal-q is.15 Another rea-
son could be costly information. If information is costly to acquire, analysts
14If e.g. analysts have some knowlege about (non-profitable) investment projects, that
will increase net-income, ujt clearly will measure investment, but it will not measure
fundamental incentives.
15Merz and Yashiv (2002) analyse the case, where the labour market is imperfect. They
show, that the labor force in place significantly eﬀects firm-value and investment decisions.
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will concentrate on information easy to obtain and omit the more expen-
sive information. As a result–of the omitted variable problem–analysts
will rationally overemphasize current and lagged cash-flow. Alternatively,
if analysts have incentives to trade oﬀ accuracy of their forecasts in favor
of optimism,16 their cash-flow forecasts will be biased. If additionally the
tolerated inaccuracy depends on the realized cash-flow, we obtain the stated
eﬀect.
The problem of mismeasured marginal-q has been addressed by Erickson
and Whited (2000, 2001, 2002), too. Instead of replacing observed average-
q by some related measure, they use higher order moment conditions to
tackle the measurement error problem more directly. Depending on the way
Tobin’s-q is computed, Erickson and Whited (2002) find that the empirical
measure Tobin’s-q explains between 44% and 65% of the variation in true but
unobservable average-q.17 Moreover, once measurement errors are controlled
for, Erickson and Whited (2000) find no additional influence of cash-flow
on investment. In line with Gomes (2001) argument they explicitly state
that this result does not necessarily imply the absence of financial frictions.
Insofar Erickson and Whited’s results rather suggest that it is necessary to
obtain more direct measures of expected marginal productivity of capital and
of the financial status of a firm, if one wishes to carry out estimations that
can be interpreted structurally.
2.4 Investment and fixed adjustment cost
Another possible argument for the empirical failure of the neo-classical in-
vestment model stems from the fact that adjustment costs of capital may
16Hong and Kubik (2003) provide evidence that analyst who provide upwardly biased
earnings forecasts are more likely to be promoted. Hence, analysts have an incentive to
do so.
17In their setting average-q is defined as the unobservable variable driving investment.
This may of course be diﬀerent to the explicit definition as ”true” value over replacement
costs.
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not be a continuous convex function.18
There are a number of reasons why adjustment cost could be non-convex.
The typically considered cases are irreversibilities and fixed costs: Investment
may be (partially) irreversible due to asymmetric information in the market
for used capital goods. Fixed costs of investment could for example arise
because the installation of a new assembly line in an existing factory requires
to halt current production. Another form fixed costs of investment can for
example take are overhead costs involved in planning and carrying out an
investment project.
In all these cases, as Caballero and Leahy (1996) show, there needs not
be a monotonic relation between marginal-q and investment; and paradox-
ically average-q better predicts investment than marginal-q does. However,
average-q no longer is a suﬃcient statistic for investment.
The following model briefly sketches this idea: Suppose a firm completely
finances the capital stock by debt (capital is leased). Moreover, assume
that profits Π (x,K) are linear homogeneous in capital given the measure of
capital imbalance x, which is aﬀected by investment. Then,
Π (xt,K) : = π (xt)Kt, (2.18)
xt+1 : = it + xt + µt (2.19)
with i.i.d. productivity-shocks µt. Now, assume that the costs of adjusting
the stock of capital are a fixed-fraction of the capital previously installed and
are borne by the equityholders, i.e.
a (i) :=
½
w
0
if i 6= 0
if i = 0.
(2.20)
Then (2.7) simplifies to
v (xt) = max
it
©
π (xt)− I{it 6=0}w + βEt [v (it + xt + µt)]
ª
. (2.21)
18Caballero (1997) gives a good overview over the literature considering this situation.
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Now, for notational convenience define
vˆ (xt) = βEt [v (xt + µt)] . (2.22)
The optimal ”capital imbalance” x∗ is implicitly defined by the first-order
condition ·
∂vˆ (x)
∂x
¸
(x=x∗)
= 0. (2.23)
Therefore, optimal investment is given by it = (x∗ − xt) . However, the firm
will only invest if
w ≤ vˆ (x∗)− vˆ (xt) (2.24)
holds.19 One can show, that v is quasi-concave, when π is quasi-concave.
Thus (2.24) implicitly defines two thresholds (l, u) for investment such that
the firm invests if and only if xt ≥ u and disinvests if xt ≤ l. Hence, in
the presence of fixed adjustment costs a firm lumps adjustment to avoid
paying the fixed adjustment costs too often. This is reflected by the inaction
range (l, u) in fundamental investment incentives. Yet, if xt /∈ (l, u) the firm
invests and qit is constant as q := vˆ (x) = const holds. Therefore, there is
no direct and obvious link between the volume of investment and Tobin’s-q.
If, however, the setting is generalized, this conclusion does not necessarily
hold anymore, as Abel and Eberly (1994) show in their model that remerges
q-theory and the theoretical literature on lumpy investment.
The ”lumpy investment” model itself has proved quite successful empir-
ically: Doms and Dunne (1998) analyze the investment-series of those firms
contained in the Longitudinal Research Database (LRD), which documents
investment pattern of 12 000 US manufacturing plants from 1972 to 1989.
To do so, they calculate the fraction of the total equipment investment of
each establishment that is carried out in a single year. They find that on av-
erage the year with the largest plant-year investment accounts for more than
19Caballero and Engel (1999) show, that a very similar model is well defined. Here, we
take the assumptions made, for heuristic reasons. See chapter 3 for a more elaborated
version of this model.
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a quarter of the total cumulative investment of a plant over the whole pe-
riod. Moreover, more than half of the establishments exhibits capital growth
close to 50 % in a single year. Employing the same database, Cooper et al.
(1999) estimate the hazard-rate of a plant exhibiting an investment spike.
They estimate this hazard-rate as a function of the time elapsed since the
last spike occurred and find evidence for a time-increasing hazard-rate. This
points towards non-convex costs of adjustment.
A more direct approach has been taken by Caballero et al. (1995): Also
using the LRD, they estimate a measure of ”mandated investment”, which
is the diﬀerence between optimal and realized capital and takes the role of q.
They construct ”mandated investment” by imposing a long-run cointegrating
relation between earnings, capital employed and the user cost of capital. In a
second step Caballero et al. estimate the adjustment hazard as a function in
”mandated investment” by spline smoothing. They find a convex relationship
between ”mandated investment” and the actual realized investment rate, i.e.
an upward sloping hazard. In contrast, the convex-cost framework would
predict investment to be concave or linear in ”mandated investment”.
Additional evidence from other data (COMPUSTAT) has been provided
by Abel and Eberly (2002), who test their (1994) q-theoretic augmented ad-
justment cost model. Indeed they find evidence for an inaction range and
hence especially for fixed costs.20 Goolsbee and Gross (2000) estimate a
model very similar to the one of Caballero et al. (1995), but they employ de-
tailed data from the airline industry. Goolsbee and Gross find significant non-
linearities in the adjustment costs, when they allow for capital-heterogeneity.
If they, however, aggregate the data to the firm-level, the non-linearities
partly wash out. Moreover, the estimated adjustment costs become upwards
biased as by aggregation parts of the fixed costs are perceived as marginal
costs by the econometric procedure. Because of that result, data on the
lowest level of aggregation available should be used to estimated adjustment
20Barnett and Sakellaris (1998) who tried to test that model earlier, could not find
evidence for non-convex costs. However, it has been noted that this might well be due to
unobserved heterogeneity, that they do not control for.
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costs.
Yet, in most cases the level of micro-detail Goolsbee and Gross have in
their data is not available to the researcher, so that one can only test for
convex adjustment cost using firm-level-aggregate data. Data, for which
Goolsbee’s and Gross’ result strikingly shows the lack of power a test for
non-convex adjustment cost might have. Accordingly one will often accept
the hypothesis of convex adjustment-cost, although adjustment-costs are in
fact non-convex.
To avoid this data problem and to obtain estimates from macro-data,
Caballero and Engel (1999) have developed an empirical model of stochastic
fixed adjustment costs that can work out the form of adjustment costs from
the time-series behavior of aggregate investment.
In this model, the range of inaction varies from period to period and the
probability of a firm to invest is given by a hazard function that is upward
sloping in ”mandated investment”. They employ this model to two-digit
aggregate data and find both an upward sloping hazard-rate and a supe-
rior within and out-of sample behavior of this model compared to the lin-
ear (partial adjustment) model. Interestingly, when estimating their model
they do not have to rely on any explicit measure of mandated investment.
Instead, they calculate the stationary mandated investment distribution of
their model in the absence of aggregate shocks and obtain the parameters
distribution of shocks to productivity and adjustment-costs by maximizing
the likelihood of the sectoral investment series. Basically, their model ex-
tends the above one to cases, where the fixed cost of investment, wt, is i.i.d.
distributed. Hence the probability of an investment(-spike) for a firm is
Λ (x) = prob [wt ≤ (vˆ (x∗)− vˆ (x))] . (2.25)
Given the stochastic model for w and µ, both Λ and v can be calculated.
An alternative econometric approach to obtain structural estimates of the
underlying adjustment costs has been followed by Cooper and Haltiwanger
(2002), using an indirect inference method. In a first step, they use em-
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ployment and sales data to generate a measure of capital-productivity. In a
second step, they regress investment on a polynomial of this measure and its
lagged value. Finally, they obtain the structural estimates by carrying out
the estimation of their second step for simulated investment models (with
diﬀerent types of adjustment costs). The estimates of the structural para-
meters are then identified as those, which minimize the distance between
the estimates from a simulated model and the previously estimated empiri-
cal one. They find that a model which mixes both convex and non-convex
adjustment costs fits the data best.
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2.5 Towards merging both strands
Up until very recently the typical strategy was to analyze each single reason
why the neo-classical model might fail separately at a time. So far, the fixed
or more generally speaking the non-convex adjustment costs model has seen
least criticism. However, do non-convex adjustment costs solely explain the
strong empirical rejection of the neo-classical model, really? Thomas’ (2002)
results casts some doubt on this: In aggregate investment general equilibrium
eﬀects mostly wash-out the influence of higher moments of the fundamental
investment incentives-distribution, that is caused on the micro-level by fixed
costs.
Moreover, if there are transaction costs of finance, debt-ceilings, or net-
worth eﬀects in financing costs, the estimates of fixed costs may well be biased
upwards compared to their structural values: Holt (2003) presents a real-
options model of investment in which equity-funds cannot be raised after the
firm is founded and in which equity serves as a buﬀer-stock for bad outcomes,
i.e. equity has to be always positive. In his model financial variables amplify
the influence of fundamental ones. Put diﬀerently, fundamentals and finance
work as complementaries in determining investment.
Empirically this has recently been confirmed by Whited (2002), who
shows that the hazard-rates of firms to exhibit an investment spike are sub-
stantially ”flatter” for firms which are financially constrained. Hence, the
average time between two spikes is much larger for financially constrained
firms.21 Figure 2.1 illustrates this.
Moreover, only when both financial frictions and fixed costs of capital
adjustment are allowed for in the (econometric) model, one can discriminate
between the various models of financial frictions. Furthermore, as Gomes
(2001) claims, the fixed transaction and the fixed adjustment costs model
may yield similar investment patterns. Hence, only by allowing for financial
21Independently developed, a comparable idea is the basis of the analysis in chapeters 3
and 4, which are based on working papers (Bayer, 2002 and 2003) previously available. The
results are similar to the ones of Whited (2002), but obtained using a diﬀerent procedure.
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Figure 2.1: Hazard-rates for constrained and unconstrained firms
frictions and fixed adjustment costs, we can separately test for both structural
(technological) assumptions.
Therefore, we will analyze investment behavior under both financial fric-
tions and non-convex adjustment costs simultaneously in the following chap-
ters. How to measure financial frictions is anything but straightforward.
Mostly cash-flow has been employed as a proxy. Yet, already at the very
beginning of the financial frictions literature, and commenting the seminal
paper of Fazzari et al. (1988), Blinder (1988, p. 199) stated that it is prob-
ably a stock of liquidity like the line of credit which influences investment.
This claim holds true in both the transaction-cost and the net-worth models.
So, Blinder concludes it would be preferable to use a stock-based measure
and that a flow measure of liquidity could be a misleading proxy. We share
this view and use the equity-ratio as such proxy throughout this thesis.22
22Strictly speaking, the equity-ratio is a stock-based relative measure. By using a relative
specification, we assume that influence of size is approximately constant (or zero) over time.
But even if varying size eﬀects are present, using the relative measures avoids picking up
size with the liquidity proxy.
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This also has a number of additional advantages. Firstly, only with a
stock-measure of liquidity one can distinguish between diﬀerent types of fi-
nancial frictions using their diﬀerential impact on short- and long-run behav-
ior of investment: Suppose fixed transaction costs of finance are the driving
force behind the dependence of investment on liquidity. Then we can expect
firms to have an optimal stock of capital independent of their financial sta-
tus, whereas investment heavily depends on liquidity. If, however, there is a
net-worth eﬀect on the marginal cost of capital, one can expect the optimal-
stock of capital to depend on the financial status, while investment is only
indirectly influenced. In fact, apriori evidence seems to support the transac-
tion costs hypothesis rather than the net-worth one.23 Secondly, the problem
of fundamental investment incentives being correlated with the measure of
liquidity can be expected to be less pronounced using a stock-measure than
with a flow-measure like the cash-flow.
2.6 Synopsis and conclusion
Before proceeding we should sum up the main points again:
Although the q-model of investment is theoretically well-founded, its em-
pirical success is modest at best. Q-models typically yield estimates of adjust-
ment costs that are way to large and hence imply very implausible half-lifes
of capital imbalances. Moreover, the fit of these regressions is typically very
low. Conversely, this leaves much room for other factors to explain invest-
ment.
One of these other factors is cash-flows. By many authors this has been
interpreted as evidence for financial frictions playing an important role in
firm-level investment decisions. Especially backed up by inter-firm diﬀerences
in the influence of cash-flows, this view has some appeal.
23E.g. Guariglia (1999) reports firm size and stock-measures of liquidity to be uncorre-
lated. Mairesse et al. (1999) report in their survey the influence of financial variables in
investment to die out rapidly over time.
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However, a measurement-error in q (whose existence can be soundly jus-
tified from theory) could as well generate the significant positive cash-flow
coeﬃcient. Moreover, this virtual influence even varies across firms in ac-
cordance to ”a priori” measures of financial frictions. Gomes (2001) even
shows that positive cash-flow coeﬃcients in a q-model are neither suﬃcient
nor necessary for the existence of financial frictions. By and large, he thereby
renders the whole approach unsuitable. Additionally he shows that the fixed
transaction-cost of finance and the fixed adjustment-cost of real investment
models are observationally virtually equivalent, if the other friction is not
controlled for.
As a consequence, an analysis has to be based on a more direct measure
fundamental investment incentives. Moreover, one has to focus much more
on the interaction of frictions and test the various models along those lines.
Instead, most studies so far have tried to establish a direct influence of a
financial variable.
Fixed-adjustment cost models always reflect the adjustment costs in the
frequency of adjustment. If we view liquidity as a measure of options to adjust
the stock of capital, crossbreeding financial frictions and fixed-adjustment
cost models yield an influence of finance on this frequency, as we will see in
the following chapter. This influence can be used to discriminate between
and to test against alternative models.
Therefore, combining the fixed adjustment-costs and the financial fric-
tions frameworks allows to discriminate both, within various financial-frictions
models, and between the financial frictions and the fixed adjustment-cost
models. Moreover it obviously avoids a number of problems of omitted vari-
ables and misspecification.
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Chapter 3
A first model of interacting
frictions
3.1 Firm-level investment
We will start oﬀ with presenting and discussing the representative problem
of a firm which is at the same time subject to financial constraints and fixed
adjustment costs.1 For simplicity and as in Caballero and Engel (1999), the
industry modelled in this chapter shall consist of a large number of monop-
olistically competitive single-plant and single-product firms, which all are
subject to a limited liability constraint. The investment decision is modelled
in discrete time. Each firm faces an infinitely elastic supply of all factors.
At the beginning of each period all uncertainty about that period is resolved
and is common knowledge from then on. Thereafter, each firm decides upon
investment.
1Note that typically the investment-functions in investment problems with fixed cost
are not aggregable. Hence we can only discuss the typical investment problem—of course
given a parameterization of the production technology, market structure etc. If these
parameters vary across firms, this makes the aggregation problem more severe. This is
quite analoguous to the aggregation problem in consumer-theory.
Moreover, when relating investment to consumer theory it should be noted that under
finacial frictions, the ”law of supply” obviously does no longer necessarily hold, as firms
then face a budget constraint.
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3.1.1 Adjustment technology and financial constraint
If a firm wants to change its capital stock it has to pay some fixed costs; all
other factors may be adjusted without costs. At the end of every period each
firm has to pay back its last period’s debt plus interest, has to pay for any
new purchased capital goods and for all other factors. Moreover, it can issue
new debt and pay out dividends.
Apart from the non-convexity in the investment technology, firms face
a capital market imperfection: As in Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998) and
as an extremely simplified version of the pecking order of finance theory,
there shall be a no-new-equity constraint, i.e. firms are unable to issue new
shares or to have negative dividends once founded (which is in the absence
of taxation equivalent on the margin):
Assumption 3.1: Once founded, firms are unable to issue new equity.
Especially, dividend payments Dt must be non-negative at any point
in time: ∀t : Dt ≥ 0.
This simplified version of the pecking order theory is necessary to keep the
model tractable. Nevertheless, the general results should not change if this
assumption were replaced by a more complex version as in Gomes (2001).
Moreover and more important, this assumption is not strongly contra-
dicted by empirical findings as e.g. Friedman (1982) shows empirically that
firms hardly use any external equity finance at all. Moreover this assumption
also has theoretical support: Fries et al. (1997) show how full collataralization-
and ”no new equity”-constraints may theoretically arise as an industry equi-
librium.
Secondly, we assume that a firm must declare bankruptcy immediately
if it has a negative book value of equity (at any point of time). Under
assumption 3.1 this is equivalent to a full collataralization constraint, i.e.,
the amount of debt a firm may issue is limited by the actual stock of capital
depreciated and discounted for one period.2 To see the equivalence, suppose
2This ensures that the firm always has a positive present value in the following period
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a firm would borrow above the constraint. Then the firm would be bankrupt
next period. Hence, either all assets were transferred to the debtholders who
continue operations or debt burden had to be renegotiated. Any combination
of the two would contradict assumption 3.1. However, both procedures would
imply a sure loss either for the stock- or the debtholders. Thus, at least one
party will never allow for any increase in debt beyond that ceiling.
Assumption 3.2: The maximum debt Bt+1 (repayable in period t+1) a
firm may issue in period t is restricted by the book value of the stock
of capital Kt, depreciated (with rate δ) and discounted (at the interest
rate on debt r) for one period: Bt+1
Kt
≤ (1−δ)
1+r
(
Bt+1
Kt
) .
The third, last, and weakest assumption regarding capital market imper-
fections is that the interest rate on debt r only depends on the leverage. As
Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1998), we assume r to be homogenous of degree
zero in B and K, and to be weakly increasing in B. This does not rule out r
to be independent of B and K.
Assumption 3.3: r = r
³
Bt+1
Kt
´
and r0
³
Bt+1
Kt
´
≥ 0.
3.1.2 Periodic sales
Now let K∗ denote the frictionless stock of capital of a firm, i.e., the stock
of capital that would be chosen in the absence of fixed costs for investment
and capital market imperfections. Let K be the actual capital employed.
The semi-reduced function of earnings per-period (EBIT), Π, shall be
linear homogenous in the frictionless stock of capital K∗ and can be written
as:3
Π(z,K∗) = π(z)K∗, (3.1)
and will stop production before going bankrupt. Alternatively, this assumption can be
viewed as a simplification of Hart and Moore’s (1994) debt capacity model.
3This assumption and the assumptions below with respect to π are e.g. fulfilled if
demand is iso-elastic and the production function is Cobb-Douglas. See Caballero and
Engel (1999) for details.
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with z denoting the capital-imbalance at the beginning of each period before
investment takes place, i.e. the ratio of actual capital employed to frictionless
capital, K
K∗ . The profit, π, per unit of frictionless capital shall be strictly
concave and fulfill the (Inada) conditions π(0) = 0 and lim
z→0
π0(z) = +∞.
Moreover, assume lim
z→+∞
π0(z) < ψδ to make profits bounded.
When a firm invests, it faces a stop of production, the duration of which is
determined by the random variable w ∈ ]0, 1[ representing the fraction of the
period used for the installation of the new capital–similar to the adjustment
costs assumption in Caballero and Engel (1999). So the costs, A, of adjusting
the capital stock are given by:
A(zo, K∗, w) := wπ(zo)K∗, (3.2)
where zo denotes the capital-imbalance after adjustment, zo := Kt+Investmentt
K∗
t
.
Note that in the presence of depreciation the firm will typically invest up to
a larger stock of capital than the frictionless optimal one, K∗.
3.1.3 Dynamics of the stochastic variables
So far there are no restrictions on the stochastic dynamics of the random
variables K∗t and wt. Both variables together completely determine firm het-
erogeneity and investment dynamics, so any assumptions on these variables
are crucial. A minimal assumption for keeping the model tractable is that
both variables exhibit the Markov property.4 Furthermore, we shall assume
that wt is i.i.d. and that K∗t follows a geometric random walk (with drift d).
The innovations ξt to K
∗
t are normally distributed and serially uncorrelated
(although possibly correlated across firms):
K∗t
K∗t−1
= exp (d+ ξt) . (3.3)
4If shocks to productivity would be serially correlated, the analysis would just be com-
plicated. Managers would have a true optimal stock of capital that is diﬀerent from the one
that maximizes current profits. This would make the financing problem more pronounced.
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3.1.4 Capital market and the firm’s objective
Firms are assumed to be risk-neutral. Therefore, they seek to maximize the
expected, discounted dividend stream. They do so by choosing some capital-
imbalance zo (respectively the amount of capital employed, zoK∗t ) and the
amount of debt used to finance production, Bt+1.
In order to finance investment, a firm can either cut back dividend pay-
ments Dt or raise debt Bt+1. As assumed, a firm is unable to sell any new
shares or raise equity by negative dividends (assumption 3.1). Moreover,
the amount of debt a firm can issue is limited by the actual stock of capi-
tal employed (assumption 3.2). Additionally, the interest rate is a function
of bt := BtKt−1 and is weakly increasing in bt (assumption 3.3).
5 Therefore,
dividend payments, Dt, are given by
Dt = D(z
o, Bt+1, K
∗
t , wt, zt, Bt)
:= Π(zo, K∗t )−A(zo, K∗t , wt)I{zo 6=zt} −K∗t (zo − zt) +Bt+1 − (1+ rt)Bt
(3.4)
in which I is an indicator function. Moreover, let the time constant discount
factor be denoted by ψ and the value of the firm be denoted by V. Then the
following Bellman equation determines both V and the optimal investment
policy:
V (K∗t , wt, zt, Bt) =
max
(zo,Bt+1)∈X
©
D(zo, Bt+1, K
∗
t , wt, zt, Bt) + ψEt[V (K∗t+1, wt+1, zt+1, Bt+1)]
ª
.
(3.5)
5That the interst-rate for bonds increases does not follow from our model but is an as-
sumption. And as we have explicitely ruled out bancruptcies, debt is even risk-free. Hence,
the assumption in its strong form itself is somewhat inconsistent with the model. Yet, to
rule out risky debt is only to simplify and concentrate the analysis. Introducing another
risk-term that enters after the investment decisions are made and adding bancruptcy costs
for the debt-holders would generate an upward sloping interest-function, but would only
complicate the analysis a lot.
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In this expression X := X (K∗t , wt, zt, Bt) is the correspondence of finan-
cially feasible capital-imbalance and debt pairs. Et denotes the expectations
operator, conditional on information available at time t.
Let the ratio of equity to capital (slightly abusing notation here) denoted
by et, which is a function of bt, i.e. et := e(bt) = 1 − (1+r(bt))1−δ bt.
6 To reduce
the number of state variables and to obtain a more convenient formulation
of the problem at hand, we subtract the book value of equity from V and
divide by K∗t . This defines a new value function v :=
V
K∗
t
− etzt, which is the
diﬀerence between ”market-value” and book-value of equity relative to the
frictionless stock of capital. As both et and K∗t are determined before the
optimal policy decision is taken, maximizing v and maximizing V yield the
same optimal policy.
Now, define firm value v˜ as v if the capital imbalance is not altered by
investment in the current period. Defining c(zo, bo) := π(z
o)
zo
+ (bo − 1) and
rearranging terms,7 we obtain
v˜(z, bo) := c(z, bo) + (1− δ)ψze (bo)
+ ψEt
n
v
h
wt+1, z
1−δ
exp(d+ξ
t+1)
, e (bo)
i
exp(d+ ξt+1)
o
. (3.6)
For capital-imbalance and debt pairs (”plans”) with strictly positive capi-
tal we define Y to be the correspondence of financially feasible plans in terms
of zo and bo :
Y (wt, zt, et) :=n
(zo, bo) ∈ R++ ×R+|zo − etzt − π(zo)[1− wtI{zo 6=zt}] ≤ zobo ≤ zobbo .
(3.7)
6See Appendix A.1 for details.
7Again, see Appendix A.1.
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bb denotes the maximum debt-to-capital ratio
bb := sup½b ∈ R++| b ≤ 1− δ1+ r(b)
¾
.
The following Lemma proves to be useful in order to write the Bellman
equation (3.5) in terms of zo and bo in a short and accessible form:
Lemma 3.1 (a) Y is non-empty and
(b) employing zero capital is suboptimal, i.e.
max
(zo,bo)∈Y
v˜(zo, bo)− π(zo)wtI{zo 6=zt} > ψEt[v(wt+1, 0, 0) > 0
Proof. (a) As, et, zt ≥ 0 also etzt ≥ 0 holds. Thus to proove (a), it is
suﬃcient to show, that
∃z(wt) : z − π(z)[1− wtI{z 6=zt}] ≤ 0.
Because lim
x→0
π0(x) = +∞ and π(x)
x
≥ π0(x) (since π is concave), this ”self-
financing” z always exists.
(b) Using z from part (a) a firm can always pay out a larger dividend than
et and can also set bo = bt+1 = 0 as well. By paying a larger dividend in the
current period and having the same debt as if it was to stop production but
with a larger stock of capital, the expected value for t+ 1 must be larger than
Et[v(wt+1, 0, 0)], so that
v˜(z, 0, wt, zt, bt) > ψEt[v(wt+1, 0, 0)]
follows. Because the plan ∀t : zot = z(wt) is always feasible and leads to
positive dividends, v (·) must be bounded from below by a positive real number,
so that ψEt[v(wt+1, 0, 0)] > 0.
Because of the above Lemma, firms never stop production completely
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respectively declare bankruptcy.8 Therefore, the optimal policy is always an
element of Y and thus the Bellman equation defining v is given by:
v (wt, zt, et) = max
(zo,bo)∈Y (wt,zt,et)
v˜(zo, bo)− π(zo)wtI{zo 6=zt} . (3.8)
3.1.5 Adjustment process
In general, Y is only upper-hemicontinuous, thus v might not be continuous
everywhere. The lack of continuity arises because of the fixed adjustment
costs: If a firm employs a large stock of capital and is heavily indebted, it
may find itself unable to repay the debt obligations if the capital-imbalance
or the debt level rise marginally. Therefore it will be necessary to distinguish
two cases when describing firm level investment:
(a) The firm is in danger of becoming insolvent: this happens, if
1− et −
π(zt)
zt
> bb . (3.9)
In this case the firm has a negative cash flow and cannot sustain the actual
level of capital employed by issuing new debt. Therefore, it has to (heavily)
cut back production to increase its average productivity. In consequence, a
firm always disinvests if in financial distress.
(b) The firm is not in danger of becoming insolvent:
Then, denoting the (optimal) capital-imbalance after adjustment with
z∗ and the ratio of debt to capital after adjustment with b∗, a firm adjusts
its stock of capital (i.e. it invests) in period t if the expected increase in
8This result seems a contradiction to empirical facts at a first glance, i.e. of course in
reality firms do declare bankcruptcy and are shut down. However, Lemma 1 should not be
taken literally as ”firms never disappear”. Basically the Lemma states, that the monopoly
power of a firm is always of some value, which would be lost upon bancruptcy. Hence, the
Lemma may better be interpreted as ”brands never disappear”, which surely comes closer
to reality than the former interpretation.
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discounted value outweighs the adjustment costs. That is if:
0 ≥ max
bo∈Z(zt,et)
v˜(zt, b
o)− v˜(z∗, b∗) + π(z∗)wt (3.10)
Z(zt, et) : =
½
bo ∈ R++|1− et − π(zt)
zt
≤ bo ≤ bb¾
or equivalently
wt ≤ min
bo∈Z
½
v˜(z∗, b∗)− v˜(zt, bo)
π(z∗)
¾
. (3.11)
As shown in the appendix, the value of a firm that adjusts,
v˜(z∗(wt, et), b
∗(wt, et))− wtπ(z∗(wt, et)) , (3.12)
is monotonically decreasing in wt, so that for every (et, zt) there exists an
unique w¯ such that
v˜(z∗(wt, et), b
∗(wt, et))− wπ(z∗(w, et)) R max
bo∈Z
v˜(zt, b
o) for w Q w¯ . (3.13)
3.2 Cross-sectional investment
3.2.1 Aggregation
Having reduced the firm’s investment decision to a comparison of two values,
it is now possible to define for every (et, zt) a critical value Ω which is the
largest value of the stoppage duration wt for which the firm chooses to invest.9
Ω(et, zt) :=
(
w(et, zt)
1
if Z (zt, et) 6= ∅
if Z (zt, et) = ∅
(3.14)
As only contemporary state variables matter for the aggregation, the time in-
dices of state variables are suppressed henceforth. LetKAt , I
A
t , Kt(e, z), It(e, z)
9Since w is always smaller than one, Ω(z, e) = const ≥ 1 implies that a firm adjusts
independent of its realized w. Furthermore, as a firm always disinvests if it is in danger
of becoming insolvent (:⇔ Z = ∅), Ω(z, e) = 1 is a sensible value if Z = ∅.
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denote the aggregate stock of capital, aggregate gross investment, and the
stock of capital and gross investment of firms with capital-imbalance z and
equity-to-capital-ratio e (sectoral aggregates) in period t, respectively. More-
over, let G(w) be the distribution of w. Then the investment hazard can be
defined as Λ(e, z) := G(Ω(e, z)) and we can define
z¯∗(e, z) := Λ(e, z)−1
Ω(e,z)Z
z∗(w, e, z)dG(w), (3.15)
which is the average optimal capital-imbalance of firms that invest condi-
tional on having an equity-ratio e and capital-imbalance z before investment.
At time t investment of firm j with capital-imbalance zjt and equity ejt,
which adjusts indeed, is given by
Ijt = [z
∗(wjt, ejt, zjt)− zjt]K∗it =
·
z∗(wjt, ejt, zjt)
zjt
− 1
¸
Kjt . (3.16)
Therefore, with these quantities at hand, the expected (cross-sectional) in-
vestment conditional on (e, z) can be expressed as
E[It(e, z)] = Kt(e, z)
·
z¯∗(e, z)
z
− 1
¸
Λ(e, z). (3.17)
Since adjustment-cost shocks w are i.i.d., the cross-sectional average invest-
ment rate i(e, z) follows directly from (3.17):
i(e, z) :=
It(e, z)
Kt(e, z)
=
·
z¯∗(e, z)
z
− 1
¸
Λ(e, z) (3.18)
Diﬀerentiating average investment i with respect to the equity-ratio e
yields an interesting decomposition of the eﬀect of a change in the leverage
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(if ∂z¯
∗
∂e
and ∂Ω
∂e
exist):10
∂i(e, z)
∂e
=
Λ(e, z)
z
µ
∂z¯∗(e, z)
∂e
¶
| {z }
level-eﬀect
+
(z¯∗(e, z)− z)
z
∂Λ(e, z)
∂e| {z }
frequency-eﬀect
(3.19)
While the first term represents a long-run or level eﬀect of the equity-
ratio, the second term represents an only short run or frequency eﬀect. The
latter eﬀect is only short-run since an increase in Λ decreases the variance
of the cross sectional capital-imbalance and therefore later on decreases the
probability of investment. Due to this frequency eﬀect investment can be
more sensitive to the financial situation than the optimal stock of capital is:
Theorem 3.1 (a) If [i(e, z) + Λ(e, z)] is large enough–but possibly smaller
than one–then the investment rate is more sensitive to the equity-ratio than
the optimal stock of capital, i.e. the elasticity of z¯∗ w.r.t. the equity-ratio is
smaller then the semi-elasticity of investment w.r.t. the equity-ratio:
∂i(e, z)
∂ ln(e)
≥ ∂z¯
∗(e, z)
∂e
e
z¯∗
. (3.20)
(b) In an environment around (e, z¯∗(e, z)) we have
∂2i(e, z¯∗(e, z))
∂e∂z
Á
∂i(e, z)
∂e
≤ 0. (3.21)
Proof. (a) From equation (3.18) we obtain
i
Λ(e, z) =
(z¯∗(e, z)− z)
z
.
10Proposition A.4 in the appendix shows that ∂Ω
∂e˜
exists almost everywhere (a.e.).
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Using this to rewrite (3.19) in terms of elasticities η, we obtain
ηie =
e
i(e, z)
Λ(e, z)
z
µ
∂z¯∗(e, z)
∂e
¶
+
e
i(e, z)
(z¯∗(e, z)− z)
z
∂Λ(e, z)
∂e
=
Λ(e, z)
i(e, z)
e
z
µ
∂z¯∗(e, z)
∂e
¶
+ ηΛe =
h
z¯∗(e,z)
z
− 1+ 1
i
Λ(e, z)
i(e, z)
ηz¯
∗
e + η
Λ
e
=
i(e, z) + Λ(e, z)
i(e, z)
ηz¯
∗
e + η
Λ
e . (3.22)
If [i(e, z) + Λ(e, z)] + i (e, z) η
Λ
e
ηz
∗
e
≥ 1, this yields
∂i(e, z)
∂ ln(e)
= ηie · i(e, z) = [i(e, z) + Λ(e, z)] ηz
∗
e + η
Λ
e · i(e, z) ≥ ηz
∗
e (3.23)
(b) Suppose ∂i(e,z)
∂e
> 0 (< 0), now let e increase marginally then we have
for some firms an increase (decrease) in realized z. Now assume contradic-
tory ∂
2i(e,z¯∗(e,z)))
∂e∂z
> 0 (< 0), then investment rates would rise (fall) further,
contradicting z¯∗ to be optimal. Thus the stated inequality must hold.
Remark 3.1 Diﬀerentiating (3.23) with respect to ln(z) yields the following:
∂2i(e, z)
∂ ln(e)∂ ln(z)
=
∂
∂ ln(z)
£
[i(e, z) + Λ(e, z)] ηz∗e + ηΛe · i
¤
(3.24)
=
∂ [i(e, z) + Λ(e, z)]
∂ ln(z)
ηz
∗
e +
∂2z¯∗
∂z∂e
e
z¯∗
z + i
∂ηΛe
∂ ln(z)
+ ηΛe
∂i
∂ ln(z)
As z and e enter Y only multiplicatively and as Y determines z∗(w, e, z),
∂2z¯∗
∂z∂e
can be approximated by ∂
2z¯∗
∂e2
e
z
. Therefore, we can state:
∂2i(e,z)
∂ ln(e)∂ ln(z)
' ∂[i(e,z)+Λ(e,z)]
∂ ln(z)
ηz
∗
e +
∂2z¯∗
∂e2
e2
z¯∗ + i
∂ηΛ
e
∂ ln(z)
+ ηΛe
∂i
∂ ln(z)
= ∂η
z
∗
e
∂ ln(e)
+ ∂i(e,z)
∂ ln(z)
£
ηz
∗
e + η
Λ
e
¤
+
h
i
Λ(e,z) + η
z∗
e
i
∂Λ(e,z)
∂ ln(z)
. (3.25)
Although the sign of these terms is not clear from analytic grounds, we would
expect for negative ln(z) the eﬀect of equity on the optimal capital stock to
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be decreasing in e, the adjustment hazard to be decreasing in z and the ex-
pected investment to be a decreasing function of z, too. Hence, intuitively
∂2i(e,z)
∂ ln(e)∂ ln(z)
< 0 if i is positive.
3.2.2 Discriminating between our model and alterna-
tives
The above theorem and remark are central in discriminating between the
model of this chapter and both, the Myers and Majluf (1984) pecking-order
of finance and the liquidity-dependent cost of capital (but convex adjustment
cost) models: In the liquidity-dependent cost of capital models with convex
adjustment costs the long-run eﬀect is clearly dominant.11 Any eﬀect of liq-
uidity on the speed of adjustment in these models is only a second-order
eﬀect. Slower adjustment marginally saves internal funds, so that the mar-
ginal gains of faster adjustment and the marginal-costs of internal funds have
to be equalized. Therefore, liquidity can have an influence on the adjustment
speed only via the second-order derivative of the costs of capital with respect
to liquidity. In the fixed adjustment cost model however, investment is an
extramarginal decision. For a given fixed cost of investment, a change in
liquidity hence may render some adjustments unprofitable, so that there is a
first-order eﬀect of liquidity on the adjustment speed.
In the pecking-order model there is an important short run eﬀect of liq-
uidity independent of the form of adjustment costs. In these models when
adjustment costs are concave typically three regimes of firm-finance emerge.12
These are stylized in figure 3.1.
The firms with a high z (low productivity of investment) are financially
unconstrained, rely on internal finance, and their investment decision is in-
11However, note that in a model with convex costs zo has to be defined somewhat
diﬀerently. In this case it is the capital imbalance at which a firm would not actively
change the capital imbalance by investing. Yet and although firms adjust their capital
imbalnce in the short-run towards this level, outside its long run equilibrium level (where
e is endogenuous) zo is never actually reached by active investment.
12See Gomes (2001), Bond and Meghir (1994), or Whited (1992) for details.
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constrainedinternal
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of investment
investment
actual investment
unconstrained investment
Figure 3.1: A stylized version of the pecking-order model
dependent of their liquidity constraint. Firms with low z rely on external
finance and depending on the form of transaction costs, investment of these
firms can be sensitive to liquidity. Firms with intermediate z are strictly
constrained by liquidity and a change in liquidity changes investment. Firms
with high productivity rely on external finance. For these firms increasing eq-
uity either has no eﬀect or actually reduces the sensitivity of investment with
respect to fundamentals, because these firms become liquidity constrained
when equity rises. This can happen since the gains of obtaining external fi-
nance get smaller, the larger the internally financed amount of investment is.
Therefore, the cross-derivative ∂
2i(e,z)
∂ ln(e)∂ ln(z)
would be positive. Consequently,
Theorem 3.1(b) and Remark 3.1 can be used to test the model of this paper
against (simpler) pecking-order alternatives.13 Another possibility to dis-
13This argument, however, only holds if transaction costs in a pecking-order model are
deterministic. If transaction costs are stochastic, cross-sectional aggregation of the short
run investment function may be governed by the distribution of transaction costs, which
- if chosen from a set of arbitrary distributions - can have a dynamics similar to the one
of our model as a result.
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criminate between fixed cost of investment and fixed cost of external finance
models is the investment behavior for z > 1 : Fixed disinvestment costs im-
ply a range of inactivity, while transaction costs of finance yield immediate
disinvestment, if firms can hold financial assets.
Whether within our model the debt-ceiling or the liquidity dependence of
the cost of capital is more important can be evaluated by comparing ∂i
∂z
× ∂z¯∗
∂e
and ∂i
∂e
. If only the liquidity dependence is of importance, ∂i
∂z
× ∂z¯∗
∂e
and ∂i
∂e
should be close to equal. In this case a change in the equity ratio alters the
discount factor. This is similar to an increase in z, i.e. the typical investment
project is smaller. Yet, there still is an eﬀect on investment frequency. Only
this eﬀect is similar to the eﬀect a marginal change in z would have, smaller
investment projects only pay at lower investment costs.
If the debt-ceiling is the important financial friction, ∂i
∂e
can be expected
to exceed ∂i
∂z
× ∂z¯∗
∂e
substantially. Here, liquididity corresponds to a number
of investment options a firm can expect to have at most over some given
period of time. The smaller the number of options is, the larger the value of
each option will be. This option-value adds another factor to the fixed cost
of adjusting the stock of capital.
In that sense, even if we later estimate the investment function non-
parametrically and even if the estimated derivatives have no structural inter-
pretation in the form of coeﬃcients of an adjustment-cost function, we can
identify the various investment models using first- and higher-order deriva-
tives. Moreover, in its general formulation, the model nests the alternative
models as it only partially diﬀers with respect to the ”test objects” men-
tioned.
3.3 Aggregate investment and its dynamics
One obtains the time-series of aggregate investment by aggregating over the
distribution of (e, z) pairs. Aggregate investment can therefore be expressed
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as:
IAt =
Z Z
i(e, z)Kt(e, z)f(e, z, t)dedz (3.26)
where f denotes the joint density of (e, z) .
To obtain a simplified expression for the aggregate investment equation,
we make the following assumption:14
Assumption 3.4: Let Kt(e,z)
KA
t
and i(e, z) be independent in (e, z).
Then we get for the aggregate investment rate I
A
t
KA
t
:
IAt
KAt
'
Z Z ·
z¯∗(e, z)
z
− 1
¸
Λ(e, z)f(e, z, t)dedz. (3.27)
Given equation (3.27), aggregate investment is fully determined by the dis-
tribution of equity and the conditional distribution of capital-imbalances.
The dynamics of the aggregate investment series is then determined by the
transition from f(·, t) to f(·, t+ 1). Now let–as in Caballero et al. (1995, p.
35) and without loss of generality–the sequence of shocks/adjustment be:
1. adjustment as described
2. idiosyncratic shocks ξ
3. aggregate shock vt and depreciation δ.
Given this sequence, we can now describe the transition from f(·, ·, t− 1)
to f(·, ·, t). We do so by proceeding backwardly beginning with step 3.
Given adjustment and idiosyncratic shocks, aggregate shocks and depre-
ciation still alter the capital imbalance and the equity ratio. If e1 is the
equity ratio before depreciation, then the equity ratio after depreciation is
e2 =
e1 − δ
(1− δ)
14See Caballero and Engel (1999, p. 816) for a detailed numerical justification of a
closely related assumption.
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so that
e1 = e2 (1− δ) + δ. (3.28)
Analoguously, we obtain
z2 =
K1 (1− δ)
K∗1 exp(vt−1)
= z1
1− δ
exp(vt−1)
(3.29)
and hence
z1 = z2
exp(vt−1)
1− δ . (3.30)
Therefore, expression (3.28) and (3.30) give the transformations the capital
imbalance and the equity-ratio of a given firm undergo by step 3. Let the joint
distribution of (e, z) after adjustment and idiosyncratic shocks be denoted
by ef1. For f we then obtain.
f(e, z, t) = ef1µδ + e(1− δ), z exp(vt−1)1− δ , t− 1
¶
. (3.31)
For step 2, let g (ξ) denote the density of the productivity shocks ξ. Then–
using the same reasoning as for the aggregate shocks and denoting the dis-
tribution after adjustment by ef2–we obtain
ef1(e, z, t-1) = Z ef2(e, z exp(d+ ξ), t-1)g(ξ)dξ. (3.32)
As adjustment itself is governed by the stochastic stoppage duration, adjust-
ment is a stochastic variable itself. So let
·
Kjt := 1 + ijt denote the growth
rate of capital and let
·
Ejt be the growth-rate of the equity-ratio. Moreover,
let H
µ ·
E,
·
K
¯¯¯¯
e, z
¶
denote their conditional distribution. This distribution
governs step 1, the adjustment-process. The distribution ef2 of (e, z) after
adjustment is generated by a convolution of f in period t− 1 and H:
ef2(e, z, t-1) = Z dH(o, p| eo , zp , t-1)f( eo , zp , t-1)dodp. (3.33)
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Since wt are i.i.d., H is stationary. Combining (3.31) - (3.33) yields
f(e, z, t) =
Z
dH(o, p| e
o
, z
p
)f
³
δ +
³
e
o
+ o
p
´
(1− δ), z
p
exp(d+ξ+vt−1)
(1−δ) , t-1
´
g(ξ)dξdodp .
(3.34)
Therefore, the aggregate investment series can be characterized as a gen-
eralized Markov-chain. Note that because of the presence of aggregate shocks
f is non-stationary.15
Our model maps the parameters at the firm level now to some density
dH. Therefore and as in Caballero and Engle (1999), even with only aggre-
gate data–and given an initial distribution f (e, z, 0)–one could still obtain
parameter estimates by choosing the firm level parameters as to maximise
the likelihood of the aggregate investment and equity-ratio data. However,
in this thesis we will pursue an empirical approach using firm-level data.
3.4 Brief Summary
As we will begin the following chapter with a relatively extended discussion
of the empirical implications of our model, we shall only very briefly sum-
marize the main results of this chapter: The key result of our model was to
introduce a frequency-of-adjustment interpretation of the eﬀect liquidity has
on investment. It explains seemingly contradictory evidence concerning the
influence of liquidity on investment decisions in the short and on stocks of
capital in the long-run. Moreover, we provided implications of the model for
15If f were stationary in the absence of aggregate shocks, the density of disequilibria
and equity to capital ratios through which a firm goes over its lifetime would be ergodic
(Caballero and Engel (1992)). Without aggregate shocks f would be stationary, if the
operator T defined below converges (to a non-degenerated density).
(Tf)(e, z) : =
Z
dH(o, p|e · p+ o
p
,
z
p
|e · o, z · p)
×f
µµ
e · p+ o
p
+ δ
¶
(1− δ), z
p
exp(d+ ξ)
(1− δ)
¶
g(ξ)dξdodp
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the derivatives of the investment function which can be used to test our model
against a broad range of alternatives. Furthermore, we have shown how the
aggregate investment series driven by the distributions of equity-ratios and
capital imbalances.
We leave an extended summary of the main implications–focused on its
empirical content–of our model to the beginning of next chapter, where our
model will be applied to German and UK firm panel-data.
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Chapter 4
Empirical evidence
With the initial considerations of the last chapter at hand, we can now turn
towards empirically assessing the importance of our claim: financial factors
and non-convexities amplify each other’s importance. We will do so by ana-
lyzing both a UK and a German dataset, which both contain accounting data
at the company-level. Yet, or of course, we will also check the existence of an
influence and its importance for both factors themselves. Before proceeding,
however, we should reconsider our main theoretical results.
4.1 Summing up and extending the theoret-
ical considerations
Like before, let k∗ denote the log of the stock of capital a company would
hold in the absence of any adjustment costs. As argued, this stock of capital
may depend on the (log) equity-ratio e in the presence of some influence of
equity on the cost of finance, i.e. the cost of capital. Thus, k∗ = k∗ (e, ξ) , in
which ξ denotes the productivity of capital. Let k be the log of the capital
actually employed. Now define the capital imbalance
x := z∗ − z = κ + k∗ − k, (4.1)
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where κ+k∗ is the dynamically optimal (long-run) capital-stock in the pres-
ence of adjustment costs. Parameter κ captures the optimal capital imbal-
ance, i.e. the capital-imbalance that is optimally installed to account for
depreciation and trends in productivity. For example, if there is depreci-
ation, a firm will adjust to a larger stock-of capital than it would hold in
the absence of adjustment-costs. The firm does so to minimize the average
distance between the capital-stock and its optimal level.
Now suppose the firm faces only fixed costs of investment; then it will
invest up to (κ + k∗) if it decides to invest. Therefore, investment would
equal mandated investment as in (3.16) and hence is given by
I = exp (κ + k∗)− exp (k) . (4.2)
Again, let Λ(x (e) , e) be the hazard rate of investment for a firm with capital
imbalance x and equity e. The expected investment rate i is then given by
i (x, e) := E
µ
I
exp (k)
¶
= Λ(x (e) , e) [exp (x (e))− 1] (4.3)
If investment is not lumpy but continuous, then Λ can be interpreted as the
fraction of mandated investment that is actually realized. As discussed in
the previous chapter, Λ is a function of both x and e: Internal funds may
not only change costs of capital but also aﬀect the speed of adjustment itself
and thus interact with productivity in a more complex way.
In order to assess to what extent financial considerations enter the firm’s
decision process mainly by a flexibility or a cost-of-capital argument we can
apply our decomposition of the eﬀect of a marginal change in equity on
investment, obtained in the previous chapter in (3.19):
∂i (x, e)
∂e
=
∂i (x, e)
∂x
∂x
∂e| {z }
level-eﬀect
+
∂Λ
∂e
[exp [x (e)]− 1]| {z }
frequency-eﬀect
. (4.4)
Thus, the eﬀect of a marginal change in equity on investment can be decom-
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posed into a ”level”-eﬀect and a ”frequency”-eﬀect. The ”frequency”-eﬀect
reflects changes in the speed of adjustment to the target stock of capital. The
”level”-eﬀect results as the change in the optimal stock of capital induced,
multiplied by the marginal propensity to invest upon changes in productiv-
ity. The optimal stock of capital may for example be changed by e through
altering the cost of capital or the (implied) managerial discount-factor.
Given this decomposition, we can test two hypothesis how the availabil-
ity of (accumulated) internal funds influences investment activity. The first
hypothesis reflects the long run neutrality of finance:
H00 : Internal funds have no eﬀect on the optimal stock of capital, a company
holds. This is equivalent to ∂x
∂e
= 0.
The second hypothesis accounts for the influence of equity on the invest-
ment process, this is:
H10 : Investment reacts to changes in internal funds only because the optimal
stock of capital is changed, i.e. ∂i(x,e)
∂e
= ∂i(x,e)
∂x
∂x
∂e
.
If H00 cannot be rejected, the Modigliani-Miller theorem holds in the long
run. However, this still allows for the possibility that finance influences the
transition path of the stock of capital, i.e. hypothesis H10 is rejected. This
could for example be due to fixed costs of external equity finance or short-run
ceilings on debt-ratios.1 Note that (only) if H00 holds true, H
1
0 simplifies to
∂i(x,e)
∂e
= 0.
Moreover, we can test the way fundamental and financial variables inter-
act in the investment decision. This–as laid out in Chapter 3–enables us to
discriminate between the ”convex-adjustment but fixed financial transaction
costs”, the ”net-worth eﬀect in finance with fixed adjustment costs” and the
”both fixed adjustment and transaction costs” model.2
1See Gomes (2001) for a discussion.
2See sections 4.2.5.3, 4.3.4 and 4.3.5.
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Since productivity of capital is unobservable, a proxy for the marginal
productivity of capital or directly for fundamental investment incentives is
needed. To obtain such a proxy, one could of course rely on Tobin’s-q. How-
ever, the drawbacks of this measure have been discussed in detail in Chapter
2. Therefore, for the German data, we follow a technique closest to the one
used by Cooper and Haltiwanger (2002): As we have data on firm-specific
wages available, we will use first-order employment conditions, to determine
the productivity of capital and hence the optimal stock of capital. In con-
trast to Cooper and Haltiwanger, however, we allow the technology to vary
across firms.
For the UK-data we do not have any wage data available, but detailed
data on firm-specific subsidies. This makes the procedure of Caballero et al.
(1995) an attractive option, as we have some variation in observed marginal
cost of capital, even if we control for firm and time fixed-eﬀects.
However, our analyses of the UK and the German sample not only diﬀer
in the way the optimal stock-of-capital measure is generated. For the UK
data we present full estimates of the investment functions as well as average
derivative estimates. To avoid any longueurs, for the German dataset only
the derivative estimates, the ”parameters” of interest, are reported. This
gives room to address possible endogeneity problems associated with the
liquidity variable. We will begin with the analysis of the UK data.
4.2 Evidence from a sample of UK firms
4.2.1 Measuring the capital imbalance
Alternatively to the two approaches mentioned above, we could of course
proceed with the full-information maximum-likelihood approach of Caballero
and Engel (1999).3 However, when micro-panel data is available, as in our
3To do so we would need to estimate the distributions involved in (3.34) . The distri-
bution of equity can be estimated without use of any theoretical model with a suitable
parametric or nonparametric estimator. However, one has to generate B and Ω for any
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case) the two-step approach of Caballero et al. (1995) is more flexible. We
follow this approach and estimate z as a proxy of fundamental investment
incentives in a first step. Thereafter, we regress investment on this proxy and
the equity-ratio, to obtain the (short-run) expected investment function. It
seems useful to take this approach, since it is applicable to a much broader
class of models that incorporate nonlinear adjustment-/investment-functions
and/or capital-market-imperfections, i.e. this estimation approach nests the
alternative models we want to test against.
The first intermediate goal of this section is hence to construct an esti-
mator for the capital-imbalance z. In contrast to Caballero et al. (1995), it
cannot be assumed that the desired capital is proportional to the stock of
capital K∗ that a plant would hold in the absence of adjustment costs. From
lemma 2, we know that z and e enter only multiplicatively in z∗. Taking logs
of all variables except for i (e, z) (without changing notation), we then can
write the optimal capital imbalance, as defined in the previous chapter, as a
function in two arguments. Abusing notation slightly, we replace z∗(w, e, z)
by z∗(w, e + z). Neglecting the diﬀerential eﬀect of e and z on the composi-
tion of z¯∗, we then can also write z¯∗ as a function of (e+ z) . Assuming z¯∗ is
diﬀerentiable, a Taylor-approximation of z¯∗(e+ z) around z¯∗(0)–neglecting
higher-order-derivatives–yields for desired stock of capital k˜ in logs (by the
definition of z∗):4
z¯∗i (eit + zit) = k˜it − k∗it = αi0 + βi(eit + zit). (4.5)
For an isoelastic production/sales function (in logs: yit = ψ
0
it + ψ
k
i kit) we
G from our Chapter 3 model and choose a starting distribution f(·, 0). Then one is able
to maximize the likelihood of the system by choosing an optimal G (Caballero and Engel,
1999). Though this approach does not rely on a specific measure of fundamental invest-
ment incentives, specifying an initial distribution f (·, 0) and the distribution of shocks
to productivity and adjustment costs can be problematic. Moreover, as a very structural
approach it does not nest all the alternative models we want to test against.
4This means, we approximate z¯∗ around the average optimal stock of capital a firm
would like to hold that has a book value of equity equal to the frictionless optimal stock
of capital.
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obtain from the first order condition for k∗it:
5
−zit = k∗it − kit =
1
1− ψki
£
ln(ψki ) + yit − kit − θi ecoit¤ , (4.6)
where kit denotes log-capital employed, yit denotes log-sales, ecoit denotes log
cost-of-capital and bi denotes the elasticity of sales to capital. Now combining
(4.5) and (4.6) yields:
z¯∗it − zit
1− βi
= αi1 + ηi [yit − kit − θi ecoit] + βi1−β
i
eit (4.7)
with αi1 : = αi01−βi +
ln(ψki )
1− ψki
and ηi :=
1
1− ψki
In this equation z¯∗it − zit gives the log of the ratio of dynamically optimal
capital to capital currently employed. If firms adjust their stock of capital
over time, we can expect z¯∗it− zit to be mean reverting. y, k and eco are most
likely to be non-stationary. The equity-ratio eit in the opening balance is
predetermined. If z¯∗it − zit is not only mean-reverting but also stationary,
there must be a cointegration relation and θ and β can be estimated from a
panel-cointegration regression (Caballero et al., 1995, p. 15).6 ,7
Regarding (βi, θi) we assume the cointegrating vector to be homogeneous
(at least amongst industries Indj). Thus (βi, θi) = (β, θ)∀i ∈ Indj. Further-
more, since the number of parameters is larger than the number of variables,
one needs to approximate ψki by the cost share of equipment capital (Ca-
ballero et al., 1995, p. 15).
Given consistent estimators bθ, bβ (and bαi0) it is then possible to compute
z and estimate i (e, z), f(e, z, t) non-parametrically.
5See appendix B.1 for details, especially for the definition of bi.
6Obviously it would be preferable to test for a cointegration relation being present
in the data. However, as the panel data we have is large only along the cross-section-
and not along the time series dimension, such a test would be meaningless. Nevertheless,
estimating the cointegrating vector should still be possible, as this is even possible in pure
cross-sections (Madsen, 2001).
7Strictly speaking, of course we only estimate a long-run covariance. This covariance
reflects the cointegration relation if there is such a relation, which is what we assume.
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4.2.2 Estimation procedure
For estimating the cointegration relation (4.8), Phillips’ and Moon’s (1999)
”full-modified panel cointegration estimator” (henceforth PFM-OLS) is used.
This estimator is
√
nT -consistent, asymptotic normal and corrects for possi-
ble endogeneity of the regressors. However, the consistency result is obtained
by letting T (the time series dimension) and n (the number of observations
per individual) tend to infinity sequentially, i.e. it is a consistent estima-
tor for samples which are larger along the time-series than along the cross-
sectional dimension. Nevertheless, the estimator should still be superior to
OLS. Moreover and mentioned before, Madsen (2001) shows, how inference
on the cointegrating vector can even be obtained from a cross-section in a
similar framework.
Another drawback of the PFM-OLS estimator is that it is formulated
for balanced panels with integrated regressors only. The data we have is an
unbalanced panel and at least for e we would rather assume it to be an I(0)
process. However, the PFM-OLS estimator is a generalization of the full-
modified OLS estimator of Phillips and Hansen (1990) and Phillips (1995)
and hence we expect the results of Phillips (1995) to carry over to the panel-
case as well, i.e. the estimator is
√
nT -consistent and asymptotic normal
for parameters of stationary regressors. The standard errors will thus be
calculated in analogy to the time-series case.
To account for the unbalancedness, the unbalanced-panel equivalents of
all items that appear in the formula of the estimator are calculated.8 For
inference the average number of observations per firm is used. The equation
we use for estimation is:
ηi (kit − yit) = αi1 + γt − θηi ecoit + κeit + uit, κ := β1− β . (4.8)
8For example when estimating the short-run covariance matrix, we calcualte the co-
variance for every firm in the sample using the firm-specific number of observations and
then average over firms.
For inference in the I(1)-regressor case we calculate confidence bounds on the basis of
T being the average number of observations per firm.
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The time-dummies γt have been added for two reasons: The first reason is
that the data used covers a period of large shocks to inflation, thus measuring
the real interest rate correctly is something to be concerned about. The
second reason is that we do not have data on taxational shocks–common to
all firms. The usual within transformation will be used to remove time and
individual eﬀects.
With the estimator of θ at hand, we can use (4.6) to calculate end-of-
period t capital imbalances zˆt+1. Of course, we would need to know the
beginning-of-period capital imbalance. Nevertheless, even with the consistent
estimates generating beginning of period capital imbalances is problematic.
Of course one could simply subtract investment from zˆt+1, which would yield
beginning-of-period z consistently with our model. However, subtracting the
regressand in generating the regressor is obviously problematic.9 Instead,
we will simply take bzt, as a proxy for zt. The innovation to productivity
and costs will then however cause a measurement error, which may bias our
estimates for the investment-function towards zero. Yet, there are no obvious
instruments available to correct for this problem.
After removing individual averages and time-specific eﬀects, we obtain
for our model:
bzit+1
ηi
=
¡
kit − ki. − k.t + k..
¢
− (yit − yi. − y.t + y..)
+ bθ(T,n) ³ecoit − ecoi. − eco.t + eco..´ (4.9)
As already mentioned before, in a second step, the investment rate ijt is
regressed non-parametrically on (ejt, bzjt) . To compare the short- and long-run
behavior, and to compare the results with other empirical studies, average
derivatives of i(e, z) are estimated, as well. These are the counterparts to the
coeﬃcients estimated in linear models. However, as we only observe average
z on the company level, but not for every single plant, and also because of
9In an earlier version, this approach has been taken and the results were qualitatively
the same.
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the measurement error described above, the second-order derivative of the
investment function in z will be underestimated if the function is convex, i.e.
the function will appear to be less curved than it is.
The nonparametric estimation procedure, that will be employed will basi-
cally be a generalized-nearest neighborhood estimator. However, accounting
for firm-specific eﬀects is not as straightforward in the nonparametric case,
as it is in the parametric one (Ullah and Roy, 1998). According to our speci-
fication in (4.9) the investment function shall meet the following assumption:
Assumption 4.1: For each firm j at time t investment i is given by
ijt(zjt, ejt) = a0j+b0t+i(zjt−(azj + bzt) , ejt−(aej + bet))+vjt . (4.10)
Moreover, E(i (·, ·)) = 0 (to identify i). axj and bxt are individual- and
time-fixed eﬀects.
Under this assumption the function i can be directly estimated using
within-transformed quantities only. Alternatively, the nonparametric first-
derivative estimator of Ullah and Roy (1998) could be applied. To obtain the
investment function one has to integrate over the derivatives. For estimating
average derivatives however, we will also apply the estimator of Ullah and
Roy.
4.2.3 Data
The UK-data we employ is the BSO-dataset of the Cambridge/DTI Data-
base.10 This database contains annual accounting data from UK companies
from 1976 to 1990. 50494 company-year observations are included in the
data. About half of them come from manufacturing firms. For the subse-
quent analysis the dataset has been restricted to companies of the manufac-
turing sector with positive fixed capital and positive equity. Moreover, only
10See Goudi et al., 1985.
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firms with 5 or more consecutive observations available remain in the sample.
After removing outliers (see below), the sample contains 7147 observations
from 915 diﬀerent firms.11
The BSO dataset contains capital and investment data for land and build-
ings as well as for tools and machinery. Since reported depreciation rates for
machinery are about 40%, we restrict the analysis to land and buildings.12
All data have been deflated to 1975 prices using the retail-price-index (RPI).
The user-cost of capital are computed as the average reported deprecia-
tion rate (on land and buildings) for each firm δi plus the real interest-rate
(reported in table 1). But then a fraction sit of the investment spending is
payed for by subsidies. In consequence, this fraction has to be subtracted
from the cost: ecoit = ln((δi + rt)(1− sit)). (4.11)
The real interest series is obtained by subtracting annual inflation rate (on
the basis of RPI) from 3-month Euro-sterling deposit rates, see table 4.1.
Due to the logarithmic transformation the real-interest rate shocks are not
completely removed by the time-dummies.
The data on subsidies is problematic as we obtain sit ≥ 1 for a few firm-
years. Therefore, all these observation are removed by discarding all obser-
vations with cost-of capital below the 4% and above the 99.5% quantile.13
Moreover, apriori it is doubtful that the yearly average subsidy fraction sit is
equal to the expected marginal fraction of subsidies. In this sense, there could
11There are missing observations for few firms due to the way outliers are removed, i.e.
we have an observation in t − 1 and in t + 1 but the observation in t is removed. The
within-transformation we use takes care of this, but we simply neglect this fact for the
following regressions. More strictly, we either would have to take the whole time series
for the firm out of the sample or at least treat observations after the outlier and before
diﬀerently. However, in any case we would lose quite many observations.
12Although our model might still hold true for fast depreciating capital goods, we would
need data at a higher frequency to sensibly analyse the data. At a depreciation rate of
50% capital goods are replaced on average every second year on a regular basis, if the
stock of capital stays constant. Hence, we can expect to hardly find any influence of fixed
costs in yearly data.
13Additionally, we remove observations with the 0.05% highest or lowest costs after the
within transformation.
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Table 4.1: Nominal interest-rate i, real interest-rate r,
change in the RPI, deflator P
year 1975 76 77 78 79 80 81 82
i [%] 11.4 13.5 8.9 10.4 13.9 16.7 13.9 12.3
RPIt+1
RPIt
[%] 17 16 9 13 17 12 9 5
r [%] -4.75 -2.18 -0.09 -2.28 -2.65 4.22 4.53 6.93
P 1 1.17 1.357 1.479 1.672 1.956 2.191 2.388
year 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91
i [%] 10.1 10.0 12.2 11.0 9.7 10.3 13.9 14.8 11.5
RPIt+1
RPIt
[%] 5 5 4 4 5 6 8 7 5
r [%] 4.89 4.72 7.91 6.70 4.48 4.07 5.46 7.26 6.22
P 2.507 2.632 2.764 2.875 2.990 3.139 3.327 3.594 3.845
theoretically be a measurement error problem present in this specification.
However, there are no obvious instruments available and the actually esti-
mated coeﬃcient looks in no way biased downwards, as it is insignificantly
diﬀerent from its theoretical value of 1.
Table 4.2 reports descriptive statistics for the variables of the sample
that we use. The within transformation is calculated before taking first
diﬀerences, and thus before loosing the first observation for each firm. Hence,
the regressors do not have mean zero exactly.
In chapter 2 we summarized the recent literature on q-theoretic empiri-
cal investment models which has highlighted the role of measurement errors.
Although the analysis does not rely on q, in two other systematic ways a
measurement error might be present in the cost series. The first is a sys-
tematic risk eﬀect, the second would be a diﬀerence between our constructed
real interest series and the real interest rate on debt. If firms have diﬀerent
idiosyncratic risks, their costs of capital are diﬀerent. If risk enters capital
costs multiplicatively, however, the fixed eﬀects perfectly control for this (if
risk is constant over time), otherwise they still should do most to remove the
measurement-error bias.14 The same argument also holds true for diﬀerences
14Note that obviously, if financial frictions determine the cost of capital, our measure of
costs measures with an error. However, the residual is just explained by the parameter of
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Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics of the quantities used
(within-transformed)
full sample removing first obs. (as in PFM-OLS)
min max std
ηy −5.655 3.438 0.326
ηk −3.389 6.302 0.486
η eco −.4233 0.627 0.075
e −2.414 1.585 0.210
ηa 0.617 1.000 0.026
zb −5.680 4.775 0.358
i −10.37 0.778 0.514
mean min max std
η (y − k) 0.001 −5.648 4.956 0.383
η eco −0.004 −.4233 0.627 0.062
e 0.0005 −2.414 1.585 0.209
before individual demeaning
z −4.08 −10.66 1.716 0.796
ic 0.339 −0.936 8.115 0.571
aNot demeaned
bAfter removing individual eﬀects, the correlation of capital-imbalance and equity-ratio is about 0.032
cGross-investment, calculated as annual diﬀerences of reported capital stocks.
between the real-interest series used and the relevant real-interest series for
firm debt.
As a last preliminary check, we test for independence of investment rates
and equity. For the full dataset, i.e. without restricting to more than 5 con-
secutive observations, Ahmad and Li’s (1997) nonparametric kernel-based
test yields a test statistics of 10.0775. Therefore, the hypothesis of indepen-
dent equity and investment rate distributions can be rejected far below the
0.1% level.
4.2.4 Long-run optimal stock of capital
Table 4.3 reports estimates of (4.8) for the whole dataset as well as for the
industries for which many observations are available. These are Food (21),
Chemicals (26), Non-electrical engineering (33), Electrical Engineering (36),
Paper, Printing & Publishing (48) and Transport & Communication (50).
The standard errors are given in parentheses.
The estimated long-run elasticity of capital with respect to the user-costs
is with 0.9752 statistically insignificantly diﬀerent from 1. The elasticity with
equity in our regression.
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Table 4.3: Estimates from the cointegration regression
(PFM-OLS, Within)
full sample By industriesc
κ θ
P
Tini
PFM-OLSa 0.079 0.98 5944
prelim. OLS 0.070 1.08
std. err. I(1) 0.026 0.07
std. err. I(0)b 0.035 0.14
OLS 0.082 0.71 7147
Ind. κ θ
P
Tini
21 PFM 0.191 1.73** 471
OLS 0.136 1.340 554
26 PFM 0.108 1.119 760
OLS 0.097 0.738 897
33 PFM 0.020 0.32** 836
OLS -0.019 0.075 1065
36 PFM 0.164 0.957 534
OLS 0.209 0.443 626
48 PFM -0.037 0.991 410
OLS -0.047 0.570 493
50 PFM 0.296 0.627 378
OLS 0.156 0.637 482
aOnly observational units have been used for which (outliers removed) 5 or more observations are available.
bThe standard errors are obtain as panel analogues to Phillips (1995, p. 1033ﬀ).
cFull industry-sample OLS estimates are reported in brackets ( ).
** Significantly diﬀerent from the remaining-sample-estimate at the 5%-level - based
on PFM-OLS estimate under the assumption of an I(1)-regressor.
respect to the equity-ratio is with κ
κ+1
= 0.077 statistically significant under
both the I(0) and I(1) assumption for e.15 If the equity-ratio influences the
long-run stock of capital through influencing the marginal cost of finance
(interest rate on debt), these estimates imply an elasticity of the cost of
finance with respect to the equity-ratio that is equal to κ
θ
' 0.081, which is
only moderate.
The OLS-estimates for the elasticity with respect to equity is slightly
lower than the PFM-OLS-estimate. This is quite in line with what one
would expect: High realizations of z induce losses and will therefore lower
the equity-ratio. Other explanations, such as older firms being less produc-
tive and more equity financed are mostly controlled for by the fixed eﬀect.
15If e exhibits lag-dependency, however, the parameter-estimate of β may be biased.
In section 4.3 this issue is discussed in more detail using the German dataset. For the
German data, we show the bias from lag-dependency to be negative, if present.
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Although there are diﬀerences among subsample estimates these are insignif-
icant, except for two estimates. Therefore, we conclude the model to be
reasonably specified as a homogeneous panel.
Compared to the estimates of Caballero et al. (1995) the PFM-OLS esti-
mates of the cost-elasticity are much closer to its neoclassical-theory value of
1. Moreover, the variation between the industry specific estimates is slightly
smaller.
With the regression estimates it is now possible to construct a time seriesbzit for each firm. The series is constructed using all 7147 observations.16
4.2.5 Investment behavior
4.2.5.1 Density and conditional expectations estimates
Since the structure of our investment model is highly nonlinear, and the
functional forms of the profit function and distributions involved are not
quite clear, a nonparametric estimation is most fruitful.17
Figure 4.1 shows the distribution of within transformed investment rates
conditional on the capital-imbalance bz. The distribution has been estimated
with a normal-kernel estimator and a fixed window width of 0.12×n−16 , both
z and i have been standardized. The relationship is as expected: Firms with
lower z invest more. More surprisingly and in line with the model the distri-
bution of investment rates has two peaks for high mandated investments.
For firms with an unproductive capital stock, we find three peaks in the
distribution, one where no disinvestment occurs, one with partial (uncon-
strained optimal) disinvestment and one peak for nearly full disinvestment,
16However, 3% of the observations were discarded as outliers with respect to the within
transformed investment-rate. We do so by removing the top 0.5 % observations and the
bottom 2.5 %.
17The non-parametric estimates presented in this section were generated in autumn 2000.
At that time, computational eﬀort of the variable window width estimator still played some
role . This forced us to rely on less computational intense estimation techniques, such as
k-nn estimators. At the time, the estimates presented in section 4.3 were generated (Spring
2003), this issue was of much lesser importance, as the computer system available then
was about 10 times faster.
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being again perfectly in line with the model. However, these findings are on
the boundary of the support, where the estimator becomes less reliable.
Figure 4.1: Density of the investment-rate distribution conditional on z
However the distributional findings are not completely supportive: Most
firms do by far not remove their capital-imbalance completely in case they in-
vest. One explanation for this could be time-to build constraints which cause
investment to be spread over two accounting periods. Another explanation
is that many of the firms in our sample are large firms. These are themselves
aggregates of many establishments. Therefore, given z, the model presented
above would yield an approximate investment rate of n
m
i(e, z) for a company
with m independent establishments of which n establishments adjust. The
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distribution of n would then be given by a binomial distribution B with:18
P (n|z, e) = B(n|m,G(Ω(e, z))
When the number m of establishments per firm is large enough we would
expect to hardly ever see zero investment rates for larger z in our model.
Moreover, if heterogeneous capital goods indeed matter, aggregation over
these goods will result in a downward bias of second order derivatives. (Gools-
bee and Gross, 2000).
Figure 4.2: Expected investment-rate i conditional on e and z
Figure 4.2 presents the expected investment rates conditional on the log
equity-to-capital ratio and mandated investment. For the estimation a 360-
nearest neighborhood (k-NN), local linear, Epanechnikov-kernel estimator19
18Note that, investment decisions in heterogeneous capital goods as in Goolsbee and
Gross (2000) or for diﬀerent establishments or plants of one company would - strictly
speaking - not be independent in our model, as investment decisions are linked through
their eﬀect on the balance sheet.
19This means, when estimating the expected investment rate E (i) at (e, z) we drop all,
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has been used. The choice of k = 360 is approximately equivalent to twice
the fixed window-width used for density estimation.20 The window-width has
been chosen by ”eye-balling”, but tends to slightly undersmooth the condi-
tional expectation estimator on the center of the support. Especially for sec-
ond order-derivative estimation, this problem becomes much more apparent.
Therefore, when estimating second-order derivatives (see below), a combina-
tion of 720-nearest-neighborhood and fixed window-width (of h = 4n−1/10)
kernel is used. This eﬀectively approximates variable window-width estima-
tors, but is computationally much faster.
Figure 4.2 shows that the investment function is nonlinear in a many-
fold sense: For a large equity-ratio, investment is a convex function of the
capital-imbalance, highly indebted firms investment mostly only disinvest
and for these firms investment is concave in fundamentals. In our model
this is a result of the concavity of the earnings-function and the fixed costs.
A higher equity-ratio raises investment, but only when fundamentals allow
so.21 Therefore, this results supports our pecking-order, fixed-adjustment-
cost model. Moreover, for very low productivity equity-ratio first has to
reach some threshold to influence investment, i.e. to stop sharp disinvest-
ment. Again this is very much in line with our pecking-order, fixed-cost
model. And as a last (but not really surprising) deviation from the linear
model, the second order derivative of equity seems to be negative, at least
for low z.
To better visualize the eﬀect of ignoring the important interaction of eq-
uity and capital-imbalance and thus the non-linear structure for investment,
but the 360 data points that are nearest to (e, z) in Euklidean distance.
Then we estimate E (i) at (e, z) running a weighted least-squares regression, for which
the weights are calculated using an Epachenikov-kernel function. See Pagan and Ullah
(1999) for details.
20The optimal k for k-NN estimators and the optimal window-width h are linked by
k = nh4/6 in the two dimensional case (Pagan and Ullah, 1999, p. 91).
21Note that we have not included any long-run eﬀect of equity in generating the capital
imbalance estimates.
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the generalized additive model
E[i|(e, z)] = m1(z) +m2(e) (4.12)
has also been estimated.
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 now present the estimates for the generalized additive
model. As the identifying restriction in a generalized additive model is arbi-
trary, we employ diﬀerent restrictions for figures 4.3 and 4.4: While in figure
4.3 E[m2(e)] = 0 was used, in figure 4.4 E[m1(z)] = 0 is chosen. This makes
it easier to visualize the relative changes in the investment rate caused by
changes in z and e.
Still there is some sign of non-linearity of investment in z. However, this
is very minor, as in general the function is close to linear. Clearly this shows,
how misleading it can be if one neglects (non-linear and) cross-eﬀects. This
bias becomes even worse for the estimate of m2(e) in figure 4.4:
For low equity-ratios there is no eﬀect, whereas for high equity-ratios the
eﬀect is clearly positive. However, we have seen a clearly positive eﬀect for
low equity as soon as productivity is high enough. Moreover from figure 4.2,
this eﬀect is decreasing if equity rises, while in figure 4.4 it is increasing in
e. This no-eﬀect result, when equity is low, has appeared in earlier studies in
the form of apriori as financially constrained considered firms reacting less
on increases in cash flow (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997). Therefore, figure 4.4
sheds some new light on these results, too: It may well be that a misspecifica-
tion bias drives this evidence that has been brought forward as an argument
against financial constraints playing a prominent role in investment decisions.
The eﬀect of the within transformation can be seen, when comparing
figure 4.4 to figure 4.5 and 4.6, where we report the estimates without trans-
formation. This allows to use the full dataset and not only firms with at least
five observations, therefore, the full dataset has been used for the estimates
in figure 4.5. For figure 4.6 the restricted dataset was used.
Interestingly, the eﬀect seems to be U-shaped. This could be due to some
underlying economic structure or to the unreliability of nonparametric esti-
4.2. EVIDENCE FROM A SAMPLE OF UK FIRMS 67
-1-0.8-0 .6-0.4-0.200.20.40.60.81
-0.4
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
capita l-imbalance z
ex
pe
ct
ed
 in
ve
st
m
en
t i
expected investment
density o f z       
Figure 4.3: Generalized additive model: m1(z)
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Figure 4.4: Generalized additive model: m2(e)
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Figure 4.5: Genralized additive model, without transformation, full sample: m2(e)
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Figure 4.6: Generalized additive model, without transformation, restricted sam-
ple: m2(e)
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mates near the boundary of the support. If there is an economic explanation
for this, it has to rely on firm- or industry-characteristics of the very indebted
firms. A theoretical explanation for this will be brought forward in chapter
5.
4.2.5.2 Average derivative estimators
A major drawback of the nonparametric estimates are their wide confidence
bounds. Thus, to draw more reliable conclusions, it is necessary to estimate
average derivatives of i(z, e) = E(i|z, e) directly. This yields much closer
confidence bounds because nonparametric average-derivative estimators con-
verge with parametric rates of convergence (Rilstone, 1991). The estimates
are reported in tables 4.4 and 4.5.
Several nonparametric estimators for the average derivative are available
in our panel data setting (Ullah and Roy, 1998). E.g. for the local linear
estimator, there are immediately two procedures to estimate the derivative
at hand. The local linear estimator is basically a locally weighted version of
an OLS estimator. Typically it is derived from a first order Taylor expansion
around the point (z, e), at which the function is estimated, i.e.
ijt = E(i|z, e) + (zjt − z) bz (z, e) + (ejt − e) be (z, e) + ujt . (4.13)
Therefore, we can numerically generate b∗ := ∂(z,e)bE(i|z, e) or alternatively
take b∗∗ :=
³bbz,bbe´ as their direct estimates. The weights are generated
according to the kernel-function chosen, with K = diag(K(z, e)). When we
denote a vector of ones by ι, the matrix of regressors by
X := [(zjt − z) (ejt − e)]j=1..Nt=1..Tj (4.14)
and the vector of observed investment-rates by
−→
i , we obtain:
[bE(i|z, e) b∗∗(z, e)] = βOLS(K1/2−→i , K1/2 [ι X]). (4.15)
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Both estimators are asymptotically normally distributed, but have a diﬀerent
variance. Moreover, in small samples the bias is diﬀerent and they perform
diﬀerently. In most cases the numerical estimator b∗ should be preferable
(Ullah and Roy, 1998). However, a drawback of this estimator is that the
variance of its averaged form is not yet known (Pagan and Ullah, 1999).
In our panel data setting, additionally the fixed eﬀects estimator of Ullah
and Roy (1998) is available.22 This estimator bFE is locally weighted OLS
of:
ijt − ij. − i.t + i.. = (zjt − zj. − z.t + z..) bz (z, e)
+ (ejt − ej. − e.t + e..) be (z, e) + ujt − uj. − u.t + u.. (4.16)
The weights are diﬀerent to those used for the pooled estimator in our
setting. For the pooled estimator we used the within-transformed data to
measure the distance of the evaluation point and the observations, while the
fixed eﬀects estimator uses the original data. The advantage of this estimator
is that assumption 4.1 is no longer needed to let the estimates be interpretable
in a sensible manner. All we need to assume is the investment function to
exhibit fixed idiosyncratic and time eﬀects and to be otherwise homogenous
among the firms in the original (not within transformed) quantities. As we
will see below, results do not qualitatively depend on the estimator chosen.
The average derivative estimators are generated as the mean of the point-
wise estimates. Average-derivatives over a subset of observations are calcu-
lated by using the conditional mean (conditional on the observation falling
into the subsample) and not by re-estimating for the subsample.
The cross- and higher-order-derivatives are computed as numerical es-
timates of these quantities using (4.13). As for the first-order derivative
numerical estimator the asymptotic variance is not yet known.
For the second-order-derivatives the undersmoothing of the nearest neigh-
borhood estimator in the center of the distribution becomes a more apparent
22Note that we also use within-transformed data in estimating (4.13) .
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problem. Therefore, we generate the weights K in (4.15) as average of a
720 nearest-neighborhood Epanechnikov kernel and a fixed window-width
Epanechnikov kernel. The fixed window width is calculated as h = n−1/10.
The implied window width dk of the nearest neighborhood estimator varies,
depending on the evaluation point xi at which we estimate. We set dk (xi)
equal to the maximum distance (to xi) of the 720 points of data being nearest
to xi. The weight (kernel) of a point of data x is hence calculated as
K(x|xi) = 1
2
·
K1
µ
xi − x
dk(xi)
¶
+K2
µ
xi − x
h
¶¸
.
This is computationally very eﬃcient and gives a variable window-width,
which is neither too small on the border nor on the center of the support,
so that the estimator should not be too heavily under- or oversmoothed.
Furthermore and within a certain range, window-width selection has been
reported to be of a lesser issue for average derivative estimators, as they
are generally not too sensitive to window-width selection,23 as long as the
averages are not dominated by a few outliers.
4.2.5.3 Average derivative estimates
The average derivative estimates for all four estimators are reported in table
4.4. Although the various estimators yield quantitatively slightly diﬀerent
estimates, they qualitatively do not diﬀer: Both the equity-ratio and the
capital-imbalance have a significant eﬀect. Moreover and more surprisingly,
the derivative with respect to the equity-ratio is about twice as large as the
elasticity of the optimal stock of capital with respect to the equity-ratio. The
diﬀerence is both economically and statistically significant. This also holds
true if one requests higher levels of significance to account for the dependence
of the short-run and long-run estimates.24 Therefore, for the DTI-Database,
23See Pagan and Ullah (1999).
24Taking the standard deviations as reported above and the asymptotic distributions as
approximation, the 5% one-sided upper confidence bound for β is 0.1368, while the lower
5% one-sided confidence bound for b
∗∗
e
is 0.1425. If both estimators were independent, this
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Table 4.4: Average first-order derivatives of the investment rate i(e, z)
Number of observations: N = 6950 std. deviation
derivative b
∗
b
∗∗
b
FE
b
∗
720,f ix
a for b
∗∗
− ∂î
∂z
0.5057 0.5146 0.5341 0.5137 0.0068
∂î
∂e
0.1555 0.1588 0.1782 0.1450 0.0097
aestimated with a mixture of fixed window-width and 720-NN-Kernel.
Table 4.5: Average second-order derivatives
of the investment rate i(e, z)
derivative full Samplea low zb high ec
∂2i
∂z2
0.2931 0.3838 0.3565
∂2i
∂e2
0.1079 −0.106 −0.150
∂2i
∂e∂z
0.1078 −0.123 0.2257
N 6922 2284 2353
a e and z within the 0.5% and 99.5% quantiles .
b e within the 0.5% and 99.5%, z within the 0.5% and 33% quantiles.
c z within the 0.5% and 99.5%, e within the 66% and 99.5% quantiles.
we can reject both the hypothesis H00 and H
1
0 , i.e. finance matters in both
the short and the long-run but influences the frequency of adjustment much
stronger, than it influences the optimal stock of capital.
Table 4.5 reports the higher-order derivative estimates and reveals some
interesting results as well: We find a clear evidence for convexity in z for both
the total sample average and the local averages over low z. Moreover and as
predicted by the theoretical model, for low z the cross-derivative is clearly
negative. Therefore, all empirical results are in line with the investment
model that includes fixed adjustment cost and capital market imperfections.
Due to the slow rate of convergence of nonparametric multivariate density
estimators, a meaningful test of forecasting performance of the generalized
Markov-chain-model proposed in chapter 3.3. does not seem to be achievable
with an unbalanced panel of only about 7000 observations over 13 years.
would of course equal an one-sided 0.25% test.
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Therefore, a forecasting performance test remains open to further research.
Maybe a series estimator for the investment function could help to overcome
the need for very large data samples.
4.3 Evidence from a sample of German firms
So far from our analysis of the UK data the main claim of this thesis seems
well supported. To provide additional empirical support of our hypothesis we
will now analyze a German company accounting dataset, the ”Bonner Stich-
probe”. Moreover, we will also address some econometric issues left out in the
last section, i.e. especially we want to account for the lagged dependency of
the equity-ratio. Additionally, we will complement the nonparametric analy-
sis with a non-structural parametric one and also will present results for the
long-run estimates from a number of diﬀerent estimators. Furthermore, the
analysis of the German data complements the analysis of the UK one, as we
use a diﬀerently constructed measure of fundamental incentives.
4.3.1 Brief description of the data
The ”Bonner Stichprobe” is a sample of annual company accounts of German
companies. Most of these companies are large listed stock companies. The
data covers the time-period 1960 to 1997. The panel is unbalanced and
contains 694 companies (observational units) and 18943 observations in total.
Thus, the average time in the sample is 28.7 years.
The data bank includes complete profit- and loss-statements as well as
annual accounting data. Moreover, for the very most company-years data on
average wages and salaries as well as the number of employees is reported.
Unfortunately, after firms which are holdings, multi-corporate compa-
nies, or business trusts are removed from the sample, sample-size falls sub-
stantially. Additionally, we have to drop a few firm-years for which data
seemed inconsistent with usual accounting standards (e.g. negative depreci-
ation, very high appreciation). This leaves us with a sample of about 10000
74 CHAPTER 4. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
observations. Although–as Goolsbee and Gross (2000) report–assuming a
homogeneous capital good biases the estimated investment function towards
a linear specification, it is necessary to do so in this section, since many firms
do not report stock and depreciation of land and buildings and machinery
separately.
If removing a single observation (due to data inconsistency) splits a firm-
series in two parts which are long enough to be sensibly analyzed, the second
part of the series is identified as a diﬀerent firm. If the missing observation
separated the series in a very short and a longer one, the short one was
completely removed, i.e. only firms with five or more consecutive observa-
tions remain in the sample. Additionally, single observations were removed,
if the investment rate diﬀered from the mean by 5 times the standard devi-
ation (removing 11 observations), diﬀered from the firm specific log-equity
ratio by 4 standard deviations (39 observations), or if the turnover-change
diﬀered from the mean by 6-times the standard deviation (14 observations).
Moreover, firms were excluded, if their average wage-share or proxied aver-
age cost-of-capital share25 exceeded 70% (removing 111 observations). This
leaves us with 449 firms and a total of 9731 observations, making an average
of 21.67 accounting years per firm.
The stock of capital series has been generated using the perpetual inven-
tory method, investment, wages and profit were deflated using the producer-
price index for investment goods.
Investment-ratios exhibit moderate excess skewness and kurtosis, reflect-
ing the fact, that most firms in the sample are aggregates of many plants.
However, investment is typically a highly concentrated activity only at the
plant level. Using the widely employed cut-oﬀ value of 30% for the defini-
tion of an investment spike, we find that 17.4% of all firm years exhibit an
investment-spike, accounting for 36.1 % of all investment.
As the time-dimension compared to the number of observational units
is only moderate and the sample is unbalanced, the Breitung-Meyer (1994)
25See section 4.3.3.
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Table 4.6: Descriptive Statistics "Bonner-Stichprobe"
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
investment-rate 9770 0.210 0.120 -0.140 0.8254
capital 9770 164.97 491.50 .03631 6893.2
equity-ratio 9770 .40287 .1395 .01561 0.9371
real wage 9770 14.803 4.969 1.7556 36.908
total value added (turnover) 9770 464.70 1415.4 0 20584
No. Employees 9770 6009.0 17813 4 215800
Table 4.7: Breitung-Meyer Unit-Root Tests
Variable estim. root sign. of estim. root ≥ 1
log No. Employees 1.034 1
log turnover 1.010 1
log capital 1.008 1
log equity-ratio 0.965 0
Πˆ 1.010 1
x 0.965 0
test is employed to test for unit-roots. The hypothesis of a unit root can-
not be rejected for capital, revenues, the number of employees, and for the
measure of capital-productivity Πˆ, which is derived below. We can however
reject the unit-root hypothesis for the equity-ratio. Also for the cointegra-
tion regression–specified below–we can reject the null of a unit-root in the
cointegration error (and thus the null of no cointegration).
4.3.2 Empirical model
Again, for the empirical model assume that revenues Y are generated by
capitalK and labor L according to a Cobb-Douglas function, which is subject
to decreasing returns to scale,26 i.e. εLi + ε
K
i < 1 and
Y = ΞLεLi KεKi . (4.17)
26The assumption of decreasing returns to scale is well supported by the data, for every
firm in the sample εL
i
+ εK
i
< 1 holds.
Furthermore, note that the parameters εL
i
and εK
i
will be firm-specific.
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Ξ is the parameter characterizing productivity. If labor is perfectly flexible
adjustable and w is the wage, we obtain
wL = εLi Y (4.18)
and thus
Y =
"
Ξ
µ
εLi
w
¶εL
i
# 1
1−εL
i
K
ε
K
i
1−εL
i . (4.19)
Take the equity-ratio as not influenced by the level of the capital stock,
then the long-run optimal stock of capital k∗ is determined by the first or-
der condition that equates marginal revenues and marginal costs mc.27 The
optimal (log) stock of capital is thus driven by marginal costs and total
capital-productivity Π,
Πit :=
ln (Ξit) + εLi
¡
ln
¡
εLi
¢
− ln (wit)
¢
1− εLi
. (4.20)
This gives for the optimal capital
k∗it =
¡
1− εLi
¢
1− (εLi + εKi )
[Πit − ln (mcit)] . (4.21)
Yet, this equation has still to be operationalised. Assume, productivity
Ξ is random, e.g. it could follow a geometrical Brownian motion, then Π is
in principle computable from estimates of (4.17) . And if marginal costs were
known, k∗it could be calculated. However, true marginal cost mcit of capital
for each firm i at time t are not directly observable. Nevertheless, under our
assumptions from the previous section, the gap between optimal and realized
stock of capital can still be identified. These assumption are especially:
27If larger firms would have diﬀerent access to capital (e.g. through an equity channel)
then of course mc would need to be corrected for this.
Suppose mc = rt+µi+θk, then the correctly measured optimal stock of capital k
∗∗ would
be k∗∗
it
=
µ
1+ θ (1−ε
L
i )
1−(εLi +εKi )
¶−1
k∗
it
.
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1. kit and k∗it are cointegrated.
28
2. Log-marginal costs split up in an aggregate component rt (e.g. the risk-
free interest rate), a firm specific component µi (e.g. due to firm-specific
risk) and the influence of the equity-ratio γ1eit - which is common across
firms.
Thus, we can estimate rt, µi, γ1 and γ2 from a panel cointegration regres-
sion between k and k∗, using preliminary obtained estimated εˆLi , εˆ
K
i and Πˆit
and
k∗it =
1− εˆLi
1−
¡
εˆLi + εˆ
K
i
¢ hγ1Πˆit − (rt + µi) + γ2eiti . (4.22)
Note, that this specification explicitly allows for a certain degree of tech-
nological heterogeneity among firms.
Once estimates of the optimal stock of capital are obtained, these can be
used in estimating the investment function. As argued before, the functional
form of investment is not clear a priori and highly depends on the distrib-
ution of adjustment cost shocks,29 the technology, the structure of financial
markets,30 etc.. Therefore, again a flexible estimation technique such as a
nonparametric local-linear regression is most appropriate. Yet, we will only
present our estimates of average derivatives, as these are the ”parameters” of
main interest. Additionally we will also estimate the polynomial expression
given below for the investment-rate i. However, to control for firm specific
adjustment costs and firm specific access to capital markets (determining
the long-run equity-ratio), only deviations from firm-specific means x¯j. are
considered:
ijt − ı¯j. =
PX
p=0
QX
q=0
ap,q
¡
xjt − x¯j.
¢p
(ejt − e¯j.)q + vjt. (4.23)
28Of course this assumption can be tested, and we actually can reject the unit-root
hypothesis for the cointegration error x. (See table 2)
29See Caballero and Engel (1999) for a detailed discussion.
30See e.g. Gomes (2001).
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To compute capital imbalances xjt, we take the optimal capital stock of
period t relative to the reported stock of capital at the end of period t− 1.
Given estimates for εLi and ε
K
i , there are two estimators at hand for Π.
One is the direct estimate, taking Ξit as the residuals of (4.17) and using
these together with the estimate for εLi in (4.20) . However, Π can also be
estimated indirectly using the optimality condition for labor, as Cooper and
Haltiwanger (2002) do. This estimate is
eΠindit := ln (witLit)− εˆKi1− εˆLi kit. (4.24)
Just as Cooper and Haltiwanger state for their data, the indirect esti-
mator is less volatile. However, this estimator relies on the hypothesis that
labor could be perfectly flexibly adjusted, which is likely to be wrong for the
German labor-market.
Nevertheless, this estimator will–even due to the inflexibility–perform
better than the residual based one, if there is a transitory as well as a per-
sistent component in the shocks to productivity. E.g. ln (Ξit) could be an
ARIMA process aﬀected by a firm-specific fixed eﬀect, a random walk com-
ponent (driven by aggregate and individual shocks) and a transitory com-
ponent υit. This transitory component should of course not matter for any
employment decisions, if capital and labor are not immediately productive
and adjustment is not costless.31
The direct estimator would include υit as an error term, while the indi-
rect one would correctly measure the productivity expected by the firm (if
managers can observe υit). For transitory shocks to the real wages (wit =
w¯i. + w¯.t + ωit) the same line of argument applies. As wages in the long-run
cannot diﬀer across firms unless they do so due to firm specific reasons, we
can easily identify the transitory shocks as ωit and remove them from the
data. However, this only holds true if working conditions remain relatively
constant across firms over time.
31See Barnett and Sakellaris (1999) for an analoguous argument on for Tobin’s q.
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Nevertheless, it could and should in general be assessed by a technique
similar to the one developed by Erickson and Whited (2001) which estimator
has the lower measurement error. Hence, which estimator is superior is in
the end an empirical question. So this issue is analogous to the problem of
the quality of diﬀerent measures of Tobin’s-q. However, in the non-linear
setting applied here, the application of Erickson and Whited’s method is not
straightforward. Moreover, the amount of data required for this procedure
is quite large. Thus, a more heuristic approach is taken: If the estimator Πˆ
has a low measurement error, first of all γ1 should be close to 1, and second
the estimate for x should be informative for the investment regression. In
the empirical specification employed, it turns out, that the direct estimateeΠdirit is more informative for the investment regression, whereas the indirect
one gives more realistic estimates for γ1. However, simply taking Πˆit :=
1
2
³eΠdirit + eΠindit ´ performs very close to the respective superior estimate for
both the cointegration- and the investment-regression.
4.3.3 Long-run optimal stock of capital
Inspecting the firm-specific average wage-shares, 1
T
P
t
witLit
Yit
, or the firm spe-
cific mean fraction of revenues which compensates for depreciation, 1
T
P
t
δitKit
Yit
,
substantial diﬀerences can be found across firms. Figure 4.7 presents a kernel
density estimate of the time-average wage-shares of firms.
Therefore, we can expect firms to be heterogeneous with respect to their
technology. Hence, using any pooled or panel estimator on
ln (Yit) = ε
L
i ln (Lit) + ε
K
i ln (Kit) + ln (Ξit) (4.25)
would yield biased estimates of the productivity shock. Estimating the pro-
ductivity for each firm is again not really feasible due to data-limitations,
as in any case a dynamic estimator32 and therefore more observations would
32Especially note that estimates just using the levels will be inconsistent. Even taking
first diﬀerences will still not remove all correlation between (∆kt,∆lt) and the productivity
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Figure 4.7: Firm—specific average wage shares
be needed. However the expenditure shares are still valid estimates for εLi
and εKi .
33 To compute the expenditure-shares for capital, the firm average-
depreciation-rates plus a time constant real interest-rate of 3% was used.
Factor productivity Πˆ is then estimated as described above. The coin-
innovation ∆ ln (Ξ)
t
. This however means that one would need at least lagged diﬀerences
as instruments, meaning a loss of 2 observations per firm, and thus limiting the analysis
to firms with at least 5 observations (leaving no degree of freedom in the equations for
some firms then).
33To see this, note that L ,Y andK are endogenuous unit-root processes, all driven in the
long-run by Ξ. Thus (8) gives–loosely speaking–a cointegration relation. However, then
OLS for each firm on this equation is super-consistent, but collapses to εL
i
= 1
Ti
P
witLit
Yit
if we can write the estimation equation with a ”heteroscedastic” error term
witLit = ε
L
i
Yit + Yitvit.
If the error were to come in multiplicatively, the geometric mean were apprpriate. Note
that using the geometric mean instead, does not alter the results significantly.
Still, Caggese (2003, p. 10) has argued that this procedure will lead to biased results,
if labor and capital employment decisions are constrained by some third variable, e.g. by
financial constraints. In our case r might depend on the finacial conditions. Nevertheless,
as we find a only very minor influence of finance on the long-run stock of capital, the bias
can be expected to matter only marginally. More formally, our estimates are consistent
under H00 , the hypothesis we test.
4.3. EVIDENCE FROM A SAMPLE OF GERMAN FIRMS 81
tegration relation (4.22) can then be estimated using the Panel-Dynamic-
OLS-Estimator (PDOLS) following Kao and Chiang (2000), the Panel-Full-
Modified-OLS-Estimator (PFM-OLS) of Phillips and Moon (1999) or OLS
controlling for fixed eﬀects. However, allowing for heterogeneous short-run
dynamics in the PDOLS regression would mean the inclusion of at least 2300
parameters (for 2 lags and 2 leads of first diﬀerence). Therefore, in estimat-
ing the PDOLS estimator, a homogeneous short-run dynamics is assumed
in all but two models (PDOLS-Ind), in which industry specific34 short-run-
dynamics is allowed for. All regressions control for fixed time and firm-eﬀects.
Table 4.8 presents the main results.
Table 4.8: Single-Stage Cointegration regressions
Estimator and Model PDOLS-1 PDOLS-2 PDOLS-Ind-2 PDOLS-Ind-1
γ1
³
Πˆ
´
0.7626*** 0.7404*** 0.7442*** 0.7717***
γ2 (log equity-ratio) -0.0386 -0.0275 -0.0144 -0.0175
No. of Parameters 39 43 378 535
No. of Observations 6612 7447 7447 6612a
No. of Firms 383 416 383 412
Estimator and Model PFM-OLS PFM-OLS OLS FM-std. err. I(1)
γ1
³
Πˆ
´
0.6938*** 0.6009*** 0.6442 0.02768
γ2 (log equity-ratio) -0.0345 -0.0484*(et−1) 0.03813 0.02544
No. of Parameters 39 39 39 std. err. I(0)
No. of Observations 9289 8823 9731 γ1 .02802
No. of Firms 442 442 442 γ2 .02763
***/**/* indicate significance at the 1/5/10% level
Model PDOLS-(Ind-)1 includes 3 lags and leads of ∆Π, whereas model
PDOLS-(Ind-)2 only includes 2 lags and leads, but of both ∆e and ∆Π.
Standard errors are calculated on the basis of the FM-Estimator, using the
average number of observations per firm. Standard errors are generated for
34The industry variable provided in the Bonn Database has been used for classification.
This variable splits up the database in 52 diﬀerent industries. Note however, that this
variable does not coincide with SIC.
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both, the case where the regressors are I(1) and the case where the regressors
are I(0). Significance is indicated on the I(1) basis.
A few remarks on these results are worthwhile. First of all and although
γ1 is significant in all estimations and the estimates are reasonably large,
it is clearly smaller than 1. This means, capital productivity seems to be
either measured with a (stochastic) error or to be simply deterministically
overestimated. Especially in the presence of fixed adjustment costs, we would
rather expect the dynamically optimal stock of capital to exceed the static
one, i.e. γ1 ≥ 1. Nevertheless, γ1 < 1 does not necessarily mean that there
is a severe bias in our later fundamental investment incentives estimate. It
could well be a fixed percentage of revenues, that has to be attributed to
something not modelled, which deterministically drives up the productivity
measure. Another explanation could be that wages endogenously react to
increases in productivity in the long-run–a fact, that is also not modelled.
Again if a fixed fraction of the productivity increase runs into wage-increases,
the estimates should not be severely biased. At any rate, the estimates for
γ1 are well in line with the estimates Caballero et al. (1995) obtained for
their cost-of capital proxy.35
For the estimate of γ2 evidence is mixed assuming the log equity-ratio is
I(1) . However, the unit-root test clearly rejects this hypothesis. Using a for-
mula analogous to the general one provided in Phillips (1995)36 standard er-
rors get slightly larger (the I(0) estimates are of course not super-consistent).
Then, hypothesis H00 , which means the equity-ratio has no influence on the
optimal-stock of capital, cannot be rejected. In any case, all except the
OLS-estimate have a negative sign, saying higher equity ratios lead to lower
optimal stocks of capital, which is contradictory to most of the earlier em-
pirical financing-constraints literature. Also this seems inconsistent with a
”wealth eﬀect on the cost-of-capital” explanation as e.g. in the theoretical
macro-model of Bernanke et al. (1998). However, still the regression results
35However, if adjustment costs strongly dampen the variation of capital, it is well known,
that our estimator will underestimate γ1 by construction (Caballero, 1997, p. 8).
36See equation (14), Phillips (1995, p. 1038).
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have to be interpreted with care, as the equity-ratio may be endogenous.
Fixed eﬀects of diﬀerent ”baseline” access to capital markets are accounted
for by controlling for firm-specific eﬀects. The PDOLS and the PFMOLS
account for the endogeneity of the equity-ratio due to shocks to the stock of
capital. If e.g. larger firms have better access to equity markets and have
reasons of holding larger amounts of equity, which are not related to costs,
our estimators control for this. Firms could e.g. have an incentive to increase
their equity holdings, if a larger stock of equity would yield more flexibility
with their investment decisions. This could economicly explain the diﬀerence
between FM and OLS estimate.
However, if there is lag-dependency in the equity-ratio (for which there
seems to be evidence), or if the contemporaneous shocks to equity and capi-
tal are correlated, the PFM-OLS estimator γˆ+2 is likely to be biased. Yet, γˆ
+
1
remains asymptotically unbiased in all these cases. To remove the contem-
poraneous correlation, one can replace et by et−1 and argue that beginning of
period liquidity determines managerial discount factors. The resulting esti-
mates are reported in column PFM-OLS (et−1). The estimate for γ2 becomes
smaller and is now weakly significant. However, if there is lag dependency,
still the estimator remains biased.
Since γ1 can be estimated consistently in any case, there is another way to
obtain estimates of γ2. If k and k
∗ are indeed cointegrated, kit−γ1Πit−rt−µi
can be expressed as
xˆit := kit − γˆ+1 Πˆit + rˆt + µˆi = γ02eit + γ002eit−1 + C∗ (L) ξit, (4.26)
with a moving-average error-term C∗ (L) ξit on the right hand side and a
the stationary cointegration error on the left hand. Depending on, whether
the beginning-of-period equity-ratio or the end-of-period (respectively during
period) equity determines the managerial discount rate, γ02 or γ
00
2 is zero.
However, the equity-ratio depends of course on its previous realization and
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past and current capital imbalances, so that we have as a second equation
eit = ρeit−1 + η1xˆit + η2xˆit−1 + νit. (4.27)
If now η1 = γ
00
2 = 0 and
∀j ≥ 0 : cov
¡
ξit−j, νit
¢
= 0, (COV)
or γ02 = 0 and
∀j ≥ 0 : cov
¡
ξit−j, νit−1
¢
= 0, (COV*)
the parameters in (4.27) can be consistently estimated recursively as all re-
gressors are predetermined then.37 In a second stage (4.26) can be estimated,
using the fixed-eﬀects OLS-residual νˆit as an instrument for eit.
Since we would rather assume current capital imbalances to influence the
current equity ratio, but not the other way round, models with γ02 = 0 are
the preferred ones, yet this comes at the price that the assumption (COV*)
is more restrictive: If x measures fundamental investment incentives imper-
fectly and current residual changes in equity reflect productivity, assumption
(COV*) will be wrong and our estimates will be biased upwards.
Hence, table 4.9 presents the two-stage estimates for both models. Again,
we cannot reject hypothesisH00 . However, the estimated coeﬃcient for equity
becomes larger. For estimating the investment-function, we use the PDOLS-
Ind-1 model with γ02 = 0. Since the resulting estimates for the influence of
equity are among the larger ones, this makes our test of the frequency eﬀect,
37Strictly speaking, this is only true if T → ∞, as we use fixed eﬀects OLS. Therefore
in small samples, our estimates are biased. However, we are mainly interested in gener-
ating an instrument that is orthogonal to the within transformed variables, but contains
information on et. Hence, one should not interprete the estimates of (4.27) structurally.
To avoid this probelm at least for the estimation of (4.27) we additionally estimate a
IV-regression of this equation in first diﬀerences, in which ∆eit−1 is instrumented by eit−2
and ∆eit−2. Yet, we only obtain ∆νit as error-term, which may be correlated with ξit
under assumption (COV) as ξit and νit−1 may be correlated. Hence, we use ∆νt+1 as
instrument for et. The results are reported under IV-PDOLS, but are not significantly
diﬀerent from the ones obtained by fixed eﬀects OLS. Nevertheless, notice that for (4.26)
the small sample bias only vanishes if one assumes ∀s, t : cov (ξ
is
, νit) = 0.
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i.e. the test of H01 , more conservative.
Now, how do these estimates correspond to an investment-function? In
any steady state, I
K
= const needs to hold. Suppose for simplicity investment
to be a linear function in the capital imbalance and the log-equity-ratio. Of
course, what we measure is not k∗ itself, but the steady-state stock of capital
kS. Define i := i (xˆ, e) . As by construction ∂xˆ
∂e
= −∂kS
∂e
, the implicit function
theorem yields
∂i
¡
xˆS, e
¢
∂xˆ
· dxˆ+ ∂i
¡
xˆS, e
¢
∂e
· de = 0⇒ ∂k
S
∂e
=
∂i(xˆS ,e)
∂e
∂i(xˆS ,e)
∂xˆ
. (4.28)
Of course, if investment would be linear in xˆ and equity e, ∂i
∂e
and ∂i
∂xˆ
were
constants and the average derivatives later estimated would equal these con-
stants. As we will see, the estimated adjustment process is quite slow, with
∂i
∂x
≈ 0.14.38 Therefore, if the linear specification was correct, from our
long-run analysis, ∂i
∂e
can be expected to be very small.
4.3.4 Investment behavior
4.3.4.1 Parametric Analysis
To analyze the investment decisions, with our German data ”mandated in-
vestment” is generated as the diﬀerence between log optimal capital at time
t and end-of-period stock of capital in period t− 1. To construct
xit := k
∗
it − kit−1 = γˆ+1 Πˆit + γˆIV2 eit−1 − (rˆt + µˆi)− kit−1, (4.29)
the estimates of γˆ+1 , γˆ
IV
2 from PDOLS-Ind-1 are used. This specification
has one of the largest influences of equity for the long-run regression. This
makes the test of H10 more conservative. Fixed eﬀects are then removed
as in (4.23) . This controls for inter-firm diﬀerences in the optimal capital
imbalance, i.e. diﬀerent target values for the capital employed. Yet, it is
38This estimate implies a half-life of 4.27 years of technological shocks.
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Table 4.9: Two-Stage Cointegration regressions
Model γ002 = η1 = 0 γ
0
2 = 0
Estimator. PFM-OLS PFM-OLS
γ1
a 0.6938*** 0.6009***
γ2 -0.0118 0.0187
η1 0 (assumed) -0.0177
η2 0.0119 0.0285**
ρ 0.8057*** 0.8058***
No. of Observ. 9364 8897
Estimator. PDOLS-Ind-1 PDOLS-Ind-1
γ1
a 0.7717*** 0.7714***
γ2 -0.0074 0.0310
η1 0 (assumed) -0.0067
η2 0.0107 0.0164
ρ 0.8056*** 0.8056***
N 8897 6720
Estimator PDOLS-2 PDOLS-2
γ1
a 0.7404*** 0.7404***
γ2 -0.0091 0.0287
η1 0 -0.0086
η2 0.1121 0.0184
ρ 0.8056*** 0.8056***
N 6720 6720
Estimator IV-PDOLS-Ind-2 IV-PDOLS-Ind-2
γ1
a 0.7442*** 0.7442***
γ2 0.0475 -0.0311
η1 0 (assumed) -0.0176
η2 0.0058 0.0068
ρ 0.5436*** 0.5458***
***/**/* indicate significance at the 1/5/10% level,
a Std. Err. from first stage PFM-OLS is 0.02833
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not obvious how to estimate rˆt. The coeﬃcients of time-dummies used in the
cointegration regression would also pick up the state of aggregate mandated
investment (which is to the most extent driven by productivity). However,
aggregate mandated investment should not be subtracted from the individual
mandated investment as both together determine the actual investment of a
firm. Hence, we project the series of the time-specific eﬀects obtained from
the cointegration-regression on a series of real-interest rates and take these
projections as estimate of rˆt.39 The equity-ratio used in the regressions is
the equity-ratio taken from the opening balances. Table 4.10 presents the
regression-results.40
Essentially, the approach taken in equation (4.3) generalizes the error-
correction model
∆kit = α (x∗i − xit) +
LX
j=1
γj
¡
∆χit−j
¢
+ φit
in which χ :=
³
k Π e
´T
. The generalization is derived as α is taken to
be a function (here approximated by a polynomial) of (e, x) . Neglecting the
short run dynamics, we obtain
ijt =
"
α0 +
pX
j=1
qX
k=1
αjk (xit − x¯i.)j (eit − e¯i.)k
#
((x∗i − x¯i.)− (xit − x¯i.)) + φit.
The capital imbalance x∗ that is chosen upon investment is typically diﬀerent
from the average x¯i. since depreciation deterministically increases the amount
of mandated investment between adjustments.
The parametric estimates show only a moderate degree convexity of the
investment function with respect to the capital imbalance. And so the aver-
39The correlation between the real-interst-rates and the time-specific eﬀects is quite low.
this reflects the fact, that the aggregate (average) capital-imbalance is mainly driven by
productivity respectively demand-shocks, which vary more than the real interest-rate.
40To preclude that our results are driven by extreme observations of mandated invest-
ment, we remove all observations from the sample which deviate by more than 4 standard
deviations from the firm-specific average in the capital-imbalance measure.
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Table 4.10: Short-Run Parametric Estimates
Model 1 Model 2
Variable Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.) Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.)
x 0.1495*** 0.0058 0.1504*** 0.0042
x2 0.0650*** 0.0112 0.0662*** 0.0111
x3 -0.0416* 0.0231 -0.0429*** 0.0073
x4 -0.0415*** 0.0113 -0.0414** 0.0110
x5 -0.0204 0.0162 — —
e 0.0246* 0.0091 0.0162*** 0.0045
e2 0.0666** 0.0258 0.0329** 0.0132
e3 -0.1430 0.0796 — —
e4 -0.0792* 0.0592 — —
e5 0.2718 0.1274 — —
xe 0.0358*** 0.0130 0.0347*** 0.0122
(xe)2 -0.0630 0.0439 -0.0840** 0.0398
xe2 0.0152 0.0288 — —
x2e 0.0240 0.0216 — —
const -0.0060*** 0.0014 -0.0052*** 0.0013
Adj. R2 0.1977 — 0.1973 —
No. Obs. 8973 — 8973 —
***/**/* significant at the 1/5/10% level
age second order derivative ∂
2i
∂x2
equals only 0.126.41 Moreover, the investment
function becomes concave when x is about as large as one standard deviation.
However, this should not be taken at face value as evidence against the fixed
adjustment cost model. It rather reflects the fact, that most companies in
the sample are multi-establishment / multi-plant firms, so their individual
investment function rather equals an average over many investment functions
of diﬀerent plants with mean capital imbalance x. Due to this fact–and as
e.g. Whited (2002) or Goolsbee and Gross (2000) argue–the observed in-
vestment function becomes less curved.
In fact it is the rather stark eﬀect of equity, that would be at odds with
a convex cost model, where there would be no frequency eﬀect of equity
41Average parametric derivatives are calculated by diﬀerencing the estimated function
(Model 2) and then averaging over the observation-wise calculated derivatives.
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Figure 4.8: Investment function, e and x between 1.5 std. errors
on investment. This is also reflected by an important interaction between
fundamental capital imbalance and the financial variable. The fundamental
influence is the strongest one and explains most of the (explained) variation.
Moreover, the adjusted R2 is notably large for an investment regression,
pointing towards a reasonable quality of xˆ in measuring investment incen-
tives.42 Moreover, as the employed estimation procedure is close to the one
of Cooper and Haltiwanger (2002), we might interpret the larger R2 as ad-
ditional evidence for substantial technological heterogeneity (which is one of
the major diﬀerences between this paper and their one). Figure 4.8 plots
the shape of the estimated investment function for 1.5 standard deviations
around the means of x and e.
In Table 4.11 average derivatives for the parametric model are reported.
The results are in line with the frequency-eﬀect interpretation of short term
influences of equity on investment introduced in Chapter 3: Equity has a
42Typical R2 statistics in most (homogeneous) investment regressions (using q or some
other estimator for productivity) range in between 5 and 10%. See for instance Cooper
and Haltiwanger (2002) or Barnett and Sakellaris (1999).
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much larger eﬀect if there are strong fundamental investment incentives any-
way. Interestingly, the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) result, that apriorily
financially constrained firms are less sensitive to changes in liquidity is repli-
cated. Firms with below ”normal” equity exhibit a far lower average deriva-
tive with respect to equity.
Table 4.11: Parametric estimates
of average derivative ∂i∂e
x ≤ 0 x > 0
e ≤ 0 −0.0001 0.0110
e > 0 0.0194 0.0328
4.3.4.2 Non-parametric Analysis
As the parametric analysis naturally depends on the choice of the functional
form, also a nonparametric analysis has been employed. Additionally, this al-
lows to obtain direct inference on the derivatives of expected investment with
respect to finance and fundamentals. To analyze the data non-parametrically,
the data are pooled after individual fixed eﬀects have been removed. As the
(average) derivatives of the investment-function are the main points of in-
terest, we concentrate on estimating these derivatives only. The derivatives
are calculated by employing a local linear kernel-estimator to the data. For
the derivative estimators, we have discussed the various alternatives in the
section about the UK-data. Here, we will use the following two: One is Li
et al.‘s (1998) (analytic) estimator from the local linear regression. As be-
fore, the average derivative is computed by taking the sample average over
the pointwise estimates
³
βˆx (x) βˆe (e)
´
, which are generated by weighted
least squares on
i (xj, ej) = m (x, e) + βx (x) (xj − x) + βe (ej − e) + uj. (4.30)
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The weights themselves are computed using a kernel-function.43 Alterna-
tively, numerical derivative (of i w.r.t. argument s) can be used, which is
obtained (at point t) as
eβs (t) = mˆ ¡x+ 12ht,ses¢− mˆ ¡x− 12ht,ses¢ht,s , (4.31)
where ht,s is the (variable) window-width used to generate kernels at evalua-
tion point t, ek is the s-th unit-vector, and mˆ again is the weighted least
squares estimate.44 Again, average derivatives are computed as sample-
means of eβ (t) . Both the analytic and the numerical average derivative esti-
mator converge with parametric rates.
As kernel, a Gaussian-product kernel has been employed. To generate
window width ht,s, the adaptive two-stage estimator for the window width
was used, starting with a fixed window width of σsn−1/4, in the first stage,
in which σs stands for the standard deviation of argument s.45
Table 4.12 reports average derivative estimates for both the direct esti-
mators and the numerical ones. Additionally, the mean of all estimates that
fall inside the interval of ±5 standard deviations around the previously calcu-
lated mean are reported as eβcens. These are less aﬀected by outliers generated
by undersmoothing and low density in the tails of the distribution.
The overall speed of adjustment, measured by the derivative of the invest-
ment rate with respect to the capital imbalance x is with 0.137 again rather
low. This speed of adjustment is equivalent to an overall half-life of an capital
imbalance of 4.7 years. In comparison to that, the mean eﬀect of equity is
with 0.018 quite substantial. An eﬀect of that size in the linear model (4.28)
would result in a long-run elasticity of approximately 0.131. This is far larger
than the previously obtained long-run estimate. Moreover, the equity eﬀect
43Note that this estimator is asymptotically equivalent to the Rilstone (1991) estimator.
44In most cases the numerical estimator has better small sample (and asymptotic bias)
properties (Ullah and Roy, 1998). However, its asymptotic variance is not yet known
(Pagan and Ullah, 1999).
45Note that in comparison to pointwise derivative estimations, this choice of window
width leads to substatial undersmoothing.
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Table 4.12: Average nonparametric derivative estimates
(a): Full sample
β¯x β¯e
overall 0.137 0.018
std. error46 0.0009 0.0013
eβx eβe
0.134 0.020
— —
eβcensx eβcense
0.138 0.018
— —
(b): Stratified
Case β¯x β¯e
x > 0 e > 0 0.163 0.043
e ≤ 0 0.137 -0.021
x ≤ 0 e > 0 0.124 0.043
e ≤ 0 0.126 -0.003
eβx eβe
0.152 0.050
0.126 -0.018
0.121 0.043
0.141 -0.002
eβcensx eβcense
0.159 0.044
0.129 -0.016
0.127 0.039
0.141 -0.002
measured is an eﬀect additionally to the one equity has on x. Hence, testing
H10 means testing the significance of βe = 0. And therefore, we are clearly
not able to reject H10 and can expect second order and cross eﬀects to be
important and of a significant amount. This is validated by looking at the
sample stratified by values of e and x, especially the numerical ones:
If equity is high, firms react 21% faster to positive mandated investment,
than they do if equity is low.47 For low mandated investment there is no such
strong eﬀect. Interestingly, the eﬀect, equity has, again seems to be rather
U-shaped, if there is high mandated investment. An explanation for this
could be a Brander and Lewis (1986 and 1988) type strategic eﬀect, which
we will discuss in chapter 5. Using the robust estimator, that calculates the
averages without using ”outliers”, the overall picture remains the same.
4.3.5 Discussion
Now as we have also used the ”Bonner Stichprobe” to test hypothesis H00
and H10 - the ”long-run” and ”short-run versions” of the Modigliani and
Miller theorem, if one likes - we can state the following, with respect to these
hypothesis:
47The halve-life is 3.9 years for high equity, whereas it is 4.7 years for low equity.
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1. H00 can only be rejected on fairly weak grounds, so in the long-run
finance does not seem to matter (a lot).
2. Since the estimated short-run influence of equity, measured by the aver-
age derivative, is both substantial and significant,H10 has to be rejected.
This holds true, as we only tested for additional short-run influences of
liquidity on investment.
Hence, the question arises, why there is the additional short-run eﬀect
that has been found. Inspecting the short-run parametric and nonparametric
estimates, we find a substantial interaction of finance and fundamentals in
determining investment.
To further condense the results and to give them a more intuitive appeal,
Table 4.13 presents (geometric) means of pointwisely calculated half-lifes
of capital imbalances. These are calculated as ln 0.5
ln(1−βˆ(x))
. As the pointwise
derivatives exhibit large variation, and sometimes obtain negative values, the
derivatives are reestimated with a three times larger window width. Again
the larger x, the faster is investment, and if firms wish to invest, more equity
speeds up investment. Therefore, a pure ”net-wealth eﬀect on cost-of-capital”
model can be rejected. Reading Table 4.13 linewise, we find some important
additional evidence for the non-convex adjustment cost and financial fric-
tions, but against a model that only incorporates fixed transaction cost in
finance. Without analyzing second-order-eﬀects, these models are typically
hard to discriminate empirically (Gomes, 2001). The evidence we find is,
that investment is ”more convex”, i.e. has a stronger curvature, in the fun-
damentals, if equity is high. However, under the pure transaction cost model,
the reverse would hold true. Thus, our results could be summed up as: ad-
justment costs are non-convex and finance influences the speed of adjustment
substantially.
So far, we omitted any short run dynamics to keep the empirical model
and the theoretical one as closely together as possible. This gave our em-
pirical model a structural interpretation. One may, however, be tempted to
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Table 4.13: Average half-lifes
of capital-imbalances (in years)
x ≤ 0 x > 0
e ≤ 0 5.06 4.41
e > 0 5.19 4.07
argue that the non-linearities found are a mere result of the omitted dynamic
links between changes in productivity, capital, and the equity-ratio. While a
structural interpretation for including the lagged change in the stock of cap-
ital could be a delivery lag, an interpretation for other short-run dynamics is
far from obvious. Moreover, even if we find a significant short-run dynamics,
this could well be due to an imperfect approximation of the true functional
form which is picked up by the first-diﬀerences of the equity-ratio and pro-
ductivity. Table 4.14 presents the regression results from a model as in Table
4.10 augmented by some short-run dynamics.
Though the point estimates change, the overall structure of the estimated
error-correction, i.e. investment function, remains the same. Hence, our
results seem–at least to a certain extent–robust to the inclusion of short-
run dynamics. However, the levels of significance of the terms involving
equity drop.
4.4 Summary of the empirical results
In chapter 3 we presented a stylized model of financial frictions and fixed
adjustment-cost. In chapter 4 we now have tested this model against alter-
natives. To do so, we analyzed two samples of company accounts, one from
the UK and one from Germany. Both samples comprised a large number of
company accounting data of (large) companies. And for both, we generated
a measure of fundamental investment incentives and took the equity-ratio as
an indicator of the financial status of a firm. Although, the way we generated
the fundamental investment-incentive measure was diﬀerent for both data,
qualitatively we obtained quite similar results.
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Table 4.14: short-run parametric estimates, dynamics-augmented
Model 1 Model 2
Variable Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.) Coeﬃcient (Std. Err.)
∆kit−1 0.1627*** 0.0064 0.1630*** 0.0064
∆eit -0.0204** 0.0064 -0.0210*** 0.0064
∆eit−1 0.0276*** 0.0073 0.0281*** 0.0073
∆Πit 0.0340*** 0.0073 0.0340*** 0.0073
∆Πit−1 0.0458*** 0.0074 0.0459*** 0.0074
(k∗it − kit−1) 0.1586*** 0.0060 0.1580*** 0.0044
(k∗it − kit−1)
2 0.0394*** 0.0116 0.0405*** 0.0115
(k∗it − kit−1)
3 -0.0579** 0.0251 -0.0458*** 0.0081
(k∗it − kit−1)
4 -0.0255* 0.0132 -0.0237* 0.0128
(k∗it − kit−1)
5 0.0067 0.0191 — —
eit−1 0.0194** 0.0091 0.0105** 0.0049
e2it−1 0.0604** 0.0260 0.0306** 0.0134
e3it−1 -0.1302 0.0805 — —
e4it−1 -0.0809 0.0595 — —
e5it−1 0.2252 0.1310 — —
(k∗it − kit−1) eit−1 0.0239* 0.0135 0.0205 0.0128
[(k∗it − kit−1) eit−1]
2 -0.0550 0.0501 -0.0972** 0.0432
(k∗it − kit−1) e2it−1 0.0373 0.0315 — —
(k∗it − kit−1)
2 eit−1 0.0084 0.0240 — —
const -0.0094*** 0.0013 -0.0088*** 0.0013
Adj. R2 0.2637 0.2635
No. Obs. 8153 8153
***/**/* significant at the 1/5/10% level
Note that k∗it := γˆ
+
1 Πˆit + rˆt + µˆi + γ002eit−1, x := (k∗it − kit−1)
One major outcome of our theoretical model was to identify the diﬀer-
ence between a short-run eﬀect of liquidity on the frequency of investment
and a long-run eﬀect on the optimal stock of capital. While the standard
agency or oligopoly models of investment and finance48 predict only a strong
48See e.g. Myers (1977) or Brander and Lewis (1986). Moreover, very most of modern
macroeconomic literarure, which emphasizes the role of a financial accelerator mechanism,
builds upon a long-run influence of finance via the cost-of-capital. Examples are: Bernanke
et al. (1995, 1998), Céspedes et al. (2000) or Devereux and Lane (2001).
In contrast, our findings are more in line with the earlier literaure such as Meyer and
Kuh (1957, pp. 198). However, other modern macroeconomic models of financial frictions
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influence of liquidity on the chosen stock of capital, the model of chapter 3
rather suggested a strong short-run eﬀect. This stronger short-run than long-
run influence of the equity-to-capital ratio on investment, is exactly what is
empirically found, so that in this point the empirical evidence supports our
theoretical model. In detail, we have found the long-run influence of finance
on the stock of capital to be only small but significant for the UK-sample and
for the German sample the influence was even mostly insignificant.49 How-
ever, the short-run influence on investment, we find, is well significant and
comparably large in both samples; but again the measured role of finance is
larger for the UK-sample.
Moreover, empirically we find the investment rate to be a highly nonlinear
function of the capital-imbalance (investment opportunities) and equity (liq-
uidity). With the UK-data we have shown, that because of this non-linearity
even only imposing additive separability leads to a severe error. This error
could well be the cause of the puzzling finding reported in the literature that
”apriori unconstrained” firms react stronger to changes in their financial
variables than constrained ones. For further empirical research, this finding
therefore suggests a need to estimate investment equations in a generalized
error correction framework50 as we did.
The results from the UK-data are complemented with our evidence from
the ”Bonner Stichprobe”. Here, we find, that the half-life of a shock to the
capital imbalance is not only substantially smaller in high-equity states, but
also, that the investment-function is stronger curved if equity is large.
These higher-order and cross-eﬀects help to discriminate between the
(pure) financial (fixed) transaction cost, the net-worth, the (pure) fixed
capital-adjustment cost and our mixed model. The comparably low influ-
rather rely on versions of the pecking-order theory of finance, so e.g. Aghion et al. (2001).
49These results are somewhat similar to the results Bond et al. (1999) have reported
earlier. They analyzed both a sample of German and UK firms using identical estimation
techniques on both samples, so that their results are better comparable between contries.
In result, they found a much larger and more significant influence of cash-flow for their
UK firm-sample than they could find for their (comparable) German one.
50See e.g. de Jong (2001).
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ence finance has on the equilibrium stock of capital does not well support
the net-worth model. The transaction and convex adjustment-cost model is
however at odds with an investment-function that is ”more convex” when
equity is high. In this setting, which yields a pecking order of finance, theory
would rather suggest the investment-function to be more curved when eq-
uity is low. And as for the pure fixed adjustment cost model, the significant
influence of equity on investment can be put as evidence against it.
To obtain these results, we have followed an econometric approach that
estimates the long-run relationships of capital, productivity and costs in a
first step. The short-run dynamics (or error correction function) have then
been estimated nonparametrically. From a complementary parametric analy-
sis, we have seen that our approach is well capable to explain a large fraction
in company-level investment. Hence, we can conclude that our proxy of fun-
damental investment-incentives, which we have obtained from the long-run
relation specified, is of reasonable quality. Moreover, and since the proxy for
the fundamental incentives we used for the German data, explicitly allows for
heterogeneity, the good relative quality of the proxy suggests that there is in-
deed a substantial degree of technological heterogeneity across firms–which
may be considered as a side-result of our analysis.
For questions of economic policy, the findings of our analysis suggest,
e.g. that the central bank not only should try to observe the distribution
of capital-imbalances, but also consider the financial situation of firms in
order to predict policy implications. More specifically both eﬀects cannot be
considered separately as the magnitude of each eﬀect depends on the state
of the other variable. Especially, we find firms with high equity to adjust to
shocks much faster. If this itself leads to a rather stabilizing or destabilizing
eﬀect remains open for further research. However, if we only concentrate
on adverse shocks, an economy which is simultaneously hit by a crisis of
company-finance and an adverse aggregate shock will recover much slower
than the financially unconstrained economy. In any case, an economy with
many firms being in a high equity state should have the stock of capital more
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eﬃciently distributed among firms.
Therefore, another example where our results have policy implications
are (corporate) tax reforms. There, the impact of the reform on the costs
of retaining earnings have to be taken into account as well. A rise in the
average equity-to-capital ratio, induced by such a reform, would not only raise
investment in the short run but also–at least in the partial model presented
in chapter 3–increase eﬃciency as average (absolute) capital-imbalances fall.
Interlude
Monopolistic competition and
oligopoly
In the proceeding chapters, we assumed the market structures firms operate
in are monopolistically competitive. In fact, we only needed that firms face
decreasing returns to scale. Monopolistic competition is just one way to ra-
tionalize this, without introducing strategic action to the model. Decreasing
returns to scale are also well compatible with perfect competition.
Anyway, this allowed us to have firms with positive profits–respectively
positive variable gross margins–analyzed in an environment of many firms.
So, we could use laws of large numbers and the expectations operator con-
sistently with our model, thereby deriving expressions for average industry-
investment.
Whether monopolistic competition, perfect competition or pure oligopoly
is the more realistic way to think about market structure has a strong history
of lively debate since the Chamberlin (1933) first introduced the idea of
monopolistic competition.51 We used monopolistic competition merely to
abstract from the influence of strategic considerations to keep our model
tractable. In a way adding imperfect competition to the framework developed
51See Samuelson (1967) and Bain (1967) for reviews. Central contributions to the debate
how to diﬀerentiate empirically between those concepts were Bishop (1952, 1953 and 1955)
Heiser (1955), Fellner (1953), Chamberlin (1953).
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in Chapter 3 serves as some sort of comparative statics.52
For homogeneous oligopolies the products of each competitor are each
perfect substitutes for the consumers. The inverse demand function is defined
as
pi = p
Ã
NX
j=1
xj
!
. (4.32)
If the products are diﬀerentiated, which is the basis for monopolistic compe-
tition, the inverse demand function takes the more general form53
pi = pi (xi |x−i ) . (4.33)
Monopolistic competition now is a situation, where firm i can rightly
neglect the influence of any other single firm on x−i, the output of other
firms. Hence it can also neglect its own influence on others. In contrast to
perfect competition, the influence of xi on pi is but not negligible.54
Which model of market-structure is appropriate for any given industry
is in the end an empirical question.55 Most probably some markets are
52However, note that we do not simply adopt the previously derived framework to
duopoly. Again this would be intractable and hence it would be excessively hard to reach
decisve conlusions.
53See e.g. Shaked and Sutton (1982) for a model of product diﬀerentiation.
54Hart (1985) presents a model that gives monopolistic competition as an arbitrary
good approximation of the equilibrium of an economy with many firms and heterogeneous
consumers.
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) provide a model based on the assumption of a representative
consumer.
55The classical debate initiated by Bishop (1952), how to measure market structure has
focused on the the the size of cross elasticities of demand in comparison to the elasticity
of demand itself. However, there is not neccessarily a such strong relation between cross-
elasticities, numbers of firms in the market and the elasticity of demand as suggested by
Bishop (1952, 1953, and 1955).
Suppose e.g. there is a representative consumer with a Cobb-Douglas utility function
over a (very large) number of goods. However, her eﬀective preferences shall be only
formulated over the set of goods that are indeed produced I.
U (x) =
Y
i∈I
xαii . (4.34)
Then given any number of firms in the economy producing an arbitrary set of goods I,
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oligopolistic (diﬀerentiated or not), some are near monopolistically competi-
tive, some are regulated or natural monopolies, and some are near perfectly
competitive.
An analysis of the impact financial frictions and non-convex investment-
technologies have on duopoly–as a complement to our analysis under mo-
nopolistic competition in Chapter 3–therefore seems to be a valid research-
goal. Also, by moving perspective from monopolistic competition, respec-
tively perfect-competition with decreasing returns to scale to duopoly, we
zoom to the very microeconomic analysis of investment decisions.
given total consumption C, this representative consumer demands
x∗i (pi,p−i) =
αiP
j∈I αj
C
pi
. (4.35)
Therefore, the elasticity of xi w.r.t. its own price is Eii = −1 and the elasticity of xi w.r.t.
price j is Eij = 0! Moreover, as there are monopoly rents to exploit, every new entrant (or
operating firm) will rather invent a new product, than imitating an existing one. It now
depends on the number of goods the consumer diﬀerentiates at most, the relation of costs
of entering a new market and a market for an established good, etc. whether monopolistic
competition, diﬀerentiated oligopoly, a number of diﬀerent homogeneous oligopolies or
perfect competition emerges.
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Chapter 5
Investment timing and
predatory behavior in duopoly
with debt
5.1 Introducing strategic considerations
5.1.1 Non-convexifying imperfect competition vs. con-
vexifying perfect competition
Our analysis of company investment decisions in the previous chapters has
highlighted the importance of the interaction between non-convexities and
financial frictions. However, Thomas (2002), Khan and Thomas (2003) and
Veracierto (2002) have recently questioned the relevance of the non-convex
adjustment-costs framework for macroeconomic data. Their basic idea is
that on the aggregate two eﬀects smooth out the non-linearities. The first
eﬀect is the direct one from aggregation itself: in the aggregate time-series
domain typically the higher-order moments of the ”mandated investment”
distribution evolve slowly. The other, less obvious reason for the minor rele-
vance of the non-convex framework in the aggregate is the convexifying eﬀect
of (perfect-) competition and general equilibrium.
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This chapter contrasts these perfect competition results, with evidence
from imperfect competition. Our model in Chapter 3 focused on the inter-
action of financial fractions and non-convex investment technologies purely
within a firm and therefore, we assumed monopolistic competition to ab-
stract from strategic aspects of this interaction between firms. Similarly, the
assumption of perfect competition abstracts from strategical aspects. Yet,
for many industries if not monopolistic competition then oligopoly seems the
more realistic way to model competition.
Therefore, we present a model of duopoly in which capital-market im-
perfection, irreversibility of investment, and imperfect goods-market com-
petition interact. This interaction brings about investment patterns which
are neither present in the monopolistic competition, irreversible investment
framework nor in the imperfect competition, reversible investment one.
Our model presented in this chapter also addresses the broader question
which impact non-convex adjustment cost and capital market imperfections
have on the strategic situation of a firm. And this strategic perspective proves
fruitful. Our model contributes to a number of strands in the literature,
such as the investment, the debt-in-industry-equilibrium, the strategic real
options, or the predatory behavior literature. To keep this chapter mostly
self-contained we will discuss the relation of our model to all these strands
of the literature in detail in this introductory section.
Most models of interdependent financial and real investment decisions can
neither replicate the observed debt-ratios, which are rather modest compared
to the substantial tax benefits of debt,1 nor a non-monotone influence of
leverage ratios on investment.2 The model of this chapter can explain both
1E.g. Schowalter (1999, p. 327) finds in a sample of 1641 manufacturing firms that the
average debt to asset ratio is about 0.25, whereas Fischer et al. (1989) obtain debt ratios
somewhat between 0.3 and 0.7 as optimal debt ratios in their capital choice model.
2An example for this non-monotone relationship are our results in the previous chapter,
presented in figure 4.5 and 4.6 and table 4.12. An alternative example is the paper of
Busse (2001), who reports that price wars between airlines are predicted best as non-
linear (threshold functions) in flow measures of liquidity.
Brander and Lewis (1988) provide an explanation for this finding, in cases when there
are bankruptcy costs which are proportional to the ”magnitude” of bankruptcy. However,
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these empirical findings by the strategic situation of indebted firms in a
duopolistic real options setting of investment.
Moreover, our model oﬀers an explanation for predatory behavior without
defining predatory behavior as deviation from tacit collusion, without relying
on learning or network eﬀects, and without relying on Folk theorem like
reputational arguments. It rather builds upon a real options approach. This
approach models predatory investment as the attempt of one firm driving
a competitor out of the market if the loss from an early exercise of the
investment option is more than compensated by a gain from the expected
earlier exit of a competitor.
5.1.2 Imperfect competition and debt
Since the seminal paper of Brander and Lewis (1986), economists have drawn
attention to the strategic eﬀects of debt on competition.3 As described in
chapter 2, most of the empirical literature on the link between financial situ-
ation and investment decisions of firms suggests that increasing debt reduces
investment. In Brander and Lewis contribution however, larger debt leads
to fiercer competition, so that firms invest and produce more. In a monopo-
listic setting, in which equity but not debt is the marginal source of finance,
we can easily build a model that replicates the general empirical findings
(Jou, 2001). However, in a duopoly with equity being the marginal source
of finance, endogenous bankruptcy decisions render predatory investment-
strategies possible.
Although Brander and Lewis (1988) already describe how predatory be-
havior may emerge in a two period setting with bankruptcy, a dynamic model
of finance, investment timing, and predatory behavior has not been formu-
lated yet. In this sense the present chapter extends the Brander and Lewis
contribution to cases in which investment is subject to non-convex costs of
their model as a static one cannot explain periods of predatory behavior triggered by
changes in the environment.
3See e.g. Maksimovic (1990), Maksimovic and Zechner (1991) and Fries et al. (1997).
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adjustment. In contrast to the Brander and Lewis (1988) model however,
declaring bankruptcy is a truly endogenous decision, as the owners of the
firm are allowed to pay for the firm’s obligations with private funds, if this is
advantageous for them. Therefore, bankruptcy is declared only when optimal
and not necessarily, once a itself firm has insuﬃcient funds.
In this (general) setting, changes in market conditions may trigger preda-
tory behavior in highly leveraged industries, but debt does not necessarily
make output market competition fiercer in general. This also is a central
diﬀerence to Brander and Lewis’ contributions, where predatory behavior
simply is fiercer competition in all states of nature and not a diﬀerent policy-
regime triggered by exogenous changes in the environment.
Moreover, the model of this chapter can also be read as a contribution
to the debt-in-industry-equilibrium literature. This literature typically has
either ruled out the possibility of predatory investment by the assumption
of free market entry–which makes predatory investment unprofitable–or
assumed myopic behavior from the outset.4
5.1.3 Imperfect competition, real options and preda-
tory behavior
Our model also extends the literature on real options in oligopoly to cases
with predatory investment. So far, most of this literature has ignored the
strategic eﬀects of debt.5 Nevertheless, debt can have important strategic
eﬀects and, especially in the irreversible investment framework, influences
investment decisions substantially: If a firm is subject to limited liability, its
owners have to decide to finance negative cash flows from private funds or to
default on the firms obligations in adverse states, i.e. to declare bankruptcy.
As declaring bankruptcy often leads to an irreversible and complete exit of
that firm from the market, a bankruptcy decision influences the payoﬀ of the
4See for instance Fries et al. (1997) or Maksimovic and Zechner (1991).
5See for example Huisman and Kort (1999), Sparla (2001), or Weeds (2001).
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competitor and thus the value of the competitor´s investment. Therefore,
the option to declare bankruptcy and the possibility of driving a competitor
to bankruptcy (and thereby out of the market) may alter the prices of in-
vestment options significantly. The decision to declare bankruptcy obviously
depends on the relative debt-burden a firm faces. Thus, investment not only
can be used to drive the competitor to bankruptcy by lowering prices, but
can also serve as a commitment device not to declare bankruptcy by altering
the relative debt-obligation.
Therefore, allowing for predatory investment yields new insights and
clearly distinguishes our model from existing work on exit decisions in duopoly
in a real options framework: Sparla (2001) discusses partial but irreversible
capacity reductions, only. Depending on the parameters of aggregate demand
firms may end up in a war-of-attrition or a preemption game. However, as
firms are assumed to be unable to increase capacity, predatory behavior does
not emerge.
Joaquin and Khanna (2001) allow for both irreversible investment and
exit decisions in their model of potential competition. Yet, predatory invest-
ment cannot occur in their model, due to their assumptions on revenues and
costs: (rational) exit of the competitor imposes a loss on the remaining firm.
This chapter combines the real options approach with the strategic eﬀects
of debt literature. The basic setting is similar to the one of Jou (2001), who
models a potential monopolist (or myopic investor) that enters the market
and at the same time issues debt to finance investment.
In contrast to Jou, we model a duopoly. Both firms are assumed to op-
erate with a given capacity and are indebted from the very beginning. Both
firms can irreversibly increase capacity, but do not have any possibility of
raising or lowering debt-levels. Therefore, debt is taken to be exogenous.
The corporate tax-system is assumed to be classical, i.e. there is no share-
holder´s relief for corporate taxes, whereas interest payments are completely
tax-deducible. This gives a tax-advantage of debt.
Although throughout this chapter ”debt” will be interpreted as a special
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financial obligation, by the way ”debt” is to be modelled, all results equally
apply to any fixed running cost (e.g. overhead costs), on which a firm may
default. As a result, the model of this chapter gives an explanation for preda-
tory behavior itself in a wide class of situations, and is thus a contribution
to the literature on predatory behavior, too. In contrast to existing models,
that relate financial situation of firms to predatory behavior (e.g. Bolton
and Scharfstein, 1990, or Glazer, 1994), predatory outcomes in our model
can be described as regimes that depend on the fluctuating state of demand.
Insofar, predatory behavior emerges from time to time, triggered by changes
in market-conditions.
In contrast to many contributions in this field that study price wars,6
predatory behavior is not defined as a deviation from tacit collusion, but as
investment at market conditions which yield negative net-present value for
investment unless the endogenous nature of the exit decisions of the com-
petitors is taken into account.7 This leads to additional investment activity
when the aggregate state of demand worsens. Hence, the present paper is
related to and extends the results of Grenadier’s (1996) real options-model
on investment-cascades to a non-collusive setting.
Moreover, our model also does not rely on the assumption that infor-
mation is asymmetric among competitors, but only on the imperfectness of
information.
In line with Fershtman and Pakes’ (2000) model heterogeneity of firms
with respect to their fixed costs is one of the driving factors in the presented
model. Other models of predatory behavior that do not rely on asymmetric
information typically build upon network8 or learning-curve eﬀects (Cabral
and Riordan, 1994 and 1997). Besides the work of Fershtman and Pakes,
the empirical paper of Busse (2002) is most closely related. Busse finds that
6See Ordover and Saloner (1989) for a summary or for more recent contributions Fer-
shtman and Pakes (2000) or Busse (2002).
7In this respect, our model is closest to Milgrom and Roberts (1982) paper.
8See Athey and Schmutzler (2001) for a fairly general model of investment and increas-
ing dominance, that includes network-industries as a special case.
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leverage is one of the main determinants for starting a price war in the airline
industry, and that the probability of starting a price war reacts in a quite
non-linear fashion to changes in the financial situation of a firm.
5.1.4 Some main results anticipated
Our model will partly consist of equations that cannot be solved analytically,
and so numerical simulations are presented where analytical solutions are not
available. Nevertheless, it will be shown analytically as well as numerically
that parameter constellations exist which lead to predatory behavior, i.e.
firms invest not because investment itself has a positive present value, but to
drive the competitor out of the market. However, the occurrence of predatory
behavior in equilibrium depends on the ”competitiveness” of the market:
When adjustment costs are high or demand is suﬃciently elastic, predatory
investment never occurs.
The numerical analysis yields furthermore that already a credible threat
of predatory behavior lowers price triggers for investment substantially. How-
ever, predatory behavior only emerges in highly indebted industries. If preda-
tory behavior does not occur in equilibrium, increasing debt increases the
price trigger for investment of the firm increasing its debt. The price trig-
ger for the other firm decreases. Therefore, only if the firm that changes its
debt were the follower in equilibrium, increasing debt would delay invest-
ment. Furthermore, competition and the possibility of predatory investment
generally lowers the value of debt and therefore might explain the lower lever-
age ratios observed in practice, when compared with those predicted by the
contingent claims literature.9
We will proceed as follows: Section 5.2 outlines the model and presents
the basic assumptions. Section 5.3 presents the expressions that determine
the value of equity and price triggers for bankruptcy when both firms have
already exercised their investment option. Section 5.4 derives the value of
9See e.g. Fischer et al. (1989).
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equity and the price-triggers for investment and bankruptcy when firms may
invest. Section 5.5 shortly states the conditions which determine debt-value.
Section 5.6 presents our numerical results and section 5.7 summarizes. De-
tailed proofs are available in appendix C.
5.2 Model setup
We model a duopoly with quantity-competition and stochastic demand fluc-
tuations in continuous time t, t ∈ [0,∞[. Total production given, the price
process (Pt)t≥0 is assumed to be a geometrical Brownian motion and shall be
given by
Pt = D(Qt)Yt , (5.1)
dYt = Yt (µdt+ σdBt) . (5.2)
Bt denotes a standard Brownian motion and Qt denotes aggregate industry
production, such that
Qt = q1,t + q2,t ,
with qi,t denoting production of firm i at time t. For the sake of simplicity,
we assume that output is solely produced by a capital good which does
not depreciate. Moreover, we assume that both firms already operate in the
market with some initial production q
i
. However, both firms may irreversibly
invest and increase production to qi at cost Ci . This increase in production
is assumed to be instantaneous. At time t = 0 each firm issues debt of
unstated maturity with associated coupon payments bi. Thereafter, a firm
may not change its debt. Since we want to model heterogenous firms, we
assume the ”flow leverage” of the two firms to diﬀer. With ”flow leverage”
the ratio li (qi) := biqiD(qi) of debt payments to monopoly earnings at the state
of demand normalized to Yt = 1 is meant. Without loss of generality assume
firm 2 is the firm with the higher leverage once both firms have invested.
Assumption 5.1: l1 (q1) < l2 (q2) .
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For notational convenience, we define a function ∆ for the relative price-
change induced by a change in aggregate supply.
∆Q1,Q2 :=
Pt(Q2)
Pt(Q1)
=
D(Q2)
D(Q1)
(5.3)
The following assumption ensures, that price levels always exist, so that
investment is profitable:
Assumption 5.2: Investment increases revenues of the investing firm,
regardless if the other firm has invested or not, i.e.
D(q
i
+ q−i)qi < D(qi + q−i)qi (5.4)
As the tax-system is assumed to be classical, losses are fully oﬀset. There-
fore, there is a tax advantage of debt, and at tax-rate τ instantaneous net
earnings of firm i are given by
(1− τ)(qi,tPt(Qt, Yt)− bi) . (5.5)
However, firms may default and declare bankruptcy at any point in time,
as they are assumed have limited liability. If bankruptcy is declared, the
coupon payments are stopped, the firm leaves the market, and its assets are
transferred to the creditors and sold at price λqi . Although in a more general
context λ may well be determined endogenously, here it will be treated as
exogenous. Moreover, λ will only matter for determining the market value
of debt and thus will not influence any decisions of the equityholders after
debt has been issued.
Furthermore, we assume that the firm is unable to temporarily suspend
production. Finally, equityholders are assumed to have unlimited external
resources. The risk-adjusted discount rate is ρ, which shall be larger than µ,
i.e. ρ > µ.
As Sparla (2001) argues, if the drift µ is strong compared to the variance
σ2, the probability that firms will not exit in finite time is strictly positive.
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However, this causes notational inconvenience as one root of the ”fundamen-
tal quadratic equation” (see below) has to be ”adjusted” to derive the correct
value functions, see Sparla (2001) for details. To avoid this diﬃculty the drift
is assumed to be not excessively large, i.e. |µ| < σ2
2
.
Under these assumptions, the roots of the so called ”fundamental quadratic
equation” (see e.g. Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) are given by
β1,2 =
1
2
− µ
σ2
±
s·
1
2
− µ
σ2
¸2
+
2ρ
σ2
, (5.6)
which implies β1 > 1 and β2 < 0 and β1 + β2 = 1− 2 µσ2 > 0.
Therefore, just as in Jou (2001, p. 72), the general solutions for the value
of equity Ei(P, b, qi, q−i) and the value of debt Bi(P, b, qi, q−i) for firm i are
given by the following equations:10
Ei(P, bi, qi, q−i) = (1− τ )
h
qi
P
ρ−µ −
bi
ρ
i
+ ai1(qi, q−i)P
β1 (5.7)
+ai2(qi, q−i)P
β2 ,
Bi(P, bi, qi, q−i) =
bi
ρ
+ ci1(qi, q−i)P
β1 + ci2(qi, q−i)P
β2 . (5.8)
For notational convenience, b is dropped from the list of arguments of the
value function, as it will remain constant throughout the subsequent analysis.
5.3 Value and bankruptcy without investment
option
The derived formula for the value of equity still contains two unknowns ai1
and ai2. These have to be solved for by deriving further conditions that reflect
the optimality of investment-plans. Therefore, strategic considerations have
an important influence on these parameters. This means the parameters ai1
and ai2 will in general vary with the state of production (qi, q−i).
10See appendix C.1 for details. As usual, we denote by firm −i the competitor of firm i.
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We should hence discuss in a bit more detail the timing structure of the
game. At each point in time an active firm may chose to
(1) invest and increase capacity to q¯i if it has not invested yet,
(2) declare bankruptcy and become inactive from then on,
(3) or do nothing and wait.
As a result, the number of possible states of production (q1, q2) complicate
the analysis a lot. The following two sections will derive and specify equity-
value at the various states (qi, q−i), which also index subgames. We do not
assume which firm invests first, but let this be determined in equilibrium.
Therefore, at the time the first firm invests the other firm must be at least
indiﬀerent between investing somewhat earlier or becoming the second firm
that invests. We discuss the behavior of both firms as second-mover first.
This allows us to obtain the valuation of the second-mover position for both
competitors. This valuation is crucial in the competition for the position of
the first-mover.
To some extent, this discussion cannot avoid some technical complexity.
The most technical proofs are presented in appendix C.
5.3.1 The monopolist’s case
Once one of the firms declares bankruptcy, the other firm becomes a monop-
olist. Therefore, we also have to consider the monopoly situation, although
we want to model a duopoly. We start with determining the value functions
of a monopolist who has already exercised its investment option. As our
model is–for the case of a monopolist that has invested–similar to Jou´s
(2001) investment and financing model, we can primarily rely on his result
to obtain the value functions.
Proposition 5.1 Having invested, the monopolist´s value of equity and debt
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is given by
E(P, q, 0) = (1− τ )
µ
q
P
ρ− µ −
b
ρ
¶
+
b (1− τ )
ρ(1− β2)
µ
P
P exitq,0
¶β2
, (5.9)
B(P, q, 0) =
b
ρ
+
µ
λq − b
ρ
¶µ
P
P exitq,0
¶β2
. (5.10)
Here, we denote by P exitq,0 =
β2(ρ−µ)
(β2−1)ρ
b
q
the trigger price to declare bankruptcy.
Proof. Denote the revenues process by eP := qP. This process has exactly
the same properties as the price process in Jou (2001). The proposition then
follows straightforward from Jou´s Proposition 1.
5.3.2 The duopolists’ case
When both firms have invested, so that we are in state (q¯1, q¯2) , both firms still
have to decide whether and when to declare bankruptcy. However, a priori
it is not obvious which firm will declare bankruptcy first. But since we have
assumed the two firms to be diﬀerently leveraged in the above introduced
sense, the only Markov-perfect equilibrium of the resulting exit game is the
one where the higher leveraged firm exits at its monopoly exit price. This is
shown by the proposition below:
Proposition 5.2 In all Markov-perfect equilibria in pure strategies of the
(q¯1, q¯2)-subgame (exit after investment), the firm with the higher leverage
(firm 2) chooses its monopoly exit price as the price trigger for bankruptcy
P
exit,2
q2,q1
= P exit,2q2,0 , whereas firm 1 chooses as exit-price trigger some
P
exit,1
q1,q2
∈
i
∆q1+q2,q1−1P
exit,1
q1,0
,∆q1+q2,q2−1P
exit,2
q2,0
h
.
Proof. See appendix.
With the equilibrium exit strategies given by Proposition 5.2, which de-
termine who stays in the market, we can now compute the equilibrium value
functions for equity and debt in a duopoly when both firms have exercised
their investment option. As firm 2´s behaves myopic, its value functions
are the same as the monopolist’s ones. However, the possible exit of firm 2
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changes firm 1´s value. Therefore, the value functions of firm 1 need to be
determined anew and the ”option values” a11, a12, c11 and c12 of (5.7) and
(5.8) have to be calculated.
Firstly, when prices tend to infinity, the bankruptcy option becomes
worthless. This leads to a11 = c11 = 0.11 Secondly, when the price tends
towards the exit price of firm 2, the following value-matching conditions
must hold:
E1(P exit,2q2,0 , q1, q2) = E(∆q1+q2,q1P
exit,2
q2,0
, b1, q1, 0) (5.11)
B1(P exit,2q2,0 , q1, q2) = B(∆q1+q2,q1P
exit,2
q2,0
, b1, q1, 0) (5.12)
This now yields for c12 and a12 after some algebraic calculations:
c12(q1, q2) =
µ
λq1 −
b1
ρ
¶Ã∆q1+q2,q1
P
exit,1
q1 ,0
!β2
, (5.13)
a12(q1, q2) = g ·
(1− τ )
1− β2
b1
ρ
Ã
1
P
exit,1
q1 ,0
!β2
, (5.14)
with g being defined as
g :=
¡
∆q1+q2,q1
¢β2| {z }
<1
−β2
¡
∆q1+q2,q1 − 1
¢| {z }
>0
µ
q1b2
q2b1
¶1−β2
> 1.
The stated inequalities are shown to hold in the appendix. With these
terms at hand, we obtain for the value of equity and debt of firm 1 the
following expressions
E1(P, q1, q2)
(1− τ ) =
µ
q1
P
ρ− µ −
b1
ρ
¶
+ g · b1
(1− β2) ρ
Ã
P
P exitq1,0
!β2
, (5.15)
B1(P, q1, q2) =
b1
ρ
+
µ
λq1 −
b1
ρ
¶Ã
P
P
exit,1
q1 ,0
!β2 ¡
∆q1+q2,q1
¢β2 . (5.16)
11See Jou (2001) for details.
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Figure 5.1: Equity-value of firm 1
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As one can now easily see, the presence of a competitor who leaves the market
at a higher trigger price adds a factor g in (5.9) to the price of the exit-option.
This factor is composed of the costs of postponed exit
¡
∆q1+q2,q1
¢β2 and the
gain, when firm 2 exits, which is a ”hedge” against bad states. This hedge
outweighs the cost of waiting and in total increases equity-value. Moreover,
value of firm 1´s equity now exhibits a kink where firm 2 exits and it no
longer necessarily monotonously increases in P (see figures 5.1(a),(b) and
appendix for details).
5.4 Value, optimal investment and bankruptcy
To describe investment behavior in the model presented here, some assump-
tions are necessary to keep the model tractable. Some of them were men-
tioned above. However, further discussion of these assumptions is still open.
First of all, as debt payments are fixed, investment–financed by external
equity–is the only way to decrease leverage. Although this seems too great a
constraint at first glance, it is very much in line with the findings of Fries et al.
(1997), who find that a small equityholder finds only extramarginal changes
in leverage advantageous. Therefore, if only marginal changes are feasible
by issuing or buying back marginal debt, investment–as an extramarginal
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change–is the only possibility to lower leverage.
Moreover, as leverage is changed by investment, the order of leverage ra-
tios and therefore the order of exit prices may be reversed by investment.
Furthermore, as we have made no assumptions about the sizes of the in-
vestment projects, the order of leverage ratios may diﬀer before and after
investment anyway. Therefore, we have to consider a number of sub-cases
which depend on the parameters of the model.
A further issue concerns predatory behavior, i.e. firms might invest just to
drive the price down to increase the probability of the other firm defaulting.
Obviously, the possibility of profitable predatory investment again depends
on the parameter-values and the order of leverage ratios.
As no assumptions concerning which firm invests first shall be made, the
two possible asymmetric orders of movement have to be considered. The
order of movement will later be determined endogenously in equilibrium.
However, as with ruling out equal leverage ratios, we assume simultaneous
investment of both firms (or collusive strategies) to be ruled out by pro-
hibitive costs of simultaneity.12
In order to obtain the sequence of price triggers for bankruptcy by the
same reasoning used in Proposition 5.2 and to obtain a benchmark case, we
start with the investment and bankruptcy decisions of a monopolist. We will
leave the calculation of debt-values open for a later section.
5.4.1 Investment- and bankruptcy-decisions of a mo-
nopolist
For a monopolist holding an investment and a bankruptcy option, we will
label its bankruptcy trigger price as P exitq,0 and its investment price-trigger as
P invq,0 . The two following value-matching conditions must hold for the equity-
12Instead we could as well assume firm sales to be decreasing if both firms invest simul-
taneously, i.e. ∆q
1
+q
2
,q1+q2qi < qi
. However, such assumption would be stronger.
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value function:
E(P exitq,0 , q, 0) = 0, (5.17)
E(P invq,0 , q, 0) = E(∆q,qP invq,0 , b, q, 0)− C. (5.18)
Together with the following smooth-pasting conditions these equations fully
determine equity-value and price triggers. The two smooth-pasting condi-
tions are:
∂E(P exitq,0 , q, 0)
∂P
= 0, (5.19)
∂E(P invq,0 , q, 0)
∂P
=
∂E(∆q,qP invq,0 , q, 0)
∂P
. (5.20)
Now, combining (5.7),(5.17) and (5.19) , an algebraic expression for the value
of equity can be derived after some calculations:
E(P, q, 0) = (1− τ )
·
q
P
ρ− µ −
b
ρ
¸
(5.21)
+
(1− τ)
β2 − β1
Ã
qP exitq,0
ρ− µ −
b
ρ
!
β1
Ã
P
P exitq,0
!β2
− β2
Ã
P
P exitq,0
!β1

+
(1− τ)
β2 − β1
qP exitq,0
ρ− µ


Ã
P
P exitq,0
!β2
−
Ã
P
P exitq,0
!β1
 .
The trigger prices P invq,0 and P
exit
q,0 , however, have to be calculated numerically
from equations (5.18) and (5.20).
5.4.2 Investment- and bankruptcy-decisions in duopoly
when one firm has invested
As mentioned above, both the order of movement where firm 1 invests first
and firm 2 invests second and the reversed one have to be considered before
one is able to determine which firm invests first in equilibrium. The firm
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investing first will be called ”leader” while the other firm will be called ”fol-
lower”. We begin with discussing the behavior of the follower. As the case
where firm 2 is the follower is the simpler one, we start with discussing this
case.
Firm 2 as follower
Proposition 5.3 As a follower, firm 2 behaves myopically, i.e. just as a
monopolist would behave that faces the same demand function as firm 2.
Proof. Investment causes no continuous costs. Therefore, equity value at
q (before investment) must be smaller than equity value at q (after investment)—
statet diﬀerently: the investment option must be worth less than the in-
crease in revenues after investment, (∆q¯1+q2,q¯1+q¯2 · q2− q2)P. Thus, we obtain
P
exit,2
q
2
,q2
> P
exit,2
q2,0
. Moreover, proposition 5.2 yields that firm 2 leaves first after
investment and behaves just as a monopolist would do. Thus, firm 2 can also
not credibly threaten to exit second before investing, i.e. firm 2 leaves first
and therefore cannot influence the (exit) behavior of firm 1.
So, as follower–just like in other games with preemption (e.g. Weeds,
2001), firm 2, the higher leveraged firm, does not need to take into account the
strategic situation. Therefore, we obtain equations similar to the situation
of a monopolist, determining the investment and bankruptcy price-triggers.
Firm 1 as follower
If firm 1 is the follower the strategic situation changes: In contrast to
the simpler situation of firm 2, firm 1’s actions aﬀect the probability of firm
2 declaring bankruptcy. Hence, the strategic situation of firm 1 is much
richer and firm 1 may invest not because it is ”fundamentally” profitable but
because this makes the exit of firm 2 more likely. As we have seen, firm 2
does not have this opportunity.
Taking into account the possible exit of firm 2, a couple of diﬀerent cases
have to be considered. For the moment, take P exit,2q2,q1 to be given. P
exit,2
q2,q1
will
be later endogenously determined in equilibrium of course. The two cases
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diﬀer with respect to the number of price-triggers for investment. In the first
case, there is a unique (high) price-trigger so that firm 1 invests if and only if
the price gets larger than this trigger. In the other case there are two trigger
prices a high and a low one. Investment at the low price-trigger is predatory.
However, to calculate the price-trigger(s) it is necessary to determine in
a first step if predatory investment is profitable. To do so, we define two
auxiliary ”equity-value” functions. The first function to be defined is the
equity value firm 1 would have if it could not investment. This is similar
to the case where both firms have already invested but q1 is replaced with
q1 and the exit-price trigger of firm 2 is replaced with P
exit,2
q2,q1
. eE1(P, q
1
, q2)
will denote this function. Given the exit price-trigger of firm 2 P exit,2q2,q1
, one
can easily decide if eE1(P, q
1
, q2) is similar to firm 1’s or firm 2’s value when
both firms have invested. This function obviously defines a lower bound for
E1(P, q
1
, q2).
It hence is necessary for predatory investment to be profitable that
eE1(P, q
1
, q2) + C1 = E1(∆q1+q2,q1+q2P, q1, q2)
has more than one solution in P . The largest solution to this equation also
defines a lower bound for the non-predatory investment price-trigger.13
Lemma 5.1 (i) Other things equal
eE1(P, q
1
, q2) + C1 = E1(∆q1+q2 ,q1+q2P, q1, q2) (5.22)
has at most three solutions in P > max{P exit,2q2,q1 , P
exit,1
q
1
,q2
}. We denote the so-
lutions with P ∗(< P ∗∗)(< P ∗∗∗) respectively and the set of solutions by S.
13A remark to notation is necessary at this point: The solution to an equation of the
form lhs(P (Y )) = rhs(P (Y )), like equation (5.22) , is noted as a ”price level” for which
the equation is solved. However, this is slightly incorrect, as we rather obtain solutions
in Y . E.g. the solution might be at a price-level, lower than the exit-price of one of the
firms. Therefore, the exit-decision has to be taken into account, since it causes prices to
rise. So we normalize for induced changes in price. Nevertheless we stick to the notion as
”price level”, as it is easier to interpret.
5.4. VALUE, OPTIMAL INVESTMENT AND BANKRUPTCY 121
Moreover, if P is large the following inequality holds:
eE1(P, q
1
, q2) + C1 < E1(∆q1+q2 ,q1+q2P, q1, q2). (5.23)
Proof. See appendix.
Although equilibrium exit-price-triggers will at first be derived in the
next subsection, individual optimality already puts a restriction to the exit-
price-triggers, as the following Lemma shows. This Lemma proves useful in
discussing the existence of predatory investment in our model.
Lemma 5.2 (i) If firm 2 leaves the market first P exit,2q2,0 < P
exit,2
q2,q1
holds.
(ii) Moreover, in all cases P exit,2q2,q1 < ∆
−1
q
1
+q2,q1+q2
P
exit,2
q2,0
.
Proof. See appendix.
The second auxiliary equity-value function to be defined, is the value
equity would have, if investment was not allowed for prices below max (S) .
This prohibits predatory investment, if P ∗ > ∆q
1
+q2,q1+q2
−1P exit,2q2,0 . We denote
this second auxiliary function by bE1(P, q
1
, q2). Note that–given the exit
strategy of firm 2–this function is well defined by the usual smooth-pasting
and value-matching conditions.14
With these auxiliary functions at hand, three possible investment schemes
can now be distinguished:
1. A situation may occur, where firm 2 exits at quite high prices in situa-
tion (q1, q2), the demand is very inelastic,
15 and the costs of investing
are low, so that the value-gain of equity of firm 1 in situation (q1, q2)
is always larger than the costs of investing. This however means that
firm 1 would invest at any price. This is the case if for all P > P exit,2q,q
E1(∆q1+q2 ,q1+q2P, q1, q2) > C1 + eE1(P, q1, q2).
14See appendix for details.
15This means prices react strongly to changes in total output.
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Therefore, in this case
E1(P, q
1
, q2) ≡ E1(∆q1+q2 ,q1+q2P, q1, q2)− C1 . (5.24)
2. If #S = 1 or #S > 1 but
bE1(P, q
1
, q2) = E1(∆q1+q2 ,q1+q2P, q1, q2)− C1 (5.25)
has one and only one solution in
h
P
exit,2
q2,q1
,∞
h
, we have
E1(P, q
1
, q2) = bE1(P, q1, q2) .
This will usually be the non-predatory behavior case. However, if
P
exit,2
q2,q1
< ∆q
1
+q2,q1+q2
−1P exit,2q2,0 , we may obtain P
∗ < ∆−1q
1
+q2,q1+q2
P
exit,2
q2,0
,
which is predatory, though we will not refer to this case as predatory
investment.
3. If #S > 1 and (5.25) has more than one solution in
h
P
exit,2
q2,q1
,∞
h
, firm
1 will predatorily invest, i.e. firm 1 invests at low prices to crowd firm
2 out of the market. However, the exact structure of the value-function
of firm 1 depends on the number of solutions to (5.25):
(a) If (5.25) has two solutions, we will get an Investment/ No-Investment/
Investment scheme, i.e. a low price-trigger for which investment
occurs and a high price-trigger for investment and a region of in-
activity in between. See figure 5.2(a). We can then obtain both
price-triggers and the equity value by applying standard bound-
ary and smooth-pasting conditions for investment. However, for
the predatory-investment price-trigger P pred,1q
1
,q2
(low price-trigger)
the smooth-pasting condition needs not to hold and the border
solution P pred,1q
1
,q2
= ∆q
1
+q2,q1+q2
−1P exit,2q2,0 may well be obtained.
(b) If (5.25) has three solutions, the situation gets even more complex:
If occasionally P is very low, firm 1 will not invest, but will invest
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Figure 5.2: Solutions to (5.22)
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as prices rise. However, smooth-pasting conditions need not to
hold in this situation. See figure 5.2(b). Starting between P ∗∗ and
P ∗∗∗, we obtain the same Investment/ No-Investment/ Investment
scheme obtained under (a). Again note the possibility of a border-
solution for the predatory-investment price-triggers.
To simplify the following analysis we shall rule out the latter case by
assumption:
Assumption 5.3: The costs of investment shall be such that firm 2 will
never invest at a price level that would lead to a type 3(b) predatory
investment case with very low prices, where firm 1 would predatorily
invest as soon as prices rise.
The following proposition discusses the general possibility of predatory
investment. The exact equations describing equity value and determining
price-triggers will be derived afterwards.
Proposition 5.4 (i) If demand is suﬃciently elastic, i.e. ∀Q1, Q2 : ∆Q1,Q2 ≈
1, or if demand is not too inelastic and the costs of investment C1 are suﬃ-
ciently high, then predatory investment never occurs.
(ii) If g >
³
q1b1
q2b2
´1−β2
and
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(a) if firm 1 exits first when it had no investment option and if
eP exit,1q
1
,q2
< ∆q
1
+q2,q1+q2
−1P exit,2q2,0 , (5.26)
then there exists an investment-cost C1, so that (5.22) has multiple
solutions.
(b) if firm 2 exits first and if for the right-hand partial derivative ∂E1
∂P+
∂ eE1
∂P
³
∆q
1
+q2,q1+q2
−1P exit,2q2,0 , q1, q2
´
>
∂E1
∂P+
³
P
exit,2
q2,0
, q1, q2
´
∆q
1
+q2,q1+q2
holds, then there exists the cost of investing C1, so that predatory in-
vestment occurs.
Proof. See appendix.
In case, predatory investment indeed occurs, the exit value-matching con-
dition for firm 1 has to be modified to
E
pred
1 (P
pred,1
q1,q2
, q
1
, q2) = E1(∆q1+q2,q1P pred,1q1,q2 , q1, q2)− C1 . (5.27)
Let ∂
∂P+
denote the right-hand partial-derivative. Due to Lemma 2 (and since
we have to allow for a corner solution) we obtain for the necessary (smooth
pasting) condition the following generalized expression:
∀P ≥ ∆q
1
+q2,q1+q2
−1P exit,2q2,0 :Ã
∂E
pred
1
∂P
(P pred,1
q1,q2
, q
1
, q2)−
∂E1
∂P+
(P pred,1
q1,q2
, q1, q2)∆q1+q2,q1
!³
P
pred,1
q1,q2
− P
´
≤ 0.
(5.28)
Corollary 5.1 The predatory investment-price trigger P pred,1
q1,q2
is always strictly
larger than P exit,2q2,q1 , P
pred,1
q1,q2
> P
exit,2
q2,q1
.
Proof. Follows straightforward from Lemma 5.2 and the definition of the
predatory investment-price trigger.
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Equilibrium exit-strategies
The exit strategy of firm 2 was taken to be given so far. However, exit
strategies have to be determined as an equilibrium of both firms competing
to monopolize the market.
Independently of the (qi, q−i)-state equilibrium exit strategies can be char-
acterized as follows:
Definition 5.1 A vector of (qi, q−i)-state-contingent price-triggers P¯
#
i is a
Markov-perfect best-response in pure strategies of firm i, given the
vector of price-triggers P#−i of firm −i, if for all (qi, q−i) not to exit before the
declared price-trigger is credible
∀P > P¯ exit,iqi,q−i : Ei
³
P, qi, q−i|P¯#i , P#−i
´
> 0. (limited liability)
Secondly, it also must be credible not to preempt on the own proposed price
triggers for investment, i.e.
∀P ≤ P¯ inv,iq
i
,q−i : Ei
³
P, q
i
, q−i|P¯#i , P#−i
´
≥ Ei
³
P, qi, q−i|P¯#i , P#−i
´
− Ci
∀P ≥ P¯ pred,iq
i
,q−i : Ei
³
P, q
i
, q−i|P¯#i , P#−i
´
≥ Ei
³
P, qi, q−i|P¯#i , P#−i
´
− Ci.
(no preemption)
For all price-triggers P#i (which may include predatory investment-triggers)
that fulfill the above credibility constraints, the proposed price-triggers need
to be optimal, i.e.
Ei
³
P¯ exit,iqi,q−i , qi, q−i|P¯#i , P#−i
´
≥ Ei
³
P¯ exit,iqi,q−i , qi, q−i|P#i , P#−i
´
Ei
³
P¯ inv,iqi,q−i , qi, q−i|P¯#i , P#−i
´
≥ Ei
³
P¯ inv,iqi,q−i , qi, q−i|P#i , P#−i
´
. (optimality)
Definition 5.2 A Markov-perfect equilibrium in pure strategies is a
pair of vectors
³
P
#
i , P
#
−i
´
, so that each is a best response of the other.
Thus, a firm that defaults first, uses the value-matching and smooth
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pasting condition
Ei(P
exit,i
qi,q−i, qi, q−i) =
∂Ei
∂P
(P exit,iqi,q−i, qi, q−i)
!
= 0 (5.29)
to determine its own exit price-trigger. If a firm expects to leave second,
the value function of this firm is flat in its own exit price-trigger. Thus, this
firm is indiﬀerent about the level of its own exit price-trigger on the margin.
Therefore, there always is a multiplicity of equilibria which only diﬀer at the
(virtual) exit price-trigger of the firm which exits second.
Now denote by P ind,iqi,q−i the largest exit-price-trigger of firm i that lets the
limited liability constraint of firm −i hold with equality for some P 0. If firm
i chooses an exit price trigger below P ind,iqi,q−i , firm −i cannot credibly threaten
to exit later as the limited liability constraint would bind. Thus, firm −i
exiting at the myopic price-trigger and the other firm choosing an exit price-
trigger smaller than P ind,iqi,q−i will be an equilibrium, if P
ind,i
qi,q−i fulfills the other
equilibrium conditions of firm i. Note that P ind,iqi,q−i ≥ ∆
−1
qi+q−i,q−iP
exit,−i
q−i,0 always
holds since firm −i would immediately exit in state (q−i, 0) at a price below
∆−1qi+q−i,q−iP
exit,−i
q−i,0 .
The following proposition describes all equilibria of the exit-game depend-
ing on the parameters of the actual environment.
Proposition 5.5 (i) If for firm i the myopic exit price-trigger Pm_exit,iqi,q−i , ob-
tained from (5.29) , is smaller than P ind,iqi,q−i , then firm −i choosing P
m_exit,−i
q−i,qi
and firm i choosing a lower price-trigger is an equilibrium of the (qi, q−i)
stage.
(ii) If
h
∆qi+q−i,qi−1P
exit,i
q−i,0 , P
ind,i
qi,q−i
i
= ∅, then firm i chooses Pm_exit,iqi,q−i as the
exit-price-trigger in all equilibria of the (qi, q−i) stage.
(iii) If Pm_exit,−iq−i,qi > P ind,iqi,q−i and
h
∆qi+q−i,qi−1P
exit,i
q−i,0 , P
ind,i
qi,q−i
i
6= ∅, then firm
i choosing some P exit,iqi,q−i ∈
h
∆qi+q−i,qi−1P
exit,i
q−i,0 , P
ind,i
qi,q−i
i
and firm −i choosing
P
m_exit,−i
q−i,qi is an equilibrium of the (qi, q−i) stage, if this yields no incentive
to predatorily invest for firm −i.
(iv) If both firms have an incentive (and option) to predatorily invest, instead
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of choosing their myopic exit price-trigger, then both firm preempt on preda-
tory investment.16
(v) If firm i predatorily invests, firm −i cannot credibly threaten to deviate
from choosing the myopic exit price-trigger to hinder i in investing predato-
rily.
Proof. See appendix.
Remark 5.1 Part (iii) of the last proposition gives rise to the problem of
multiplicity of equilibria. For the numerical simulations the firm with the
larger P ind,iqi,q−i is selected as the one, who leaves second.
This selection can be motivated by the following idea: Suppose firm−i chooses
an exit price-trigger P¯ marginally larger than P ind,iqi,q−i. Is the choice of P
ind,i
qi,q−i
still credible then? Of course not for the firm with the lower P ind,iqi,q−i, as
P ind,iqi,q−i < P¯ < P
ind,−i
q−i,qi , so that firm i would find it optimal to leave before
P¯ is actually reached, even when (falsely) expecting to leave second.
Conversely, this rule can be interpreted as a notion of conservativeness in the
following sense: Suppose the shareholders of firm i imagine the worst case,
i.e. firm −i defaults just one logical second before i0s (proposed) trigger price
is reached. Then only if the proposed exit price trigger is larger than the own
indiﬀerence price trigger, i has no incentive to exit before.
Another motivation for this rule would be that firms stepwise and sequentially
undercut each other’s exit price-triggers before the actual game commences.
5.4.3 Investment- and bankruptcy-decisions in duopoly
when no firm has invested yet
We shall now turn to the investment decision of the leader. Here however, the
problem becomes more complex, as there may be a preemption game for both,
predatory investment and ”fundamental” investment decisions. However, if
second mover advantages are not too strong, one can obtain a relatively
simple rationale for the investment trigger prices.
16See section 5.4.3
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To avoid further complication, we will make the following assumption
according to the price-level (and investment costs) in t = 0 :
Assumption 5.4: At the initial price-level P0 at least one firm finds
it unprofitable to invest and both firms find it unprofitable to de-
clare bankruptcy. Moreover, P0 lies between the preemption thresholds¡
P pred,ipre , P
inv,i
pre
¢
, which will be define below, i.e.
min
i=1,2
{P pred,ipre } < P0 < max
i=1,2
{P inv,ipre } .
Non-predatory investment
To disentangle the interrelated decisions at the early stage of the game
(when both firms still do not have invested) non-predatory investment is
analyzed separately in a first-step. The exit and investment strategy of the
respective other firm are assumed to be given for the moment. Just as we
did when firm 1 was the follower, we construct a hypothetical value-function
for the leading firm i. For this hypothetical value-function we again assume
firm i would not have any investment option. Hence, this function exhibits
a kink at the price-trigger where the follower, firm −i, invests.
Non-predatory investment of a leader (with the leader’s role preassigned)
is again defined as investment, that occurs at prices larger than the largest
price-level P ∗ for which this hypothetical value function intersects with the
value at output (qi, q−i) less investment costs.
17 However, if this intersection
is at a higher price than the investment price of firm −i, then firm i can-
not profitably invest in a non-predatorily before firm −i invests. Therefore,
under the assumption that firm −i does not predatorily invest, we obtain
the following value-matching conditions for our second hypothetical value-
function: bEi(P exit,−iq−i ,qi , qi, q−i) = Ei(∆qi+q−i,qiP exit,−iq−i ,qi , qi, 0) (5.30)
17Again a case where investment is profitable at any price may occur. However, we will
not further comment on this possible case.
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if firm i chooses an exit price-trigger larger than the one of firm −i and
bEi(P exit,iq
i
,q−i
, q
i
, q−i) = 0 (5.31)
otherwise. If firm i non-predatorily invests, we obtain
bEi(P inv,iq
i
,q−i
, q
i
, q−i) = Ei(∆qi+q−i ,qi+q−iP
inv,i
qi,q−i, qi, q−i)− C
i (5.32)
and if firm −i invests first, we obtain
bEi(P inv,−iq−i ,qi , qi , q−i) = Ei(∆qi+q−i ,qi+q−iP inv,−iq−i ,qi , qi, q−i). (5.33)
The investment price-trigger P inv,iq
i
,q−i
is then determined as the solution P inv,iq
i
,q−i
∈
Θ :=
h
P pred,−iq−i ,qi , P
inv,−i
q−i ,qi
i
to the generalized smooth-pasting condition
∀P ∈ Θ :
Ã
∂ bEi
∂P
(P inv,iq
i
,q−i
, q
i
, q−i)−
∂Ei
∂P
(P inv,iq
i
,q−i
, qi , q−i) ·∆qi+q−i ,qi+q−i
!
×
³
P inv,iqi ,q−i − P
´
≤ 0. (5.34)
Proposition 5.5 can be used to find an exit-equilibrium, given the invest-
ment strategies of firm −i. If predatory investment at the early stage of the
game is possible, can be checked by expressions analogous to those obtained
in the case when firm 1 is the follower.
Equilibrium investment
The investment strategies of firm−i obviously cannot be taken as given, i.e.
we have to determine the exit- and investment-equilibrium at the early stage
of the game simultaneously. Remember that we were merely interested in
competitive outcomes. Thus, we assumed that collusive investment strategies
are not feasible.
We define as Huisman and Kort (1999) a function Φi(P ) which represents
the advantage of taking the role of the leader and investing at P instead of
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becoming the follower, when the other firm invests at price P.
Φi(P ) := Ei(∆q
i
+q−i ,qi+q−iP, qi, q−i)− C| {z }
Value as leader
− Ei(∆q
i
+q−i ,qi+q−iP, qi, q−i)| {z }
Value as follower
(5.35)
Note that this expression is independent of exit decisions in the early stage
of the game and is thus well defined, although we have not identified the exit
equilibrium, yet.
To describe the root-behavior of Φi(P ) a bit more notation has to be
introduced. We denote the state-
¡
q, q
¢
price at which firm i invests as follower
by P i, i.e.
P i = ∆−1q
i
+q−i ,qi+q−i
P
inv,i
q
i
,q−i
analogously we define P i as the price at which firm i quits as follower, invests
predatorily, or firm −i quits, whichever happens first.
Proposition 5.6 (i) On M := [max
j=1,2
{P j},min
j=1,2
{P j}]
Φi(P ) = 0 (5.36)
has at most three solutions.
(ii) If P i ≤ P−i, then Φi(P ) = 0 has at most two solution on M and only
one additional one for P i ≤ P ≤ P−i, namely P−i with Φ0i(P−i) < 0.
(iii) If P i > P−i , then Φi(P i) = 0 and Φi(P ) < 0 for all P i > P > P−i.
(iv) If Φi(P ) = 0 has two solutions onM in case (ii) or three solutions in case
(iii), then Φi(max{P i}) > 0. Moreover, there can only exist an additional
solution on min
j=1,2
{P j} < P < max
j=1,2
{P j} if P i < P−i.
Proof. See appendix.
If there are two solutions to Φi(P ) = 0 in case (ii) (respectively three
solutions in case (iii)) we will call the smaller one the preemption-threshold
for predatory investment and the larger one preemption-threshold for non-
predatory investment. They define a threshold at which firm i is just indif-
ferent between being the leader and being the follower. We will denote these
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thresholds by P pred,ipre and P
inv,i
pre respectively. If there are less solutions, we
only define a non-predatory preemption threshold.
If in case (ii) there is no solution to (5.36) onM then there is a solution for
smaller P since the leader´s payoﬀ is negative at its eﬀective exit price, while
it is zero for this firm being follower. We then denote this solution by P inv,ipre .
Moreover, we set P pred,ipre = P i. This is the only case in which P
inv,i
pre > P
pred,i
pre .
If in case (iii) Φi(P ) < 0 for all P < P i, we set P inv,ipre = P−i.
A typical problem that arises in timing games of (dis-)investment is the
multiplicity of equilibria associated with Fudenberg and Tirole´s (1985) no-
tion of perfect timing game equilibria. The non-uniqueness typically arises
if none of the firms has an unilateral incentive to invest, while both firms
have an incentive to preempt each other.18 However, this non-uniqueness
disappears when we look at the renegotiation-proof equilibria only and make
the following additional assumption.
Assumption 5.5: Let i be the firm with the larger P i, then the largest
solution to (5.36) for firm −i shall be larger, than the optimal uncon-
strained19 investment price trigger of firm i. Moreover at least for one
firm there exists an (interior) solution for P inv,ipre on M.
This assumption assures that second-mover advantages not being ”too
strong”
Proposition 5.7 Under Assumption 5.5 the only Markov-perfect equilib-
rium for the preemption game for non-predatory investment is that the firm
18See e.g. Weeds (2001) or Sparla (2001).
Indeed, in some numerical simulations (not reported) we found non-renegotiation-proof
predatory equilibria. Renegotiation-prooveness is but a strong assumption on rationality.
Therefore, we might in reality observe a circular situation of the following form: One
agent takes pre-emptive, predatory action in threat of a predatory action of the other
agent. This other agent however has no incentive to undertake that action as long as the
first agent does not take action. The first agent however takes action as she is threatened.
Triggered oﬀ by a sunspot, the situation escalates.
19This means P inv,−iq−i ,qi is set to infinity in calculating the price-triggers.
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with the smaller P inv,ipre takes the lead, and chooses an investment-price trig-
ger, which is a solution to (5.34) , where P inv,−iq−i ,qi = P
inv,−i
pre , P
pred,−i
q−i ,qi
= P inv,ipre .
We denote this investment price trigger by P inv,Lq
L
,q−L
.
Proof. First note that at P inv,Lq
L
,q−L
firm L indeed prefers to be the leader,
moreover because of assumption 5.5 we have a preemption game for non-
predatory investment: Suppose τ denotes the stopping-time associated with
the optimal investment-price trigger of firm i. Then firm −i has an incentive
to invest at time τ − , as long as the price is above its preemption threshold.
Therefore, when Pt ∈ [P pred,−Lpre , P inv,−Lpre ] firm −L prefers to be the follower,
while at P inv,Lq
L
,q−L
firm L profitable invests.
However, an existing preemption threshold for predatory investment does
not necessary imply predatory investment to occur in a renegotiation-proof
Markov-perfect equilibrium:
Proposition 5.8 There can only occur predatory investment in a renegotiation-
proof Markov-perfect equilibrium, if at least one firm can profitably invest
predatorily, without assuming that the other firm invests predatorily, i.e. a
P´ < P inv,Lq
L
,q−L
exists, such that
Ei(∆q
i
+q−i ,qi+q−i P´ , qi, q−i)− C ≥ bEi(P´ , qi, q−i), (5.37)
where bEi denotes the equity value without the possibility of predatory invest-
ment. If (5.37) has indeed such a solution, we will call predatory investment
for firm i to be ”fundamentally profitable”.
Proof. (5.37) defines a kind of net-present value rule to predatory in-
vestment: The option to predatorily invest exists if and only if predatory
investment can give a net-present-value gain. If predatory investment is not
profitable for both firms unless the other firm predatorily invests, then both
firms can renegotiate not to invest predatorily.
Proposition 5.9 A solution to (5.37) implies that a predatory investment
preemption threshold for firm i exists, i.e. there cannot be second-mover
advantages for profitable predatory investment independent of how low P gets.
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Proof. See appendix.
Therefore, if both firms have a predatory-investment preemption-threshold
price, or if the non-predatory investment threshold of one firm is smaller than
the predatory one of the other firm, we have a preemption game for preda-
tory investment. However, both firms only enter this game, if at least one
firm finds predatory investment fundamentally profitable. If only for one
firm a predatory-investment preemption threshold is defined, and if this firm
finds predatory investment fundamentally profitable, then it will predatorily
invest, indeed. In this case it sets the predatory investment-price trigger ac-
cording to a generalized smooth pasting condition analogous the one derived
for firm 1 as follower.
Proposition 5.10 (i) If there is a preemption game for predatory invest-
ment and P pred,ipre < P
inv,−i
pre for both firms, the only Markov-perfect equilibrium
(outcome) is that the firm with the higher P pred,ipre , takes the lead for predatory
investment and invests at a price-trigger which is a solution to a version of
(5.34) that is modified by defining P inv,−iq−i ,qi := P
pred,i
pre , P
pred,−i
q−i ,qi
:= P pred,−ipre and
by using the appropriate value matching conditions.
(ii) If there is a preemption game for predatory investment, and P pred,ipre >
P inv,−ipre for firm i, and one of the firms has an unilateral incentive to invest
in
£
P inv,−ipre , P
pred,i
pre
¤
,20 then in all Markov-perfect equilibria firm −i invests
predatorily at P pred,ipre .
(iii) If there is a preemption game for predatory investment and P pred,ipre >
P inv,−ipre for one of the firms, and none of the firms have an unilateral incentive
to invest on
£
P inv,−ipre , P
pred,i
pre
¤
, then in all renegotiation-proof Markov-perfect
equilibria firm i predatorily invests at its unconstrained optimal predatory
investment price-trigger or at P pred,−ipre , whichever is the higher price.
Proof. See appendix.
Corollary 5.2 If both firms wish to predatorily invest, then the equilibrium
20This means the unconstrained optimal investment price-trigger falls in this interval.
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predatory investment price-trigger is strictly smaller than the equilibrium nor-
mal investment price-trigger.
The equilibrium exit strategies are determined analogously to the follower
case. Therefore, we now have all equations that determine the equilibrium
price-triggers of our model and so we can obtain numerical results and nu-
merically check the importance of the strategic situation modelled in this
chapter.
5.5 Value of debt
For completeness, we briefly state the two value-matching conditions which
generally characterized the value of debt:
Bi(P
exit,i
qi ,q−i , bi, qi , q−i) = λqi , (5.38)
Bi(P
Trig, bi, qi1 , q−i1) = Bi(∆qi1+q−i1 ,qi2+q−i2P Trig, bi, qi2, q−i2). (5.39)
P Trig denotes an arbitrary decision price trigger that does not lead to an
immediate exit of firm i and at which capacities are changed from (qi1 , q−i1) to
(qi2 , q−i2). However, as we do not aim at deriving optimal leverage strategies,
debt values are not reported in the numerical results.
5.6 Numerical results
Numerical solutions have been calculated for diﬀerent parameter values. Ta-
ble 5.1 contains the parameter-values for the non firm-specific parameters.
In all calculations an isoelastic specification for the inverse demand-function
has been used. Two base cases are considered. One to discuss the impact of
changes in the leverage, and one to study the influences of the elasticity of
demand and the tax rate.
Tables 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 report the results for those two base cases. First
of all, investment price-triggers for the duopoly and the monopoly diﬀer very
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Table 5.1: General Parameter Values,
Base Cases
Tax Rate τ 0.3
Discount Rate ρ 0.05
Drift µ 0.03
Variance σ2 0.1
Inverse-Demand Q−ξ
Table 5.2: Base Case I (a), (b): ξ = 0.9
Firm 1 (a) Firm 1 (b) Firm 2
Production before Investment 18 17.9 18
Production after Investment 20 20 20
Investment-Costs 120 120 120
Coupon-Payment [Debt] 49.9 49.9 50
MONOPOLY
Exit-Price Trigger after investment 0.4496 0.4496 0.4505
Exit-Price Trigger before investment 0.4980 0.4980 0.4990
Investment-Price Trigger 99.844 95.337 99.844
DUOPOLY
Both Invested, Exit-Price Trigger Firm 2 exits Firm 2 exits 0.45049
Firm 1 Follower: Exit-Price Trigger 0.4867 0.4888 Firm 1 exits
Firm 1 Follower: Investment-Price Trigger 15.872 15.061 Firm 1 inv.
Firm 2 Follower: Exit-Price Trigger Firm 2 exits Firm 2 exits 0.4881
Firm 2 Follower: Investment-Price Trigger Firm 2 inv. Firm 2 inv. 17.48
Preemption Threshold Non-Predatory Investment 4.57881 4.36741 4.895 (4.873)
Unilateral Incentive to predatorily Invest as Leader No No Yes
Firm 1: Predatory Investment-Price Trigger 0.611624 0.6206 Firm 1 inv.
significantly21.
For the follower, this is just the standard result of Cournot competition.
For the preemption threshold of the leader, this is the usual eﬀect of the
strong first-mover advantages of the Stackelberg-leader. These first-mover
advantages are additionally amplified in the presence of predatory behavior
or if the order of exit is reversed by investment. These first-mover advantages
drive the results of our base cases.22 The (tax adjusted) net-present-value
21This is also true for the trigger values of Y , which can be obtained by rescaling the
price triggers by 1.86607 for the leader and 1.95912 for the follower, setting D (q) = 1.
22Note, that although interior solutions for the non-predatory investment price-trigger
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Table 5.3: Base Case I (c): ξ = 0.8
Firm 1 Firm 2
Production before Investment 17 18
Production after Investment 21 20
Investment-Costs 160 120
Coupon-Payment [Debt] 70 70
MONOPOLY
Exit-Price Trigger after investment 0.601 0.631
Exit-Price Trigger before investment 0.7296 0.695
Investment-Price Trigger 34.75 49.77
DUOPOLY
Both Invested, Exit-Price Trigger Firm 2 exits 0.631
Firm 1 Follower: Exit-Price Trigger 0.693 Firm 1 exits
Firm 1 Follower: Investment-Price Trigger 9.293 Firm 1 inv.
Firm 2 Follower: Exit-Price Trigger Firm 2 exits 0.680
Firm 2 Follower: Investment-Price Trigger Firm 2 inv. 15.924
Preemption Threshold Non-Predatory Investment 3.579 3.109
Unilateral Incentive to predatorily Invest as Leader No Yes
Firm 1: Predatory Investment-Price Trigger Firm 2 inv. 0.786
price triggers, PNPV , for investment in duopoly in the two base cases were
(according to rule 1 below) 5.7 (8.2) and 7.6 (10.9) respectively.23 If one
assumes the other firm would invest, unless firm i invests (rule 2), then the
net-present-value rule yields a tax-adjusted price trigger of PNPV = 4.5 in
base case I (a), which is only slightly below the equilibrium investment-price
trigger of firm 1.
Moreover, in calculating the adjusted net-present value price-trigger of
were allowed for, in the cases reported, the leader always invested at the preemption
threshold of the follower.
23
PNPVRule_1 =
ρCi
(1− τ)
³
qi∆q
i
+q−i ,qi+q−i
− q
i
´ (5.40)
PNPVRule_2 =
ρCi
(1− τ)
³
qi∆q
i
+q−i ,qi+q−i
− q
i
∆q
i
+q−i ,qi+q−i
´ (5.41)
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Table 5.4: Base Case II: ξ = 0.7
Firm 1 Firm 2
Production before Investment 18 18
Production after Investment 20 20
Investment-Costs 160 160
Coupon-Payment [Debt] 40 50
MONOPOLY
Exit-Price Trigger after investment 0.3604 0.4505
Exit-Price Trigger before investment 0.3963 0.4951
Investment-Price Trigger 43.9427 43.9679
DUOPOLY
Both Invested, Exit-Price Trigger Firm 2 exits 0.4505
Firm 1 Follower: Exit-Price Trigger Firm 2 exits 0.4584
Firm 1 Follower: Investment-Price Trigger 19.59 Firm 1 inv.
Firm 2 Follower: Exit-Price Trigger Firm 2 exits 0.4863
Firm 2 Follower: Investment-Price Trigger Firm 2 inv. 19.73
Preemption Threshold Non-Predatory Investment 9.055 9.4218
Unilateral Incentive to predatorily Invest as Leader No No
Firm 2: Exit-Price Trigger before Investment Firm 2 exits 0.4974
PNPV = 4.5, the investment of firm 2 when the price-process reaches the
follower’s price-trigger is ignored. Therefore the ”true” net-present-value rule
investment-price trigger is larger than 4.5. In that sense, we can conclude
that in some cases the threat of being forced to exit first outweighs the gains
from waiting.
Comparing the results for the three sub-cases of Base Case I–(a) Firm
1 has lower leverage before and after investment, (b) Firm 1 has a higher
leverage before, but lower leverage after investment and (c) the size of the
investment projects diﬀers between Firm 1 and 2–shows that the firm with
the higher initial, the firm with the higher post-investment leverage, and the
firm with the lower leverage in both states can prey in equilibrium. Therefore,
our model includes not only the cases studied by Busse (2001) but also the
cases in which the financially healthier firm preys.
Table 5.5 now reports the eﬀects of a change in leverage of firm 1 (relative
to Base Case I(a)). In states, in which investment does neither change the
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Table 5.5: Eﬀects of firm 1’s debt on investment-price triggers
debt P inv,1q
1
,0 P
inv,1
q
1
,q2
P inv,1pre P
inv,2
pre
49.9∗ 99.8436 15.8715 4.57881 4.89525
49 99.8422 17.2948 6.0871 6.52665
48 99.8407 17.2942 6.08645 6.52679
47 99.8392 17.2935 6.08581 6.52694
40 99.8294 17.2894 6.08161 6.5279
35 99.8232 17.2868 6.07892 6.52851
∗ Firm 1 exits first as follower and also predatorily invests as leader.
Table 5.6: Eﬀects of firm 2’s debt on investment-price triggers
debt P inv,2q
2
,0 P
inv,2
q
2
,q1
P inv,2pre P
inv,1
pre
50 133.102 23.2316 8.57345 8.20269
55 133.108 23.2526 8.61058 8.1743
60 133.115 23.2749 8.64987 8.14432
70 133.13 23.3233 8.73448 8.07987
80 133.147 23.3762 8.8266 8.00988
ordering of exit price triggers, nor predatory investment would occur on the
second stage, the eﬀect of debt on investment-price triggers are rather minor.
Moreover, as firm 1 becomes leader in equilibrium, the probability of
investment in duopoly shrinks with larger debt levels, as long as debt levels
stay intermediate.
However, if both firms become more similarly leveraged, debt starkly
influences investment decisions. If firm 2 can expect that firm 1 leaves the
market first (in case firm 2 becomes the leader) then—as we have seen—first-
mover advantages become very strong. The first-mover advantages can be
even strong enough to let firm 1 in equilibrium invests below the simple
net-present-value price trigger.
Therefore, the model presented in this chapter might indeed explain the
U-shaped investment-debt relation found in our empirical analysis of the pre-
vious chapter. Figure 5.3 shows the Φi functions for both firms corresponding
to the first base case.
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Figure 5.3: Gain, Φi, from becoming the leader, Base Case I (a)
Table 5.6 reports the investment price triggers for diﬀerent debt-levels of
firm 2 (with the base case II specifications). For firm 2 investment becomes
more likely for lower debt levels, which is in line with Jou´s (2001) findings
for monopolists and empirical evidence. Interestingly, diﬀerent debt levels
influence firm 2´s investment decision much stronger in a duopoly than in
monopoly.
Unlike in a static model of Cournot-competition, here increasing the elas-
ticity of demand make investment of the leader more likely, whereas the
investment of the follower becomes less likely, as shown in table 5.7. Here
again the strong first-mover advantages drive the result. This may serve as
an independent test of the model.
Table 5.8 presents the price triggers for diﬀerent corporate tax rates. We
use Base Case II as the reference-case, because in Case I, firm 1 would invest
immediately as follower for low tax rates. However, note that the eﬀect of tax-
rates of course only comes in, when tax rates do not lower investment costs by
the same percentage, i.e. given debt, taxes are neutral if Ci (τ) = (1− τ)Ci.
At last one may wonder if the results hinge on the near symmetry of
both firms in the cases studied. Yet, although only results for firms that are
relatively symmetric were reported, solutions have been calculated for cases
more asymmetric in production or investment costs, too. In more asymmetric
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Table 5.7: Eﬀects of the elasticity of demand on investment-price triggers
elasticity P inv,1q
1
,0 P
inv,2
q
2
,0 P
inv,1
q
1
,q2
P
inv,2
q
2
,q1
P inv,1pre P
inv,2
pre
−0.5 26.1318 26.1671 17.0162 17.1305 9.98429 10.3272
−0.6 32.8083 32.8389 18.2142 18.34 9.50913 9.86668
−0.7 43.9427 43.9679 19.5916 19.729 9.05488 9.42182
−0.8 66.2228 66.2419 21.1916 21.3402 8.61981 8.99124
−0.9 133.09 133.102 23.0725 23.2316 8.20269 8.57345
Table 5.8: Eﬀects of the tax rate on investment-price triggers
tax rate P inv,1q
1
,0 P
inv,2
q
2
,0 P
inv,1
q
1
,q2
P
inv,2
q
2
,q1
P inv,1pre P
inv,2
pre
0.1 34.2003 34.2304 15.2379 15.399 6.98867 7.41972
0.2 38.462 38.4898 17.1425 17.2921 7.8937 8.29367
0.3 43.9427 43.9679 19.5916 19.729 9.05488 9.42182
0.4 51.2517 51.2744 22.8573 22.9816 10.6 10.9317
0.5 61.4864 61.5063 27.4294 27.5396 12.7591 13.0528
cases the results do not change much, except for predatory outcomes to be
more likely, i.e. we obtain predatory equilibria also for cases with a greater
diﬀerence in leverage ratios or more elastic demands.
Generally predatory outcomes are likely if firm 1 is small compared to
firm 2 and both are heavily leveraged.
5.7 Summary of the results of chapter 5
At the end of this chapter, we may briefly summarize. We analyzed a real
options model of a duopoly. This model simultaneously allowed for both irre-
versible investment and exit decisions. The duopoly was modelled in contin-
uous time, firms were assumed to hold debt because of tax advantages, and
were allowed to default on their obligations at no cost to the equityholders.
We showed how endogenous bankruptcy decisions alter the strategic sit-
uation significantly: Firms may invest not because investment is fundamen-
tally profitable, but because this makes the exit of the competitor more
likely. This, however, aﬀects the value of the investment options themselves.
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Therefore, in the presented model debt not only induces an agency prob-
lem, but also has a negative strategic eﬀect, which reduces the value of debt.
This might explain the low debt-ratios found in practice compared to the
substantial tax benefits of debt.
Moreover, a discontinuous eﬀect of debt on investment incentives was
found. For moderate levels of debt, investment tends to decrease with in-
creasing debt. However, if debt levels get large enough, investment-incentives
become very strong, as both firms seek to become leader and monopolize
the market when revenues decrease in the presence of adverse shocks. This
strategic eﬀect of debt might explain the non-monotone influence of debt on
investment we found in chapter 4. Therefore, our model also explains preda-
tory behavior in a dynamic setting with neither relying on an asymmetry
of information among competitors, nor on learning-curve or network eﬀects.
Our numerical examples show that in equilibrium both the firm with the
higher and the firm with the lower debt may prey.
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Chapter 6
Concluding Remarks
Although we have discussed the main results of each chapter at the end of
it, some concluding remarks may still be justified.
The goal of this work was modest. We wanted to show that financial
frictions and non-convex adjustment costs interact in a non-trivial and im-
portant way, when firms decide upon investment behavior. To do so, we
began with building a model of a monopolistically competitive firm which
faces both financial constraints and fixed costs of investment. We found the
financial status of the firm to be influential on both the adjustment speed
and the optimal stock of capital in this model. Maybe, one should summarize
the idea behind this eﬀect in the following very stylized way: Suppose a firm
completely leases its capital. Given an amount of liquidity and given a fixed
cost of adjusting the stock of capital, this firm is employed with a certain
number of options to change the stock of capital. The larger this number,
the smaller the value of each of the options. However, the option-value adds
to the fixed cost of adjustment. Hence, adjustment is the more frequent, the
larger liquidity is.
To test our hypothesis, we analyzed company-account data from Ger-
many and the UK. Indeed, we could find only a weak influence of finance on
the long-run optimal stock of capital. Yet, we found the influence of finance
on investment to be quite substantial. Moreover, greater liquidity also am-
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plified the reaction of investment to changes in fundamentals. Therefore, our
theoretical point appears to be well supported by the data.
On the basis of these results, we have built a model of duopoly in which
two firms are both equipped with an irreversible investment and a bankruptcy
option. As we have seen, these two options and competition interact in
a complex manner. This interaction can trigger predatory investment in
adverse states of demand. Moreover, we have seen this interaction to speed
up investment more than the eﬀect of competition alone would do.
So we might say we have reached our goal to a considerable extent. How-
ever, it is still not clear, how the proposed investment model would actually
behave in a macroeconomic setting. Would the financial frictions exacerbate
shocks to the economy or would they rather smooth the reaction of firms
to those shocks over time? Suppose an economy is hit by an adverse shock,
that drives down firm liquidity as well as productivity. On the one hand,
firms would adjust their stock of capital more slowly than without the finan-
cial shock. Hence, there would be a lesser financial-multiplier eﬀect, caused
by a drop in the price of capital goods. On the other hand, the economic
downturn would appear to be more persistent. Compared to the convex-cost
framework the reaction of aggregate investment, may yet still be stronger, if
the shock is large and many firms would be forced to fully adjust their stock
of capital.
Another field of further research, related to our findings, could look for
the interaction of non-convex adjustment cost and other rigidities than only
an imperfect financial market. For example studying labor demand of firms
with non-convex adjustment costs in both capital and labor would surely be
a topic of interest.1 Again these interdependent demands could be influenced
by financial market imperfections.
Our duopoly model might be extended in several directions: The choice
of debt may be endogenised and collusive behavior and simultaneous action
may be allowed for. This might especially be of interest, as Glazer (1994)
1See Sakellaris (2001) for an exploratory study of this topic.
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finds debt to make collusive behavior more likely in a two-period setting of the
Brander and Lewis (1986) model. Moreover, market entry as a special case
may be worthwhile to study. Another interesting extension of the duopoly
model would be to allow for a multitude of investment options or to analyze
welfare issues.
However, these questions go beyond both, the aim and scope of the
present thesis.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 3
In this appendix, we derive the Bellman equation which is central to our
model in chapter 3. Thereafter, we show the existence and uniqueness of a
solution to this equation. At the end of this appendix, some properties of
the induced optimal-policy function are discussed.
A.1 Deriving the Bellman Equation
All variables, functions etc. are defined as in the main text, unless stated
diﬀerently. The correspondence, X, of financial feasible capital-imbalance
and debt pairs is given by:
X (K∗t , wt, zt, Bt) =
(
zo, Bt+1 ∈ R2+|D(zo, Bt+1, K∗t , wt, zt, Bt) ≥ 0
∧Bt+1 ≤ bˆzoK∗t
)
=
(
zo, Bt+1 ∈ R2+
¯¯¯¯
¯ (1+ i( BtKt−1 ))Bt − Π(zo,K∗t )[1− wtI{zo 6=zt}]+K∗t (zo − zt) ≤ Bt+1 ≤ bˆzoK∗t
)
(A.1)
Dividing the expression by K∗t and using bt :=
Bt
Kt−1
and for the stock of
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capital before investment Kt−1 = Kt1−δ yields:
Xˆ (K∗t , wt, zt, bt) :=
=
(
zo, bo ∈ R++ ×R+
¯¯¯¯
¯ (1+r(bt))1−δ btzt − π(zo)[1− wtI{zo 6=zt}]+(zo − zt) ≤ bozo ≤ bˆzo
)
∪ {(0, 0)}
(A.2)
To obtain a more accessible form define et to be the equity-ratio in the
opening balance and thus
et := e(bt) = 1−
(1+ r(bt))
1− δ bt.
Define furthermore c(z, b) to be the cash flow per unit of capital (including
cash flow from newly issued debt, and ”costs” for ”buying back” the capital
stock), that is
ct := c(z
o, bo) =
π (zo)
zo
+ (bo − 1) .
We then get for Xˆ :
Xˆ (K∗t , wt, zt, bt) =

z
o, bo ∈ R++ × R+
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ e(bt) ztzo + c(zo, bo)− wtI{zo 6=zt} π(z
o)
zo
≥ 0
∧ 0 ≥
³
bo − bˆ
´ 
∪{(0, 0)}.
(A.3)
Next define
Y (wt, zt, et) :=


z
o, bo ∈ R++ × R+
¯¯¯¯
¯¯ et ztzo + c(zo, bo)− wtI{zo 6=zt} π(z
o)
zo
≥ 0
∧ 0 ≥
³
bo − bˆ
´ 
 .
(A.4)
For et = e(bt) we have Xˆ = Y ∪ {(0, 0)}.
Now denote the value-function by V. For notational convenience define
Y := Y (wt, zt, e(bt)) . Then V is determined by the following Bellman equa-
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tion:
V (K∗t , wt, zt, bt)
:= max
(zo,bo)∈X(K∗
t
,wt,zt,bt)
©
D(zo, bo, K∗t , wt, zt, bt) + ψEt
£
V (K∗t+1, wt+1, zt+1, b
o)
¤ª
= K∗t max
(zo,bo)
∈Y
n
e(bt)zt + c(z
o, bo)zo − wtI{zo 6=zt}π(zo) + ψEt
h
V (K∗
t+1,wt+1,zt+1,b
o)
K∗
t
io
= K∗t

e(bt)zt + max
(zo,bo)
∈Y



c(zo, bo)zo − wtI{zo 6=zt}π(zo)+
+ψEt
h³
V (K∗
t+1,wt+1,zt+1,b
o)
K∗
t+1
− e(bo)zt+1 + e(bo)zt+1
´
K∗
t+1
K∗
t
i 



= K∗t

e(bt)zt + max
(zo,bo)
∈Y



c(zo, bo)zo − wtI{zo 6=zt}π(zo) + ψe(bo)zo(1− δ)
+ψEt
h³
V (K∗
t+1,wt+1,zt+1,b
o)
K∗
t+1
− e(bo)zt+1
´
zo(1−δ)
zt+1
)
i 



(A.5)
The first equality follows from the linear homogeneity in K∗ of the function
D and the linearity of the Et−operator, the second equality stems from the
fact, that e(bt)zt is no function of (zo, bo) and is thus not aﬀected by the
maximization. The third follows from the linearity of Et and the definition
of zt+1. (3.3) yields
K∗
t+1
K∗
t
= exp(d+ ξt+1) and z
o(1− δ) = zt+1 · exp(d+ ξt+1).
Now define vt :=
V (K∗
t
,wt,zt,bt)
K∗
t
− e(bt)zt. Due to the homogeneity of V , v does
not depend on K∗t . Thus we obtain:
v(wt, zt, e (bt)) := max
(zo,bo)∈
X(1,wt,zt,bt)
(
c(zo, bo)zo − wtI{zo 6=zt}π(zo) + ψe(bo)zo(1− δ)
+ψEt[v(wt+1, zo (1−δ)exp(d+ξ
t+1)
, bo) exp(d+ ξt+1)]
)
(A.6)
That maximizing v leads to an equivalent policy to maximizing V has been
discussed in the main text.
A.2 Existence and uniqueness
From now on time-indices will be suppressed. Due to Lemma 3.1 we can
drop ”no production” from the set of alternatives X and express the value
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function v as
v (w, z, e) = max
(zo,bo)∈Y (w,z,e)

 c(z
o, bo)− wπ(zo)I{zo 6=zt} + (1− δ)ψe (bo) zo
+ψ
RR h
v
³
, zo 1−δ
exp(d+ξ)
, e (bo)
´
exp(d+ ξ)
i
dF (ξ)dG()


(A.7)
or respectively as:
v (w, z, e) =
(
max {vno adj (z, e) , vadj (w, z, e)}
vadj (w, z, e)
for Z 6= ∅
for Z = ∅
(A.8)
with
vno adj (z, e) : = max
bo∈Z



c(z, bo) + (1− δ)ψe(bo)z
+ψ
RR h
v
³
, z 1−δ
exp(d+ξ)
, e (bo)
´
exp(d+ ξ)
i
dF (ξ)dG()



vadj (w, z, e) : = max
(zo,bo)
∈Y (w,z,e)



c(zo, bo)− wπ(zo) + (1− δ)ψe (bo) zo
+ψ
RR h
v
³
, zo 1−δ
exp(d+ξ)
, e (bo)
´
exp(d+ ξ)
i
dF (ξ)dG()


 .
Assumption A.6: µξ := ψE[exp(ξ + d)] < 1.1
Lemma A.1 Consider the operator T defined by posing (Tv) (w, z, e) equal
to the right hand side of (A.7). This operator is defined on the set B of
all real-valued, a.e. continuous and bounded functions with domain D =
[0, 1]× R+ × R+
Then the mapping T (a) preserves boundedness, (b) preserves continuity a.e.,
1This assumption is equivalent to assumption A.6 in Caballero and Engel (199, p. 811).
Assume ξ is normally distributed with variance σ2. Then this assumption is equivalent
to exp
³
d+ σ
2
2
´
< 1+ r. Approximately, this is r − d > σ22 . Economicly this means that
productivity and hence value of a given stock of capital grows at a smaller rate than the
market rate of return.
Suppose, this assumption would not hold and neglect adjustment costs for the moment.
It is easy to see that a firm could obtain infinite expected value by choosing a stock of
capital that is small enough to reproduce its depreciation plus the interest rate in the
first period. In the next period it can be expected, that this stock of capital (depreciated
capital replaced) generates a positive profit, which grows at a larger rate than the interest
rate.
In this sense, assumption 1 is an equilibrium condition for the capital-market.
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and (c) satisfies Blackwell´s conditions.
Proof. (a) To show that T preserves boundedness, one has to show that
for any bounded function u (Tu)(·) is bounded.
Consider u ∈ B, that is bounded from above by u and bounded from below by
u, then(Tu) (·) is bounded from above because
(Tu) (w, z, e) ≤ µξu+ sup
(zo,bo)∈Y (w,z,e)
©
c(zo, bo)− wπ(zo)I{zo 6=zt} + (1− δ)ψe (bo) zo
ª
≤ µξu+ sup
0≤zo,0≤bo≤b̂
{c(zo, bo) + (1− δ)ψe (bo) zo}
= µξu+ sup
0≤zo,0≤bo≤b̂
{[1− ψ (1+ r(bo))] bzo + π(zo)− (1− ψ(1− δ)) zo}
≤ µξu+ sup
0≤zo,0≤bo≤b̂
{(1− ψ) zo + π(zo)− (1− ψ(1− δ)) zo}
= µξu+ sup
0≤zo
{π(zo)− ψδzo} .
The first inequality reflects the boundedness of u. The second inequality results
from dropping adjustment costs.
Using the definitions for c and e we obtain the first equality. The third
inequality now follows from r(bo) ≥ 0, 0 ≤ bb < 1.
The last supremum is bounded, because π(zo) − ψδzo obtains its maximum.
This follows from our concavity assumption on π and our assumption on the
first derivative of π that leads to
lim
zo→0
π0(zo)− ψδ > 0 > lim
zo→∞
π0(zo)− ψδ.
That (Tu) (·) is bounded from below follows from
(Tu) (w, z, e) ≥ µξu+ sup
(zo,bo)∈Y (w,e,z)
©
c(zo, bo)− wπ(zo)I{zo 6=zt} + (1− δ)ψe (bo) zo
ª
> µξu.
The last inequality follows directly from Lemma 3.1—the optimality of no-
bankruptcy.
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(b) Firstly, for every u that is continuous a.e. the parameter integrals in
(A.7) are continuous. So the function that is maximized is continuous. Sec-
ondly, both Y and Z are continuous correspondences except for the equity
and capital imbalance pairs (e, z) ∈ A := {(m,n)|m = (1 −bb) − π(n)
n
. These
are the points at which Z switches to being empty, the (e, z) pairs at which
a marginal decrease in equity will force the firm to adjust capital to avoid
bankruptcy. Therefore, the maximization fullfils the assumptions of Berge’s
thorem at all points outside A. Hence, (Tu)(w, z, e) is continuous for all
points (e, z) /∈ A. Now, as A is a curve in R2 and so has measure 0, (Tu) is
continuous a.e.
(c) To show that T satisfies Blackwell´s conditions, one first notes that if
f1, f2 ∈ B and if ∀(w, z, e) ∈ D : f1(w, z, e) ≤ f2(w, z, e), then (because
exp(d + ξ) > 0) the expected value in (A.8) preserves the inequality, and so
does the max-function. Thus
(Tf1)(w, z, e) ≤ (Tf2)(w, z, e)
Straightforward algebra yields
(Tf + a)(w, z, e) = (Tf)(w, z, e) + µξa
Assumption A.6 now yields the second Blackwell condition.
Proposition A.1 Equation (A.7) has exactly one solution (which belongs to
B).
Proof. Lemma A.1 yields that T defines a contraction mapping on the
metric space B with a modulus strictly smaller than one. The existence and
uniqueness now follows from the contraction mapping theorem (See Theorem
3.2 in Stockey, Lucas and Prescott, 1989)
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A.3 Optimal policy
Now define the following functions related to the solution of the Bellman
equation of v (w, z, e) in Chapter 3.
J(z, b, w) := c(z, b)− wπ(z) + (1− δ)ψe (b) z + I(z, b) (A.9)
I(z, b) := ψ
ZZ h
v
³
, z 1−δ
exp(d+ξ)
, e (b)
´
exp(d+ ξ)
i
dF (ξ)dG() (A.10)
Lemma A.2 The function J(z, b, w) is bounded from above, so that
sup
(zo,bo)∈Y (w,e,z)
J(z, bo, w) is finite.
Proof. As v satisfies the Bellman-equation, it must be bounded. However,
since
v (w, z, e) = max
(zo,bo)∈Y (w,e,z)
J(zo, bo, w)+wπ(zo)I{zo=z} ≥



max
(zo,bo)∈Y (w,z,e)
J(zo, bo, w)
max
bo∈Z(z,e)
J(z, bo, w) + wπ(z)
always hold, J must be bounded, too.
Corollary A.1 bJmax(z, e) := sup
bo∈Z(z,e)
J(z, bo, w)+wπ(z) and Jmax(w, z, e) :=
sup
(zo,bo)∈Y (w,z,e)
J(zo, bo, w) are finite, too.
Lemma A.3 (a) J and Jmax are strictly monotonously decreasing in w.
(b) J(z, e, w) + wπ(z) is independent of w,
(c) Jmax and bJmax(z, e) (and therefore v, too) are monotonously increasing in
e.
Proof. (a) For any w1, w2 ∈ [0; 1] : w1 < w2 we have:
J(z, b, w2) = c(z, b)− w2π(z) + (1− δ)ψe (b) z + I(z, b)
< c(z, b)− w1π(z) + (1− δ)ψe (b) z + I(z, b)
= J (z, b, w1)
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And since Y2 := Y (w2, z, e) ⊂ Y (w1, z, e) =: Y1, we get:
Jmax(w2, z, e) = max
(zo,bo)∈Y2
J(zo, bo, w2) ≤ max
(zo,bo)∈Y1
J(zo, bo, w2)
< max
(zo,bo)∈Y1
J(zo, bo, w1) = Jmax (w1, z, e)
(b) This follows directly from the definition of J,
(c) Since both Z and Y strictly grow with e this follows straightforwardly.
Proposition A.2 Define for Z 6= ∅ as an implicit function w(z, e) by
Jmax(w, z, e)− bJmax(z, e) = 0 (A.11)
Then firms adjust if their current adjustment cost factor w is smaller than
w(z, e) or if Z = ∅.
Proof. That a unique w(z, e) equating Jmax and bJmax exists, follows from
Jmax(0, z, e) ≥ bJmax(z, e) ∀(z, e) together with the monotonicity of Jmax in w.
As argued in the main text firms adjust if Z = ∅ or Jmax(w, z, e) > bJmax(z, e).
Since Jmax is monotonously decreasing in w this inequality holds if and only
if w < w.
Proposition A.3 J(z, b, w) is analytic and thus the set Q of (zo, bo) ∈bY (w, e) ∩ {zo ≥ z} (Lemma 3.1) such that J(z, b, w) = Jmax(w, z, e) is a
non-empty set with a finite number of points.
Proof. To show that J is analytic it suﬃces to show that I is analytic.
Therefore note that I can be written as a convolution of an a.e. continuous
function and a normal density:
I(z, b) : = ψ
Z
K(z, b, ξ)dF (ξ)
K(z, b, ξ) : =
Z ·
v
µ
, z
1− δ
exp(d+ ξ)
, e(b)
¶
exp(d+ ξ)
¸
dG()
However, as K is integrable, the convolution of K and a normal density is
analytic (see e.g. Theorem 9 on p. 59 in Lehmann (1986)).
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As J is analytic is must be continuous, too. Since Y (w, z, e) is compact this
ensures that J attains its maximum within a non-empty compact set Q. Since
J is analytic the maxima are isolated, so that Q contains a finite number of
elements.
Proposition A.4 Suppose π is analytic, then the function w(z, e) is analytic
on the open and convex set C :=n
(e, z) ∈ R2+|e > (1−bb)− π(z)z o , of which A is the border. Therefore, Ω(z, e)
is analytic a.e. and so has derivatives of all order on R2+\A
Proof. From proposition A.3 we know that J is analytic on C. As all
functions involved in the construction of Z and Y are analytic (when π is
analytic), so must be Jmax and Jˆmax.(The hessian of the associated Lagrange-
Kuhn-Tucker problem has maximal rank). As (A.11) implicitly defines w¯, its
diﬀerentiabilty of all order follows from Jmax and Jˆmax being analytic together
with the implicit function theorem.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 4
B.1 Approximation of the optimal stock of
capital for the UK data
Suppose a firm produces with a production function that is of the Cobb-
Douglas-type and with two Input factors K and L.1 Then taking logarithms:
yit = ξit + ε
K
i kit + ε
L
i l ; ε
K
i + ε
L
i < 1.
Denoting wages by w and interest-rates by r, the first-order condition for
labor yields
l∗i (kit) = ln
¡
εLi
¢
+ yit (kit, l
∗ (kit))− ln (wit)
Hence, we can rewrite the production function in a semi-reduced form as an
iso-elastic function only of capital.
yit = ψ
0
i + ψ
k
i kit,
ψki : =
εKi
1− εLi
,ψ0it =
ξit + ε
L
i
£
ln
¡
εLi
¢
− ln (wit)
¤
1− εLi
1The derivation of z follows Caballero et al. (1995, p. 37).
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Now the first-order condition for k determines k∗
ln
¡
ψki
¢
+ yit (k
∗
it)− ln (r) = k∗it
Replacing y (k∗) by an exact Taylor-expansion y around kit now yields
ln
¡
ψki
¢
+ yit (kit) + ψ
k
i (k
∗
it − kit)− ln (r) = k∗it
Subtracting
¡
1− ψki
¢
kit from both sides and rearranging terms, we obtain
ln
¡
ψki
¢
+ yit (kit)− kit − ln (r) =
¡
1− ψki
¢
(k∗it − kit)
−zit := (k∗it − kit) =
1¡
1− ψki
¢ [ln (bi) + yit (kit)− kit − ln (r)]
B.2 Data Appendix to the ”Bonner Stich-
probe” (Section 4.2)
The dataset used is the ”Bonner Stichprobe”, a sample of annual company
accounts of German companies. To the very most, these companies are large
listed stock companies. The sample covers the time-period 1960 to 1997.
The panel is unbalanced and contains 694 companies (observational units)
and 18943 observations in total. Thus, the average time in the sample is 28.7
years.
The sample includes complete profit- and loss-statements as well as fur-
ther annual accounting data. Moreover, for the very most company-years
data on average wages and salaries as well as the number of employees is
reported.
Unfortunately, after firms which are holdings, multi-corporate companies,
or business trusts are removed from the sample, sample-size falls substan-
tially. Additionally, we have to drop firm-years for which data seemed in-
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consistent with usual accounting standards (e.g. negative depreciation, very
high appreciation). This leaves us with a sample of about 10000 observations.
If removing a single observation (due to data inconsistency) splits a firm-
series in two parts which are long enough to be sensibly analyzed, the second
part of the series is identified as a diﬀerent firm. If the missing observation
separated the series in a very short and a longer one, the short one was
completely removed, i.e. only firms with five or more consecutive observa-
tions remain in the sample. Additionally, single observations were removed,
if the investment rate diﬀered from the mean by 5 times the standard devi-
ation (removing 11 observations), diﬀered from the firm specific log-equity
ratio by 4 standard deviations (39 observations), or if the turnover-change
diﬀered from the mean by 6-times the standard deviation (14 observations).
Moreover, firms were excluded, if their average wage-share or proxied aver-
age cost-of-capital share exceeded 70% (removing 111 observations). This
leaves us with 449 firms and a total of 9731 observations, making an aver-
age of 21.67 accounting years per firm. In many cases series for ”land and
buildings” and ”machinery” were not reported separately over the full sam-
ple period. Therefore ”capital” is identified as ”total tangible fixed assets”
(”Sachanlagevermögen”).
Depreciation rates were generated as reported depreciation relative to the
reported stock of capital before depreciation. For a number of firm-years the
data contains capital sales as well as gross investment. For some firm years
only investment net of capital sales are reported. The stock of capital used for
the analysis was generated by the perpetual inventory method. Investment
was deflated by the producers-price index for investment goods. To account
for sales of capital, we assume that in case capital is sold, the capital stock of
each vintage is reduced by the same fraction. Thus, we obtain for the capital
series (in real terms):
Kit = Kit−1 (1− δit)
µ
1− CSitbKit + CSit
¶
+
Iit
Pt
, t > Ti
160 APPENDIX B. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 4
KiTi =
bKiTi
PTi
.
Here bKit is the reported stock of capital of firm i at time t. CSit are reported
capital-sales and Iit is reported investment, Pt is the price-index, Ti is the
year when firm i joins the sample. Wages, profits etc. were also deflated
using the producer-price index for investment goods as well.
By using the perpetual inventory method, problems induced by a change
in accounting standards in 1987 are partly eluded. However, the perpetual
inventory method leads to diﬀerent (mostly larger) stocks of capital than
reported. Thus the book-value of equity was adjusted as well.
Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 5
In the following appendix, we first derive the functional form of the value
function involved in the model of chapter 5. Thereafter the proofs which
were omitted in the main text of chapter 5 are presented.
C.1 Deriving the value functions
Treating Ei(P, bi , qi , q−i) as an asset value and using (5.2) yields according
to Itô´s Lemma for the firms expected gain in value (capital gain):
E
·
dEi(P, bi, qi , q−i)
dt
¸
=
1
2
σ2P 2
∂2Ei(P, bi, qi , q−i)
∂P 2
+ µP
∂Ei(P, bi , qi, q−i)
∂P
(C.1)
This expected capital gain plus the dividend (1− τ ) [qiP − bi] should be equal
to the normal return ρEi(P, bi , qi, q−i) to prevent any arbitrage profits from
arising. This yields the diﬀerential equation
ρEi(P, bi, qi , q−i) =
σ2
2
P 2
∂2Ei(P, bi , qi, q−i)
∂P 2
+ µP
∂Ei(P, bi , qi, q−i)
∂P
+ (1− τ ) [qiP − bi] (C.2)
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A particular solution to this equation is
Ei(P, bi, qi, q−i) = (1− τ)
·
qi
P
ρ− µ −
bi
ρ
¸
(C.3)
The complementary solution involves terms in the form P β, for each solution
β to the fundamental quadratic equation
β2
σ2
2
+ β
µ
µ− σ
2
2
¶
− ρ = 0 (C.4)
as given in (5.6) . (See Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for details.)
C.2 Proofs of the propositions of the main
text
C.2.1 Proof of Proposition 5.2
Lemma C.1 Under the assumptions of our model
g ≥ h :=
"¡
∆q1+q2,q1
¢β2 − β2 ¡∆q1+q2,q1 − 1¢µq1b2q2b1
¶1−β2
∆−(1+b)q1+q2,q2
#
≥ 1
(C.5)
holds for all ∆q1+q2,q1 ≥ 1 ≥ ∆
−β1
q1+q2,q2
.
Proof. For notational convenience we denote a := ∆q1+q2,q1 − 1; b :=
−β2 > 0 and r := q
1b2
q2b1
. By definition of flow leverage, we obtain r =
l2
l1
∆q1+q2,q2
∆q1+q2,q1
. Therefore, we have r∆q1+q2,q2
(a + 1) = l2
l1
> 1 by assumption,
so r∆q1+q2,q2
> 1
a+1
follows. Rewriting h yields:
h(a) =
µ
1
a+ 1
¶b
+ bar1+b∆−(1+b)q1+q2,q2 (C.6)
≤
µ
1
a+ 1
¶b
+ bar1+b = g (a) (C.7)
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and
∂h(a)
∂a
= b
"
∆−(1+b)q1+q2,q2r
1+b −
µ
1
a+ 1
¶1+b#
= b
µ
1
a+ 1
¶1+b "µ
l2
l1
¶1+b
− 1
#
> 0
(C.8)
Now, note that h(0) = 1 which completes the proof.
Lemma C.2 For any P exit,2q2,q1 and P ≥ P
exit,2
q2,q1
≥ ∆−1q1+q2,q2P
exit,2
q2,0
> 0 equity
value of firm 1 is positive.
Proof. To obtain negative equity values dependent on choosing P exit,2q2,q1 , a
necessary condition would be that ∃Pˆ exit,2q¯2,q¯1 > 0 : min
P>0
{E1(P, b1, q1, q2)} ≤ 0.
Using (5.11) we obtain as a general solution for the equity-value of firm 1:
1
1− τ E1(P, b, q, q2) =
qP
ρ− µ −
b
ρ
+OpV P β2 (C.9)
OpV :=
¡
∆q1+q2,q1 − 1
¢ q
ρ− µ
³
Pˆ exit,2q2,q1
´1−β2
+
1
1− β2
b
ρ
³
∆−1q1+q2,q1P
exit,1
q1,0
´−β2
.
(C.10)
Therefore, we obtain for the price Pmin which minimizes value:
Pmin = OpV
1
1−β2
·
− 1
β2
q
ρ− µ
¸− 1
1−β2
. (C.11)
Note that this price may be smaller than Pˆ exit,2q2,q1 . Using Pmin to calculate the
minimal equity-value Emin of firm 1 yields.
Emin : =
1
1− τ E1(Pmin, b1, q1, q2)
= q
ρ−µOpV
1
1−β2
h
− 1
β2
q
ρ−µ
i− 1
1−β2 − b
ρ
+OpV
1+
β2
1−β2
h
− 1
β2
q
ρ−µ
i− β2
1−β2
=
h
(−β2)
1
1−β2 + (−β2)
β2
1−β2
i · q
ρ− µ
¸− β2
1−β2
OpV
1
1−β2 − b
ρ
. (C.12)
Since OpV is increasing in Pˆ exit,2q2,q1 so is Emin. Therefore, the smallest minimal
equity value is obtained at Pˆ exit,2q2,q1 = ∆
−1
q1+q2,q2
P exit,2q2,0 = ∆
−1
q1+q2,q2
rP exit,1q1,0 (with
r defined as above in the previous Lemma). Substituting this back in (C.10)
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we obtain (making further use of the definition of P exit,1q1,0 )
OpVmin
³
P exit,1q1,0
´β2
=
¡
∆q1+q2,q1 − 1
¢ q1P exit,1q1,0
ρ− µ
³
∆−1q1+q2,q2r
´1−β2
+ 1
1−β2
b
ρ
³
∆q1+q2,q1
´β2
=
¡
∆q1+q2,q1 − 1
¢ q−β2(ρ−µ)(1−β2)ρ bq
ρ− µ
³
∆−1q1+q2,q2r
´1−β2
+ 1
1−β2
b
ρ
³
∆q1+q2,q1
´β2
=
·
−β2
¡
∆q1+q2,q1 − 1
¢ ³
∆−1q1+q2,q2r
´1−β2
+
³
∆q1+q2,q1
´β2¸ 1
1−β2
b
ρ
= h
1
1− β2
b
ρ
. (C.13)
This now yields for Pminmin :
Pminmin = h
1
1−β2
"
1
1−β2
b
ρ
− 1
β2
q
ρ−µ
# 1
1−β2 ³
P exit,1q1,0
´− β2
1−β2 (C.14)
= h
1
1−β2
h
P exit,1q1,0
i 1
1−β2
³
P exit,1q1,0
´− β2
1−β2 = h
1
1−β2P exit,1q1,0 .
Thus, the global minimum of the equity value is
1
1− τ E1(P
min
min , b1, q1, q2) = h
1
1−β2
q1P
exit,1
q1,0
ρ− µ −
b1
ρ
+ h 1
1−β2
b1
ρ
h
P exit,1q1,0
i−β2 h
h
1
1−β2P exit,1q1,0
iβ2
= h
1
1−β2
"
q1P
exit,1
q1,0
ρ− µ −
b1
ρ
+ 1
1−β2
b1
ρ
#
+
³
h
1
1−β2 − 1
´ b1
ρ
=
³
h
1
1−β2 − 1
´ b1
ρ
> 0. (C.15)
The last equality follows from the definition of P exit,1q1,0 , whereas the inequality
is result of Lemma C.1. This completes the proof.
Proposition C.1 (Proposition 5.2 main text) In all Markov-perfect equi-
libria in pure strategies of the (q¯1, q¯2)-subgame (exit after investment), the
firm with the higher leverage (firm 2) chooses its monopoly exit price as the
price trigger for bankruptcy P exit,2q2,q1 = P
exit,2
q2,0
, whereas firm 1 chooses any price
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P exit,1q1,q2 , such that P
exit,1
q1,q2
∈ eP :=]∆(q1+q2, q1)−1P exit,1q1,0 ,∆(q1+q2, q2)−1P exit,2q2,0 [.
Proof. First note that under the proposed equilibrium strategy firm 2
never becomes a monopolist. Therefore, only the actual price and not the
quantity of the competitor matters for firm 2, so that firm 2 behaves myopic.
Thus, the value of firm 2 under the proposed strategy is zero at P exit,2q1,q2 , which
then is indeed the optimal trigger price.
Secondly, we have to show that firm 2 cannot profitably choose an exit price
trigger smaller than P exit,1q1,q2 . To see this, suppose firm 2 chooses a lower price
trigger. Hence, it becomes a monopolist after firm 1 exits. However, as the
price after firm 1 has left the market is still below firm 2´s monopoly exit
trigger, the value associated with this strategy must be negative.
To see that P exit,1q1,q2 is indeed an equilibrium trigger price, first note that, if firm
2 chooses P exit,2q2,q1 , all trigger prices below P
exit,2
q2,q1
yield the same payoﬀ given
P . Because of the above Lemmata this payoﬀ must be positive. Moreover,
it cannot be rational to exit earlier than firm 2 as firm 1 would then forego
monopoly profits, i.e. the positive payoﬀs.
Choosing any price-trigger outside eP for firm 1, however, cannot be part
of an equilibrium strategy as firm 2 could profitably deviate and set a price
slightly smaller and obtain monopoly profits.
Last, we have to show, that eP is non-empty. This now follows straightforward
from our assumption regarding the leverage ratios.
C.2.2 Proof of Lemma 5.1
Lemma C.3 (Lemma 5.1 main text) (i) Other things equal
eE1(P, b1, q1, q2) + C1 = E1(∆q1+q2,q1+q2P, b1, q1, q2) (C.16)
has at most three solutions in P > max{P exit,2q2,q1 , P
exit,1
q
1
,q2
}. We denote the solu-
tions with P ∗(< P ∗∗)(< P ∗∗∗) respectively and the set of solutions by S.
(ii) The sign of
∂
[
E˜1 (P,b1,q1,q2)−E1 (∆q1+q2,q1+q2P,b1,q1,q2)
]
∂P
changes from one solu-
tion to the next.
166 APPENDIX C. APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 5
(iii) If the number of solutions is odd, we have
∂
h eE1(P, b1, q1, q2)− E1(∆q1+q2,q1+q2P, b1, q1, q2)i
∂P
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
P=P ∗
< 0;
(iv) if there are two solutions, we have
∂
h eE1(P, b1, q1, q2)− E1(∆q1+q2,q1+q2P, b1, q1, q2)i
∂P
¯¯¯¯
¯¯
P=P ∗
> 0.
Proof. (i) Due to Lemma C.1, if firm 2 exits first, eE1(P, b1, q1, q2) ex-
hibits a kink, and this kink must be at a smaller P than the kink in
E1(∆q1+q2,q1+q2P, b1, q1, q2). Define the continuous function
f(P ) := eE1(P, b1, q1, q2) + C1 −E1(∆q1+q2,q1+q2P, b1, q1, q2). (C.17)
In case ∆q1+q2,q1+q2P exit,1q
1
,q2
< P exit,2q2,0 it has the following functional form (for
P > max{P exit,2q2,q1 , P
exit,1
q
1
,q2
}):
f(P ) =
(
x11P + x12P
β2 + C if ∆q1+q2,q1+q2P < P exit,2q2,0
x21P + x22P
β2 + C if ∆q1+q2,q1+q2P ≥ P exit,2q2,0
. (C.18)
Otherwise
f (P ) = x31P + x32P
β2 . (C.19)
Hence, f must be either concave or convex on each subset. Consequently
f(P ) = 0 can have at most four solutions.
Now note that as sales are increasing with investment lim
P→+∞
f(P ) = −∞.
Moreover, consider that f keeps its functional form until firm 1 exits in
monopoly. As eE1(P, b1, q1, q2) ≥ 0, we can conclude f(P ) > 0 at the nor-
malized price where firm 1 exits in monopoly. Therefore, the number of
solutions to f(P ) = 0 must be odd on the set of price-levels larger than the
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monopoly exit-price. However,
n
P
¯¯¯
P > max{P exit,2q2,q1 , P
exit,1
q
1
,q2
}
o
is subset of
this set. This completes the proof.
(ii)-(iv) follow trivially.
C.2.3 Proof of Lemma 5.2
Lemma C.4 (Lemma 5.2 main text) (i) If firm 2 leaves the market first
P exit,2q2,0 < P
exit,2
q2,q1
holds.
(ii) Moreover, in all cases P exit,2q2,q1 < ∆
−1
q
1
+q2,q1+q2
P exit,2q2,0 .
Proof. (i) The first inequality follows from the fact that the possible
investment of firm 1 lowers equity-value of firm 2. Thus, P exit,2q2,0 < P
exit,2
q2,q1
.
(ii) We firstly show that
∀P < P inv,1q
1
,q2
: E2(∆−1q
1
+q2,q1+q2
P, q2, q1) > E2(P, q2, q1).
∆−1q
1
+q2,q1+q2
P maps situation (q2, q1) to (q2, q1) prices and situation (q2, q1)
diﬀers from (q2, q1) for firm 2 only in the diﬀerent prices which correspond
to the same Yt.
Therefore, the decrease in equity value of firm 2 that is caused by the existence
of an investment option of firm 1 is always smaller than the decrease caused
by investment itself. Thus, the stated inequality follows. This inequality
itself implies that the equity-value of firm 2 at price ∆−1q
1
+q2,q1+q2
P exit,2q2,0 must
be positive, because
E2(∆−1q
1
+q2,q1+q2
P exit,2q2,0 , q2, q1) > E2(P
exit,2
q2,0
, q2, q1) = 0.
Thus, P exit,2q2,q1 < ∆
−1
q
1
+q2,q1+q2
P exit,2q2,0 , which concludes the proof.
C.2.4 Proof of Proposition 5.4
Proposition C.2 (Proposition 5.4 main text) (i) If demand is suﬃciently
elastic, i.e. ∀Q1, Q2 : ∆Q1,Q2 ≈ 1, respectively if demand is not too inelastic
and the costs of investment C1 are suﬃciently high, then predatory invest-
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ment never occurs.
(ii) If g >
³
q1b1
q2b2
´1−β2
and
(a) if firm 1 exits first when it had no investment option and if
eP exit,1q
1
,q2
< ∆q
1
+q2,q1+q2
−1P exit,2q2,0 ,
then there exists an investment-cost C1, so that (5.22) has multiple
solutions.
(b) if firm 2 exits first and if for the right-hand partial derivative ∂E1
∂P+
∂ eE1
∂P
³
∆q
1
+q2,q1+q2
−1P exit,2q2,0 , q1, q2
´
>
∂E1
∂P+
³
P exit,2q2,0 , q1, q2
´
∆q
1
+q2,q1+q2
holds,1 then there exists the cost of investing C1, so that predatory
investment occurs.
Proof. (i) As ∆q1+q2,q1 → 1 the value of a monopolist and of the value
a duopolist (after investment) converge and firm 1 cannot gain anything by
firm 2´s exit. Therefore, predatory investment must become unprofitable.
(ii) First note from the proof of Lemma C.2 that if g >
³
q1b1
q2b2
´1−β2
and if
P 0 ∈
³
P exit,2q2,0 , Pmin
´
, then ∂E1
∂P
(P 0, q1, q2) < 0. Moreover, P
exit,2
q2,0
corresponds
to the same Y as ∆q
1
+q2,q1+q2
−1P exit,2q2,0 does in situation-
³
q
1
, q2
´
.
(a) If firm 1 exits first if not predatorily investing in situation
³
q
1
, q2
´
, equity
value is upward sloping and eP exit,1q
1
,q2
< ∆q
1
+q2,q1+q2
−1P exit,2q2,0 by assumption.
Thus, shifting eE1 + C1 by altering C1 yields a solution of (5.22) oni
∆q
1
+q2,q1+q2
−1P exit,2q2,0 ,∆q1+q2,q1+q2
−1Pmin
h
1This condition means that an increase in the state of demand, Y, aﬀects the value
of a firm with low capacity stronger than the firm with high capacity. This is possible if
the hedging eﬀect from the other firm potentially leaving is relatively strong, i.e. value
decreases when demand increases. Then, for a large firm the potential gain from a price
increase is of course larger.
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and another one on
i
∆q
1
+q2,q1+q2
−1Pmin,+∞
h
.
(b) If firm 2 would exit first, due to Lemma 2, the peak in E1 (P, q1, q2) lies
at ∆q
1
+q2,q1+q2
−1P exit,2q2,0 > P
exit,2
q2,q1
. Consider the costs C 0 that yield
eE1 ³P, q1, q2´+ C 0 < E1 ³∆q1+q2,q1+q2P, q1, q2´ (C.20)
for all P ≥ ∆q
1
+q2,q1+q2
−1P exit,2q2,0 except for one point P
0 (see figure C.1). At
this point either both functions are tangentially or P 0 = ∆q
1
+q2,q1+q2
−1P exit,2q2,0 .
The assumption on the derivative rules out the latter case.
Therefore, at costs C 0 firm 1 invests for all prices P ≥ ∆q
1
+q2,q1+q2
−1P exit,2q2,0
and
Eˆ1
³
P, q
1
, q2
´
≡ E1
³
∆q
1
+q2,q1+q2P, q1, q2
´
− C 0.
Now take costs to be equal to C 0 + ε, ε > 0. Assuming that there is only one
price trigger for investment P inv, will lead to a contradiction: For this trig-
ger P 0 ≤ P inv holds. However, defining the stopping-time τ (P1) := inf{t ∈
R|Pt = P1} the diﬀerence in value for ∆q
1
+q2,q1+q2
−1P exit,2q2,0 < P < P
0 evalu-
ates as
Eˆ1
³
P, q
1
, q2|C 0
´
− Eˆ1
³
P, q
1
, q2|C 0 + ε
´
= E
"Z τ(P inv)
0
³
E1
³
∆q
1
+q2,q1+q2Pt, q1, q2
´
− C 0 −fE1 (Pt, q1, q2)´ e−ρtdt
¯¯¯¯
¯P0 = P
#
≥ E
"Z τ(P 0)
0
³
E1
³
∆q
1
+q2,q1+q2Pt, q1, q2
´
− C 0 − eE1 (Pt, q1, q2)´ e−ρtdt
¯¯¯¯
¯P0 = P
#
> 0.
Both inequalities follow from (C.20) (and τ (P inv) ≤ τ (P 0) ). Thus, a mar-
ginal change in costs would lead to a non-marginal drop in value (the last
integral does not depend on ε), whereas this would not be true for a system
of two price-triggers of investment depending on ε. Thus for ε small enough
two price-triggers are optimal.
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E
P
E1
E1+C'
P'
Loss in value when using just a
single trigger
Figure C.1: Loss in value from a single trigger
C.2.5 Proof of Proposition 5.5
Proposition C.3 (Proposition 5.5 main text) (i) If for firm i the my-
opic exit price-trigger Pm_exit,iqi,q−i obtained from (5.29) , is smaller than P ind,iqi,q−i,
then firm −i choosing Pm_exit,−iq−i,qi and firm i choosing a lower price-trigger is
an equilibrium of the (qi, q−i) stage.
(ii) If
h
∆qi+q−i,qi−1P
exit,i
q−i,0 , P
ind,i
qi,q−i
i
= ∅, then firm i chooses Pm_exit,iqi,q−i as the
exit-price-trigger in all equilibria of the (qi, q−i) stage.
(iii) If Pm_exit,−iq−i,qi > P ind,iqi,q−i and
h
∆qi+q−i,qi−1P
exit,i
q−i,0 , P
ind,i
qi,q−i
i
6= ∅, then firm
i choosing some P exit,iqi,q−i ∈
h
∆qi+q−i,qi−1P
exit,i
q−i,0 , P
ind,i
qi,q−i
i
and firm −i choosing
P
m_exit,−i
q−i,qi is an equilibrium of the (qi, q−i) stage, if this yields no incentive
to predatorily invest for firm −i.
(iv) If both firms have an incentive to predatorily invest, instead of choosing
their myopic exit price-trigger, then both firm preempt on predatory invest-
ment.
(v) If firm i predatorily invests, firm −i cannot credibly threaten to deviate
from choosing the myopic exit price-trigger to hinder i in investing predato-
rily.
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Proof. (i) Firm value is increasing in the exit price of the competitor.
If undercutting the price-trigger of firm i is not credible even when i chooses
the myopic price-trigger, then −i cannot threaten to exit second.
(ii) If leaving second always yields positive equity value for all credible exit
price triggers of the competitor i, then firm −i will leave second, as this
increases value at the myopic exit price-trigger. Note that since P ind,iqi,q−i ≥
∆−1qi+q−i,q−iP
exit,−i
q−i,0 , the interval can never be empty for both firms.
(iii) This was largely discussed in the main text, it remains to mention that
if firm −i invests predatorily, this decreases equity value below the value ob-
tained by behaving myopically, since the competitor will only invest predato-
rily (if not preempting) if she expects to leave second after investment.
(iv) See main text.
(v) If firm -i would exit earlier it would forgo profits, therefore, this is not
credible. Exiting later is also not credible. If firm -i exits later, payoﬀ becomes
negative. Thus, firm -i cannot credible threaten to set an exit price diﬀerent
to the one determined by the smooth-pasting conditions if firm i predatorily
invests.
C.2.6 Proof of Proposition 5.6
Lemma C.5 Let f(P ) = x0 + x1P + x2P β1 + x3P β2; P > 0 and x1 > 0,
x2 < 0, then f has at most three roots. Moreover if at P 0 f(P 0) > 0, there
can only be two roots of f for P < P 0.
Proof. We have to consider two cases:
Case 1: x3 ≤ 0, then f is concave and therefore has at most two roots.
Case 2: x3 > 0. We firstly show that the second derivative changes its sign
at most once:
Suppose f 00(P ∗) = P ∗−2
£
β1 (β1 − 1) x2P ∗β1 + β2 (β2 − 1)x3P ∗β2
¤
= 0. Then
f 000 (P ∗) = −2P ∗−3
£
β1 (β1 − 1) x2P ∗β1 + β2 (β2 − 1)x3P ∗β2
¤
+ P ∗−2
£
β1 (β1 − 1) β1x2P ∗β1 + β2 (β2 − 1) β2x3P ∗β2
¤
. (C.21)
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However, the first term is zero and therefore:
f 000 (P ∗) = P ∗−2[β1 (β1 − 1)β1| {z }
>0
x2P
∗β1| {z }
<0
+ β2 (β2 − 1) β2| {z }
<0
x3P
∗β2| {z }
>0
] < 0 . (C.22)
This implies that the second derivative changes its sign at most once, dividing
the function in a convex and a concave part. Now suppose f (P ∗) < 0, then
there may be two roots larger than P ∗. However, as f (P ∗) < 0, at the next
smallest root f 0 (P ) must be negative, but as f is convex , there are no more
roots. The case f (P ∗) ≥ 0 follows analogously.
Lemma C.6 Φi(P ) can be represented by Φi(P ) = x0i + x1iP + x2iP β1 +
x3iP
β2 for P ∈M := [max
j=1,2
{P j},min
j=1,2
{P j}]; with x1i > 0, x2i < 0. Moreover,
Φi(P ) is also continuous on [min
j=1,2
{P j},max
j=1,2
{P j}]
Proof. First note that Φi(P ) has the stated functional form since it is a
diﬀerence of functions of the type given in (5.6) (which are analytic onM). It
is clear, that the followers equity value must be a convex function. Moreover,
the leader´s value decreases by the potential entry of the follower, therefore
x2 < 0. That sales are increased by investment implies x1 > 0. Continuity
follows from the value-matching conditions
Proposition C.4 (Proposition 5.6 main text) (i) On
M := [max
j=1,2
{P j},min
j=1,2
{P j}]
Φi(P ) = 0 (C.23)
has at most three solutions.
(ii) If P i ≤ P−i, then Φi(P ) = 0 has at most two solution on M and only
one additional one for P i ≤ P ≤ P−i namely P−i with Φ0i(P−i) < 0.
(iii) If P i > P−i, Φi(P i) = 0 and Φi(P ) < 0 for all P i > P > P−i.
(iv) If Φi(P ) = 0 has two solutions in case (ii) or three solutions in case (iii)
on M then Φi(max{P i}) > 0. There may only exist an additional solution
for min
j=1,2
{P j} < P < max
j=1,2
{P j} if P i < P−i.
Proof. (i) follows straightforward from the last two Lemmata.
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(ii) At P i firm i invests as follower, therefore
Ei(∆q
i
+q−i ,qi+q−iP, bi, qi, q−i) = Ei(∆qi+q−i ,qi+q−iP, bi, qi, q−i)− C ∀P ≥ P i.
(C.24)
This implies Φi(P ) > 0 if P i ≤ P < P−i and Φi(P−i) = 0, since sales of the
leader are larger before the follower has invested and
Ei(∆qi+q−i ,qi+q−iP−i, bi , qi , q−i)− C = Ei(∆qi+q−i ,qi+q−iP−i, bi , qi , q−i)− C.
(C.25)
(iii) At P−i firm −i invests as follower, therefore
∀P ≥ P−i : Ei(∆q
i
+q−i ,qi+q−iP, bi , qi , q−i)− C
= Ei(∆qi+q−i ,qi+q−iP, bi, qi, q−i)− C. (C.26)
Therefore, as long as P < P i firm i finds it unprofitable to invest as fol-
lower and obtain Ei(∆q
i
+q−i ,qi+q−iP, bi, qi, q−i) − C. Hence, the right-hand
term must be smaller than the equity value of i being the follower when
P < P i.
(iv) Φi(max
j=1,2
{P j}) > 0 follows from the continuity of Φi and in case (ii) from
Φi
¡
P¯i
¢
> 0, respectively Φi
¡
P¯−i
¢
< 0 in case (iii). Define f (P ) as stated in
Lemma C.5. Now suppose that firm i exits at P i ≥ P−i, then Φi(P ) > f (P )
for P < P i, since the value of firm i as follower is a convex function with
derivative zero at P i. Therefore, for Φi(P ) to have an additional root, f(P )
must have an additional root, too. However, due to Lemma C.5, f (P ) cannot
have that additional root.
If firm i predatorily invests at P i. Then for all min
j=1,2
{P j} < P < max
j=1,2
{P j}
Φi(P ) = Ei(∆q
i
+q−i ,qi+q−iP, bi, qi, q−i)− Ei(∆qi+q−i ,qi+q−iP, bi, qi, q−i) > 0
(C.27)
because the sales of the follower are lower, and firm −i exits later.
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C.2.7 Proof of Proposition 5.9
Lemma C.7 If firm i invests predatorily as follower, then Φ (P i) > 0.
Proof. At the price where firm −i exits after firm i has predatorily in-
vested as follower Φ = 0 must hold. However, in state (qi , q−i) firm −i will
exit later than in state
³
qi, q−i
´
. Moreover, prices are lower before −i exits
if i is the follower. Therefore, firm i’s value as leader must be larger than
firm i’s value as follower at the price at which firm i predatorily invests as
follower, i.e.
Ei(∆qi+q−i ,qi+q−iP i, bi , qi , q−i)− C ≥ Ei(∆qi+q−i ,qi+q−iP i, bi, qi , q−i)− C .
(C.28)
Lemma C.8 Only a firm i that eﬀectively stays in the market longer than its
competitor in state
³
q
i
, q−i
´
could have second mover advantages of profitable
predatory investment.
Proof. Suppose that firm i leaves the market first in state
³
q
i
, q−i
´
.
Furthermore, suppose firm −i invests at P 0 and at P 0 predatory investment
would be profitable for firm i, too, i.e.
Ei(∆q
i
+q−i ,qi+q−iP
0, bi , qi , q−i)− C ≥ bEi(P 0, bi, qi, q−i) . (C.29)
Investment of firm −i will lower prices and therefore decrease the revenues
of firm i compared to the situation
³
q
i
, q−i
´
. Then, as firm i leaves first, it
cannot gain of any investment-induced change in the probability of firm −i
exiting. Therefore, its value as follower must be less than bEi(P 0, bi , q
i
, q−i),
so that there cannot be any second mover advantages, i.e. bEi(P 0, bi, q
i
, q−i) >
Ei(∆q
i
+q−i ,qi+q−i+
P 0, bi , q
i
, q−i).
Lemma C.9 If firm i does not predatorily invest as follower, then
Ei(∆q
i
+q−i ,qi+q−iP, bi, qi, q−i) ≤ bEi(P, bi , qi , q−i) .
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Proof. The option of firm −i investing decreases firm i´s value to a lesser
extent than the drop in revenues caused by investment itself does. Because
of that bEi(P, bi , q
i
, q−i) < Ei(∆qi+q−i ,qi+q−iP, bi, qi, q−i) can only hold, if firm
i would have to expect some costs not included in bEi for low P or if there
would be any expected gain in revenues associated with investment of firm
−i. However, as firm i as follower was assumed to not predatorily invest,
there cannot be any expected gain, since firm −i’s investment decreases the
probability of firm −i leaving the market. Moreover, there are no costs ignored
in deriving bEi (except for the cost of possible predatory investment, which -
if profitable - increases value). Therefore, the stated inequality follows.
Proposition C.5 (Proposition 5.9 main text) A solution to (5.37) im-
plies that a predatory investment preemption threshold for firm i exists, i.e.
there cannot be second-mover advantages for profitable predatory investment
independent of how low P gets.
Proof. In case firm i exits first or exists last, but does not predatorily
invest, the proposition follows straightforward from the last two lemmata.
Hence, we only need to discuss the case where firm i would predatorily invest
as follower. However, due to Lemma C.8 Φ (P i) > 0. Therefore, and because
of Proposition C.4(iv) we either have first-mover advantages of investment
for all P, or we have an preemption threshold price for predatory investment
which is larger than P i.
C.2.8 Proof of Proposition 5.10
Proposition C.6 (Proposition 5.10 main text) (i) If there is a preemp-
tion game for predatory investment and P pred,ipre < P
inv,−i
pre for both firms, the
only Markov-perfect equilibrium (outcome) is that the firm with the higher
P pred,ipre takes the lead for predatory investment and invests at a price-trigger
which is a solution to a version of (5.34) that is modified by defining P inv,−iq−i ,qi :=
P pred,ipre , P
pred,−i
q−i ,qi
:= P pred,−ipre and by using the appropriate value matching con-
ditions.
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(ii) If there is a preemption game for predatory investment, and P pred,ipre >
P inv,−ipre for firm i, and one of the firms has an unilateral incentive to invest on£
P inv,−ipre , P
pred,i
pre
¤
, then in all Markov-perfect equilibria firm −i invests preda-
torily at P pred,ipre .
(iii) If there is a preemption game for predatory investment and P pred,ipre >
P inv,−ipre for one of the firms, and none of the firms have an unilateral incentive
to invest on
£
P inv,−ipre , P
pred,i
pre
¤
, then in all renegotiation-proof Markov-perfect
equilibria firm i predatorily invests at its unconstrained optimal predatory
investment price-trigger or at P pred,−ipre , whichever is the higher price.
Proof. (i) Suppose firm i wishes to invest at a price P 0 < P pred,−ipre . De-
fine τ to be the corresponding stopping time. Then firm −i would have an
incentive to preempt and invest at a smaller price at time τ − ε. Therefore,
predatorily investing below P pred,−ipre cannot be part of an equilibrium. How-
ever, at prices between P pred,−ipre and P
inv,−i
pre firm −i wishes to become follower
and so will not preempt. Moreover at prices below P pred,ipre firm i wishes to
become leader, therefore the described solution P ∗ to the generalized smooth
pasting condition (5.34) (allowing for border and non-border solutions) is in-
deed optimal for firm i, given firm −i would invest as soon as prices hit the
preemption thresholds. Hence, this is indeed an optimal strategy for firm
given that firm i would invest at all prices lower than P ∗.
(ii) If one of the unconstrained investment price triggers–say for firm j–
lies between P pred,ipre and P
inv,j
pre , then not only threatening to invest is for firm j
credible, but also threatening to not invest is not credible. Thus, the firms wish
to preempt until P pred,ipre is reached, where firm i is indiﬀerent between becom-
ing leader or follower. As investment-price trigger, firm −i will clearly choose
(if this is possible) its unconstrained-optimal predatory-investment price trig-
ger, which determined by a smooth-pasting condition or otherwise P pred,ipre as
investment price-trigger.
(iii) We only need to argue that investing on [P pred,ipre , P
inv,−i
pre ] cannot be renegotiation-
proof. Suppose one firm would invest at P ∗ ∈ [P pred,ipre , P inv,−ipre ]. Then, since
neither firm has an unilateral incentive to invest at some price P ∈ [P pred,ipre , P inv,−ipre ],
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both firms would find it profitable to renegotiate and sign an incentive com-
patible contract that investment should be carried out at the proposed price-
triggers for predatory and non-predatory investment.
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